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Foreword 
 
 
Linking pay to performance is something employers increasingly seek to achieve. This was 
once seen as an objective which could only be met in the private sector. That is no longer 
true. In the 1990s the British public services have experienced a revolution which has 
attracted the interest and concern of public service managers and unions around the world.  
The days when government officials marched in step up incremental pay scales are gone.   
Virtually all civil servants are now subject to new forms of performance management, or 
performance pay.  This approach now extends to many other areas of the public services. 
But are these new systems of financial reward as effective as their creators had 
hoped?  This is one of the questions which prompted the substantial programme of research 
carried out by David Marsden and Stephen French under the auspices of the Industrial 
Relations programme of the Centre for Economic Performance (with financial assistance 
from the Anglo-German Foundation).  It is the most extensive study of its kind, looking at 
performance pay systems in the Inland Revenue and the Employment Service; within the  
NHS; and in the teaching profession. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction and Overview 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
From the mid-1980s, the British public services have led the world in pioneering new performance 
management systems. Major changes in management information systems have been introduced 
with a view to clarifying management’s goals, and to analysing the efficiency with which resources 
are used in achieving them. The two civil service departments included in our study have been at the 
forefront in translating these into office and job level targets. In 1989, they were praised by the 
public sector efficiency watchdog, the National Audit Office, in its report on manpower planning in 
the civil service for their innovative use of efficiency benchmarking between offices (NAO 1989). 
For hospitals and schools a similar management revolution has taken place. In the NHS ‘internal 
market’, hospitals now have to contract for their key business with general practitioners and health 
authorities with the clear message that if they cannot do so competitively with other health care 
providers they will lose their contracts. At the time of our survey, one such NHS trust hospital, the 
Anglian Harbours NHS Trust, was faced with closure after losing two major contracts. This has the 
effect of forcing hospital senior management to look very carefully at the efficiency with which NHS 
services are provided. In many state schools, a comparable process of devolution of management 
and financial control to school heads and governing bodies has taken place giving head teachers 
both new opportunities and new responsibilities in running their establishments. Although in public 
debate much has been made of the ‘ideological’ motivation of Mrs. Thatcher’s and Mr. Major’s 
governments, the high cost of public services in the national budgets of all countries, and the 
increasingly complex demands placed on them by their citizens, have been at least as important a 
driving force behind the reforms. It is almost certainly the latter which explain the world-wide 
interest in the success or otherwise of Britain’s public service reforms. 
 None of the critical management changes introduced in the past decade and a half can 
really be expected to work unless there are corresponding changes in the way public servants 
approach their work, and think about the use of the resources at their disposal. Performance related 
pay has played a central role in the reform of performance management within the British public 
services. It is now applied to practically all of the civil service, large parts of the education sector, 
and in a small number of NHS hospital trusts. In these organisations it has replaced the traditional 
system of length of service increments under which employees marched in step up to the top of their 
respective pay scales where they then stayed unless they gained promotion. Although, in theory, 
such increments were never automatic, in practice, as the 1982 Megaw Inquiry in Civil Service Pay 
observed, the procedures for withholding increments were rarely if ever used. 
 There have been a number of reasons for moving to performance related pay, three of 
which stand out: 
 
· to promote a change of management culture, and in particular, to get staff to think more about 
the objectives of, and cost constraints on, their organisations; 
· to motivate staff better by making annual salary increments dependent on performance rather 
than length of service; and 
· to introduce a greater element of pay-cost flexibility and discretion more appropriate to 
management of smaller units. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
The first systematic study of performance pay across the public sector 
 
Our study is the first one designed to evaluate the effectiveness of performance related pay across a 
wide range of public sector services, and so has a critical message for all those concerned with the 
reform of public service management. It is also one of the few systematic attempts to evaluate the 
impact of performance pay on motivation in the public domain1. Even in the private domain, Cannell 
and Wood’s (1992) IPD/NEDO survey of pay systems in UK organisations, like that of Thompson 
(1992) on performance pay, found that very few undertook any systematic evaluation of their 
schemes. In the US, the Wyatt (1989) survey found that less than a third of organisations had 
undertaken any kind of survey work. Most relied on managers ‘keeping their ear to the ground’. 
Such evidence casts serious doubt on the value of one of the commonest ways of surveying the 
effectiveness of performance pay schemes: asking top managers how well their schemes are 
working. Whatever might be the potential biases involved reporting on one’s own scheme, this lack 
of systematic evaluation means that many top managers’ views are not based on sound evidence. 
No doubt they will be aware of certain problems, and the Wyatt survey showed most were quite 
critical of their schemes, but as will be seen in this study, the effects are quite complex, and the 
points at which problems emerge may be far removed from where the basic problems lie. For 
example, as will be seen in our Employment Service study, the much reported inflation of job 
placements could be seen as a technical problem of poorly designed performance monitoring, but 
our evidence suggests the malaise went much deeper. 
 In designing our study, we chose to conduct case studies in six parts of the public services: 
two government departments, two NHS trust hospitals, and among primary and secondary school 
head teachers. In this way, we obtain a wide diversity of types of public service organisation, from 
large government departments to small primary schools, and across a wide range of types of 
occupational activity, from the highly professionalised health service occupations, to office workers 
in the civil service. We also include a good cross-section of staff in management and non-
management positions. Our study also covers a number of different kinds of performance pay 
system, enabling conclusions to be drawn about the relative merits of different kinds and designs of 
scheme. 
 In contrast to many previous studies of performance pay, which ask senior managers to 
rate the effectiveness of their organisation’s schemes, our own survey asks the employees 
themselves and their line managers. 
 In judging the effects of performance pay we measure two main outcomes: 
 
· employees’ views on how their scheme has affected their own motivation and that of their 
colleagues; and 
· the judgements of line managers who carry out appraisals as to the effects on staff 
performance2. 
 
                                                 
1. Other recent British studies include an earlier one of the Inland Revenue by Marsden and Richardson (1992 
and 1994), one by Thompson of local government staff (1993), and of health service managers by Dowling and 
Richardson (1997). 
 
2. We do not have this data for school head teachers. 
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 The latter group are especially important. If there is any effect that is directly attributable to 
performance pay they should see it because they are in the front line of their organisations’ 
performance appraisal systems. 
 All of our surveys relate to staff views at one point in time, except in the Inland Revenue 
where we were able to make over-time comparisons, following up the results obtained by Marsden 
and Richardson five years earlier. 
 
Analytical framework 
 
In designing our questionnaire, we took our general analytical framework from ‘expectancy theory’ 
as it is very flexible and its proponents, such as Lawler (1971), claim that it can encompass most of 
the main psychological theories linking work motivation and performance. It is also very close to the 
models used by economic theory (eg. Milgrom and Roberts 1992, Lazear 1995), and perhaps 
more importantly, is close to the philosophy underlying many performance pay systems. Thus, if 
performance pay is to work, then it should do so for the kinds of reasons expectancy theory 
highlights, and if it is found not to do so, then we know we have covered the main questions to 
which the theory needs an answer. 
 
Figure 1.1  
Outline of the ‘expectancy’ framework 
 
 
Effort Performance Reward 
Value of 
reward  
to employees 
Obstacles:   
• Inadequate skills 
• Weak goal setting 
• Poor coordination 
Obstacles:  
• Poor performance measurement 
• Mgt. lack necessary money 
• Mgt.bad faith 
Obstacles:   
• Performance rewards not valued 
• Other motivators more important 
• Conflicts with other motivators 
• Mgt. motives distrusted 
Obstacles:  
• No scope to increase effort 
• Very tight management 
• Already work at max. 
 
 
 
 The analytical framework can be summarised as in Figure . For performance pay to 
succeed in motivating employees to higher effort (or care) a number of conditions have to be met: 
their effort must translate into better performance, that performance must be recognised and 
rewarded by management, and the reward must be valued by the employee. A break at any point in 
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the circuit can lead to a breakdown in the expected motivational effects of performance pay. Figure 
1.1 also provides some illustrations of the kinds of obstacles that can occur at each link in the chain. 
Greater effort may not lead to better performance if employees lack the necessary skills, or if 
management is poorly organised. Performance may not be rewarded because management are 
unable to measure it accurately, or because they lack the money to do so. Whatever the actual state 
of affairs, the important thing for expectancy theory is that employees should believe that the 
linkages are solid and that rewards will follow from their increased effort. The next link may be 
especially important in the public services, namely employees should value the rewards offered for 
improved performance. Finally, even though the rewards may be valued, employees may not believe 
their jobs give them any scope for increased effort. They may already be very tightly supervised and 
have little discretion in their jobs, or they may already be working at what they consider to be an 
appropriate standard. 
 Thus although tying pay to performance may at first sight appear a simple and logical 
process, in practice there is a large number of problems that management has to overcome. The 
framework as outlined may be something of an ‘ideal world’ model and it may seem unrealistic that 
all these conditions could be fulfilled in any organisation. Its main purpose in our research is to direct 
attention to potential problem areas should it be found that performance pay does not have all the 
desired effects, and in that way we may identify at least some of the immediate causes of problems. 
 The complexity of the linkages between pay and performance are such that only well-
thought out schemes have any chance of success. In warning how to ‘ruin motivation with pay’, 
Hamner (1975) stresses the many pitfalls in a scheme’s operation, as does Pearce (1987) in 
explaining ‘why merit pay doesn’t work’. However, the schemes we examine in the British public 
service are not naïve, and follow many of the canons of current ‘best practice’ as outlined by the 
ACAS advisory booklet on Appraisal related pay (ACAS, 1990), the Institute of Personnel and 
Development, leading pay consultants such as Armstrong and Murlis (1994). 
 In all the organisations we study, individual members of staff are assigned their own 
individual performance targets in the appraisal process which, in theory at least, should also take 
account of training needs and problems of coordination with other staff. Moreover, the targets 
against which performance is assessed should be agreed between members of staff and their line 
managers. 
 There are also extensive measures designed to ensure ‘procedural justice’ within the 
scheme which a number of studies have shown affects the legitimacy staff accord even to 
unfavourable ratings (Cropanzo and Fulger, 1991). All of the schemes provide some form of appeal 
procedures against appraisals felt to be unfair, and two civil service departments undertake 
extensive checks between offices to ensure overall consistency of standards, as does the trust with 
the individual scheme. The use of indicative distributions of appraisal ratings and of budgets from 
which performance pay is awarded could also be seen in this light: a guarantee of management’s 
good faith that it will award a significant number of good ratings and that it will indeed pay up at the 
end of the year. It was doubtless for this reason that the agreement setting up the first Inland 
Revenue scheme in 1988 included a clause indicating how much management was expecting to pay 
out under the scheme. Although collective bargaining may be regarded by some as inimical to a 
‘performance culture’, joint procedures for monitoring and appeals can make the outcomes appear 
more legitimate by making them less dependent on management. 
 Whether employees value the rewards is perhaps harder for a scheme to influence, but as 
will be seen shortly, our own surveys, and those of others, show that apart from head teachers, 
public servants accept the principle of linking pay to performance, and most believe their work 
provides a valuable public service. Basing staff performance targets on individual agreements with 
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line managers should, in theory, give staff the opportunity to air their views on the priorities for their 
jobs, and management, an opportunity to explain the reasons for its targets. 
 Finally, although a substantial minority of line managers in our sample believe performance 
pay problematic because many staff do not enjoy enough discretion in their jobs, there are also 
many staff who do, and it is very likely, given the large number of professionals employed, that job 
autonomy is at least as great as in many private sector organisations. 
 Because we are looking at different types of ‘best practice’ performance pay scheme, our 
research is able to provide answers to the effectiveness of performance related pay in the public 
services, and what can be learned about improvements in performance management. 
 
Choice of sectors 
 
The choice of sectors for our study was motivated by the desire to look across the full diversity of 
public service employment while at the same time building on an earlier study by Marsden and 
Richardson which would provide also a comparison with earlier years. We therefore chose, in 
addition to the Inland Revenue, the Employment Service. Being more like other large government 
departments, which now have agency status, it should be possible to test how far the results for the 
Inland Revenue are typical of other large government departments. The ES had the added 
advantage of having adopted a different kind of scheme to that of the Revenue, one based on 
‘Equity Shares’. The IR scheme awards performance pay purely on the basis of evaluated 
performance, with no quota system to control costs, whereas the ES scheme awards, for each level 
of performance, a predetermined number of shares of a total performance pay kitty that has been 
agreed with the unions. 
 In the National Health Service, our choice was limited to the small number of NHS 
hospital trusts that have adopted performance pay. By an initial survey we tracked down eleven 
trusts that operated some kind of scheme, and of these only seven did so for the majority of their 
staff. The two trusts chosen had schemes that had run for about three years, and which had 
therefore been in operation long enough for staff to have reached an informed judgement of their 
impact. Of the two trusts studied, one operated an individual performance pay scheme, and the 
other, a trust-wide performance bonus. Their schemes covered all staff except doctors. 
 In the education sector, the most important area to study in terms of its size is that of 
schools. There we chose to study performance pay for head teachers. This was partly out of 
necessity as the scheme for classroom teachers was not operational at the time of our research, but 
also we felt that head teachers, who have had performance pay for several years, are a group with 
much greater autonomy in their work than the other groups of public servants in our study. 
 The sectors chosen also offer a wide range of different kinds of problem in developing 
performance measures that are useful to management and acceptable to staff. Performance 
measures need to be both valid and reliable. That is to say, they should measure the most relevant 
dimensions of performance, and they should do so with a minimum amount of error. Neither 
problem is trivial. 
 Determining the relevant dimensions of performance has been a major area of controversy 
across the public services as staff and their representatives have often argued that quantity is being 
stressed at the expense of quality. The way these problems emerge is of course different in each of 
the sectors we have chosen to study. In the two civil service departments avoiding mistakes in tax 
assessments or finding more suitable job placements may seem part of the quality staff can offer to 
the public, but the time taken in doing so always has a cost. In the hospitals, the quality of patients’ 
stay in hospital and the attention they receive from staff has a cost. In hospitals, management faces 
the additional pressure that the professional associations have strong ideas about the desirable 
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quality of care to be provided, and this does not always square easily with either budgetary 
pressures or with multi-disciplinary patterns of working, such as care teams. In schools, quality of 
education is an even more controversial subject. Thus, in deciding on valid criteria for performance 
measurement management is facing much more than a simple technical issue, but one which relates 
to people’s beliefs about the goals of the service they work for. As will be seen in the case studies, 
a great many staff are strongly committed to a certain idea of public service, and there is much 
disagreement about the suitability of the targets chosen by management. 
 Reliability of performance measures is also a difficult issue. Unless such measures are 
reliable, performance pay will be more like a lottery than a payment system. Finding measures which 
both command a degree of consensus as to their validity and are also reliable complicates the issue 
greatly. As we pass from the civil service, through the NHS to school head teachers, the task 
becomes progressively more difficult, and is no doubt reflected in the nature of the different kinds of 
scheme adopted. In the civil service, it has proved possible to establish very large-scale schemes 
covering many thousands of employees. In contrast, in the NHS, individual local initiatives have 
been necessary to get performance pay started. In schools, despite central government guidelines, 
the precise details of performance criteria have often been worked out by the governing bodies of 
individual schools and their head teachers. In this last case, our survey results show, for example, a 
strong preference for performance criteria that are felt to be valid over those which are felt to be 
most reliable and easiest to measure objectively. 
 
 
1.2 The Survey 
 
Because we were interested in the effects of performance pay on staff motivation and their relations 
with management and other colleagues, we decided to use a questionnaire survey sent out to 
individual employees, and their line managers. The questions were developed in discussion with 
management and staff representatives, and were piloted on groups of staff and lay representatives. 
 In the two trust hospitals our survey had the active support of management and staff 
organisations, and the questionnaire went out with a joint letter from both parties. In the two civil 
service departments, management expressed interest, but declined to support to the survey, and so 
we had to draw our sample from the union membership records. In the Inland Revenue, the rate of 
membership is very high, around 90%, but in the Employment Service it is somewhat lower, at 
about 60%. There our questionnaire was sent out with a covering letter from the union general 
secretaries explaining its purpose. For the head teachers, we again worked through the head teacher 
professional associations drawing our sample from their membership records. Among school heads 
and deputies also membership is very high, at about 80%. 
 The questions mostly invited responses on a five point ‘Likert scale’ ranging from ‘strongly 
disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’, and the questionnaires for each survey and their full results are shown 
in Appendix 2. In individual chapters, to keep tables simple, we have mostly focused on summary 
details such as reporting only ‘agrees’ and ‘disagrees’. 
 Our questionnaires also included a section for staff to give written answers to certain 
questions. Although not extensively analysed in this report, they have provided a valuable insight into 
some of the other replies. 
 With this kind of survey method, there is an inevitable worry about self-selection bias in 
response. Do those who respond have a particular axe to grind for or against performance pay, or 
are they disproportionately people who consider themselves to be ‘winners’ or ‘losers’ under their 
schemes. Our response rate was generally between 20% and 40%, we therefore undertook a 
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number of checks against data we had on job grades, gender, and age, and on appraisal marking. 
These are described in detail in Appendix 2. Because response was higher among staff in higher job 
grades, we weighted our civil service and trust hospital replies by staff group. On our check against 
appraisal ratings, our sample mirrored the actual ratings within the organisations very closely so 
there was no reason to believe we had a disproportionate number of ‘winners’ or of ‘losers’. For 
the Inland Revenue, we had the additional opportunity of comparing with the 1991 sample which 
had achieved a much higher response, and we found the pattern of non-response very similar. The 
main reasons we could identify for the lower response were the length of the questionnaire — 
completion could take 20-30 minutes — and that staff were not given time off work to complete it. 
The hospital reponse may have been depressed additionally by the number of staff away on holiday 
in August. 
 Finally, we gave a number of feedback presentations to the organisations which had 
supported our research. This proved a valuable opportunity to discuss interpretations with 
management and staff. 
 
 
1.3 An Overview of the Findings Across the Three Sectors 
 
Our key findings can be summarised as follows: 
 
· most staff, except head teachers, agree with the principle of performance pay; 
· up to a half of line managers in the civil service and hospitals believe PRP has raised 
productivity, improved goal setting, and to a lesser extent, raised quality; 
· many staff believe it has improved goal setting; 
· most staff believe it has not raised their own motivation; 
· most staff believe PRP is divisive, undermines morale, causes jealousies, and inhibits workplace 
cooperation; 
· many believe line managers use PRP to reward their favourites; 
· many believe higher management unfairly restricts performance pay by means of quotas; 
· many line managers believe performance pay has reduced staff cooperation with management; 
· group PRP scores much better for morale and cooperation than individual PRP, but less well on 
goal setting. Other differences between PRP schemes had little effect; 
· there are strong reasons to doubt the sustainability of the productivity improvements, especially 
in the civil service. 
 
Summary figures are shown in Table 1.1.  Note that we report only one dimension of the replies, the 
percent who ‘agree’ and ‘agree strongly’. Full details of ‘disagrees’ and ‘no views’ are reported in 
the individual chapters, and in the summary of replies in Appendix 2. 
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Table 1.1 
Summary of main replies 
 
 Civil Service 
 
NHS trust hospitals Schools 
 
Question: % replying ‘agree’ IR-91 IR-96 ES Individual 
PRP trust 
Group PRP 
trust 
NAHT, 
primary 
SHA, 
secondary 
 
Pay and work orientations 
       
PP a good principle 57 58 72 62 52 29 42 
I contribute to an important public 
service 
62 56 64 84 89 94 92 
Personal satisfaction of my work is 
enough incentive 
63 32 50 75 61 Na na 
 
Improved goal setting and higher 
productivity 
       
PP makes managers set work targets 
more clearly* 
27 32 50 53 31 36 29 
Line manager views:        
PP has increased quantity of work 
done 
22 42 28 52 34 Na na 
PP has increased quality of work 
done 
 
19 17 18 39 22 Na na 
Relations with management        
Management use PP to reward their 
favourites  
35 57 41 41 27 Na na 
There is a quota on good 
assessments* 
74 78 74 57 36 48 45 
PP has made me less willing to 
cooperate with management* 
10 30 26 19 14 7 4 
Line manager views:        
PP has reduced staff willingness to 
cooperate with management 
20 45 39 30 27 Na na 
 
Motivation and relations with 
colleagues 
       
PP an incentive to work beyond job 
requirements 
21 18 12 32 22 8 10 
PP causes jealousies 62 86 78 61 51 58 70 
PP has undermined morale 55 81 78 52 47 Na na 
PP discourages team working  Na 67 77 64 61 51 54 
Line manager views:        
PP bad because staff have 
insufficient control in their jobs 
46 57 64 41 44 Na na 
 
* For head teachers the question focused on governing bodies and whether their pay policy would allow a 
performance enhancement even if merited. 
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1.3.1  General attitudes on pay and performance 
 
One of the most striking responses across our case studies was the degree of support for the 
principle of linking pay to performance. In one of the civil service departments over 70% of staff 
were in favour of the principle, and despite the results to be discussed later, even in the Inland 
Revenue, almost six out of ten employees supported the principle. Only among school head 
teachers, and especially those in primary schools, did support begin to fall away seriously, and large 
numbers judge it to be ‘fundamentally unfair’. There was certainly no sign that people replied to our 
questionnaire because of any ideological or impassioned opposition to the principle of performance 
pay. 
 The general acceptance of the principle may seem all the more surprising given the strong 
intrinsic rewards of the work, and the widespread belief that it represented an important public 
service. Both of these might have led one to expect hostility to performance pay either as an 
impertinence because it implies staff are motivated to additional effort by the money rather than the 
inherent interest of their work, or because a practice that originates in the private sector might seem 
inappropriate, or even immoral, in the public sector. One might also have expected stronger 
opposition to the principle in view of the large numbers of staff who believe the nature of their work 
is hard to measure, and so inappropriate for performance pay. 
 
1.3.2 Improved productivity and goal setting 
 
In the civil service and the trust hospitals, many line managers carrying out appraisals, and therefore, 
who are well placed to judge the immediate effects of performance pay on staff performance, report 
a resulting increase in work quantity. If we assume that line managers reporting an increase in work 
quantity supervise roughly similar numbers of staff to those not doing so, then we could say that in 
the Inland Revenue, roughly 40% of the staff are judged to be working harder. In the trust with 
individual performance pay the figure is even higher at over 50%. The effects on quality of work are 
everywhere smaller, but are again not negligible. The question could not be asked of head teachers. 
 In focusing on those who reported an increase in productivity as a result of PRP, as we do 
in Table 1.1 above, it is important to remember the large number of other line managers who 
reported no such increase (Table 1.2). From our survey evidence, we do not know whether these 
witnessed offsetting drops in productivity, or whether they simply believed there had been no 
increase. For the Inland Revenue and the Employment Service, however, there is evidence that the 
overall workloads of the two departments have increased, or at least been maintained, whereas the 
number of staff has significantly declined. From this we infer that the ‘disagrees’ on whether staff 
productivity has risen are primarily reporting no change in work quantity rather than a decline. Given 
the pressures on the National Health Service generally, and that our two trust hospitals were among 
the ‘good performers’ on the national performance tables, it seems unlikely that staff productivity 
has fallen overall, and hence that there too, the ‘disagrees’ mean ‘no effect’ rather than a fall in 
productivity which has to be set against the rise in productivity reported by the ‘agrees’. 
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Table 1.2 
PRP has led to an increase in the quantity many of the staff do: Line manager views  
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree No view Agree Strongly 
agree 
Inland Revenue ‘91 9 62 7 19 3 
Inland Revenue ‘96 5 46 7 38 4 
Employment Service 6 53 14 25 3 
NHS individual PRP trust 5 32 11 41 11 
NHS group PRP trust 6 43 17 25 9 
 
 The mechanism by which PRP has raised productivity is through improved goal setting for 
individual staff. The most positive effect to emerge from the judgements of staff has been to improve 
the clarity with which managers set work objectives. If we include the clarity with which school 
governing bodies determine targets, then improved goal setting was true of all six case studies. Head 
teachers gave similar replies concerning their relationship with their schools’ governing bodies. The 
reason for this lies in the use of appraisal as a basis for performance pay, and echoes similar findings 
on the importance of effective goal setting by Dowling and Richardson (1997) among health service 
managers. On the whole, the appraisal procedures seemed to be working, and in most cases, staff 
believed their most recent appraisal a fair reflection of their performance. 
 
1.3.3 Staff relations with management 
 
Nevertheless, there was also widespread suspicion of both line and senior management in the civil 
service and hospitals. Many thought that managers frequently used performance pay to reward their 
favourites despite the controls on ratings. Suspicion of senior management showed up in the large 
numbers who believed the operation of quota systems meant that many who deserved rewards 
were effectively denied them. Outside the two civil service departments, this suspicion of 
management did not go so far as to cause many of the staff to feel less willing to cooperate with 
management. In the Inland Revenue, we were able to check whether such suspicion had been 
induced by performance pay, or whether it was just part of an established attitude to management in 
what are often rather impersonal organisations, or a manifestation of ‘them and us’ attitudes from the 
wider society whose persistence in Britain has been noted by Kelly and Kelly (1991). In the Inland 
Revenue, comparison with our 1991 results shows a big increase in suspicion of favouritism, and a 
tripling of those saying PRP has reduced their willingness to cooperate with management. The 
percentage believing there is a quota is even more striking for the fact that top management has 
issued very explicit instructions to line managers that there should be none. This is clearly not the 
result of general social attitudes, but of a malaise within the organisation which the staff attribute to 
performance pay. 
 Partly as a result of the perceived deviousness of management, but also because of the 
pressure to raise productivity, performance pay has made the job of management harder. This can 
be seen from the number of line managers reporting that performance pay has made staff less willing 
to cooperate with management, more than doubling in the Inland Revenue to 45%. 
 
1.3.4 Motivation and relations with colleagues 
 
For most staff, support for the principle of performance pay does not translate into a positive 
willingness to work harder or to improve work quality. Only a rather small minority, between a tenth 
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and a third depending on the service, said it had given them an incentive to work beyond the 
requirements of their jobs, and most believed it had not. 
 The rather modest incentive effect has to be balanced against the widespread damage 
done to relations between colleagues and to morale. Large numbers in the civil service and the 
hospitals believed morale had been undermined, that performance pay caused jealousies among 
staff, and that it undermined team-working. The latter problems are particularly important because 
they conflict with one of the other reforms management has been to try to foster: a more team-
oriented approach to work. In the civil service it has sought to encourage staff to work more 
flexibly; and in hospitals, to attach less importance to long-standing professional demarcations. 
 
1.3.5 Group versus individual performance pay 
 
Our study has covered a wide variety of different designs of PRP schemes, but the only difference 
that appears to have had any profound effect was that between group and individual performance 
pay. In our chapter on the NHS trust hospitals, the most important finding is that the group-based 
trust-wide scheme used by one of the hospitals caused much less damage to work relations than the 
individual scheme. Especially when one confines attention to those on trust contracts, and therefore 
directly covered by the scheme, it caused less jealousies, less harm to team working and morale, 
and less damage to cooperation with management. It also appears to make an element of cost 
flexibility to preserve jobs more acceptable. 
 Its main weakness lay in less effective goal setting, and a smaller effect on productivity. 
There are two reasons for this. The trust-wide bonus did not focus on individual work objectives; 
and separating performance pay from appraisal removes one of the incentives to staff and line 
managers to do their appraisals. On the other hand, separation reduces the risk that pay will 
contaminate appraisal. 
 
1.4 Outcomes and Sustainability 
 
Our first conclusion is that performance pay has caused a substantial minority of staff in the civil 
service and in one of the hospitals, even a majority, to work harder. It has caused a smaller 
percentage of staff to raise work quality. We have no evidence either way for head teachers. 
 The chief mechanism seems to be through improved goal setting rather than any positive 
motivating effect of linking pay to performance. Although logically distinct, the two processes may 
not be easily separable. As will be seen, the hospital case studies show that the need to reach a 
decision on pay awards forces line managers and staff to complete appraisals on time. This does 
pose a dilemma because the view of management at the group PRP trust also seems vindicated: that 
pay contaminates appraisal, especially by the suspicion in the minds of many staff that management 
manipulate the awards unfairly. 
 Our study brings out a fundamental ambiguity in the appraisal process, especially when it is 
linked to pay. On the one hand, appraisals and goal setting serve as an occasion for staff to discuss 
and agree objectives with their line managers, and thus promote better performance by giving 
everyone a clearer idea of what they should be doing. This can be a very positive experience, and 
no doubt explains why so many staff in the two hospitals were very positive about their reviews. 
 On the other hand, they are also seen as the vehicle through which management may 
pressure workers into higher performance. Despite the language of agreed objectives, very many 
civil servants felt pressured into accepting objectives imposed by management, and thought that in 
practice everyone had the same objectives: increase quantity. Given that kind of pressure, one can 
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understand why so many staff seem to have increased output, but at the expense of lower morale, 
jealousies, poorer cooperation among staff, and in the Revenue, a reduced willingness to cooperate 
with management. 
 Does all this matter if output increases? There are three reasons for thinking it does: 
 
· sustainability of the performance increase; 
· perverse effects of ‘procedural justice’ measures; 
· vulnerability of the pay and appraisal system to demoralisation. 
 
 The first problem is whether higher output can be sustained over the longer run if it is 
primarily the result of increased management pressure without the support of positive motivation 
from staff. Large numbers of civil service staff still believe their job is worthwhile as it contributes to 
an important public service. So there is clearly a fund of goodwill and commitment to the service 
which no doubt will help sustain motivation for a time. However, the number of Revenue staff 
replying that the personal satisfaction of their work is sufficient incentive halved between 1991 and 
1996. There is of course no proven evidence linking job satisfaction to job performance, although 
there is some evidence linking satisfaction to the willingness of staff to act as good ‘organisational 
citizens’, and to go beyond a narrow conception of their duties (Organ, 1988). Our comparison 
between 1991 and 1996 suggests that this element is under strain. 
 The second problem concerns the paradox that the very measures that management, and 
sometimes the union, installed to ensure a degree of procedural justice have had the opposite effect. 
Procedural justice is important because, it is argued, employees are more likely to accept the 
fairness of adverse appraisals if they believe the procedures are fair. For example, if they have a 
right of appeal, if the outcomes are generally seen to be fair, and there are guarantees of a real 
likelihood of being awarded performance pay. The paradox is that in our case studies where pay is 
linked to individual performance, the measures designed to ensure procedural justice are seen not as 
signs of management’s good faith, but rather as evidence of its deviousness. Cross-checking 
between offices is not seen as a means of preventing favouritism and discrimination, but rather as 
depriving those who deserve performance pay of their just reward. The ‘quota’ is not seen as a 
guarantee of a minimum amount of money being available for the performance pay scheme, but 
rather as proof that management will refuse deserved rewards. 
 The third problem is potentially the most serious: that the performance management system 
itself can become demoralised. If staff feel it is imposed on them, and that the targets do not reflect 
what they consider the most relevant aspects of their work, then it becomes vulnerable to abuse. 
This happened dramatically at the Employment Service, and was reported in the national press a 
few weeks after our survey. The situation was sufficiently serious for the then government to set up 
an internal inquiry, and according to Guardian’s sources, job placement figures, on which 
performance pay partly depended, were being inflated nationally by up to 30%3. What had started 
as a minor abuse had rapidly escalated to the extent that several local offices across the country 
were involved, and there were cases of double-counting of job placement lists between offices, 
something which would have involved management as much as staff.  
 Technical improvements in monitoring, such as random statistical checks of reported 
placements, and ‘mystery shoppers’, can of course be used to limit phoney placements, but the ill 
goes deeper than the design of management control systems. As can be seen in our survey, many 
staff have lost any faith in the relevance and legitimacy of their performance targets, seeing the 
                                                 
3. Guardian (29.3.97), ‘Jobcentres fiddled figures to boost employment statistics’; Guardian (1.4.07) ‘McDonalds’ 
job data abused’; Guardian (16.4.97) ‘Fake job figures scandal exposed’. 
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exercise as more of a numbers game than an aid to job seekers. Under such circumstances, any 
performance management system becomes very vulnerable to breakdown. 
 Among the positive lessons from our study has been the relative success of the group-
based performance pay scheme in sustaining morale, cooperation and a degree of intra-
organisational solidarity among the staff. 
 Our findings also pose difficult problems to the unions and professional associations in the 
public services.  A great many public servants approve of the principle of linking pay to 
performance, which makes outright opposition difficult to sustain.  Yet many also believe the 
schemes have been unfair in their operation, and no doubt expect their representatives to do 
something about it.  But what should be done is more difficult to determine. 
 Clearly, one service that unions and professional associations can and do offer their 
members is a means of ensuring greater fairness in the operation of pay systems, and a channel for 
pursuing grievances.  A very important component of this is the development of mechanisms to 
ensure procedural justice so that staff do not feel they will be denied rewards unfairly.  Yet a 
worrying paradox emerges from our findings.  The very measures that might be thought to offer 
some kind of procedural justice, especially under the individual schemes, are widely seen as an 
indication of management’s deviousness rather than as a guarantee of fair treatment.  For example, 
the ‘quota’ in the 1988 Inland Revenue agreement, which was in part an undertaking that 
management would pay out real money, was widely seen as a quota on good appraisals.  Another 
example is that the mechanisms to ensure consistency and lack of discrimination in appraisals were 
seen as a chance for higher management to withdraw good appraisals that had been awarded by 
line managers. 
 Although unions have traditionally been reactive to management proposals rather than 
taking the initiative, the public services are an area ripe for a positive dialogue.  Membership density 
is high, the staff and managers believe strongly in public service, and there are no shareholders who 
might cream off the rewards of greater efficiency.  Our survey results show that performance pay 
has contributed to distrust of both line managers and higher management, and soured work 
relations.  As individual staff feel their appraisals have been mostly fair, this suggests that much could 
be done to improve the perceptions and mechanisms of procedural justice within the performance 
management systems.  This would both benefit the public services, and improve the atmosphere in 
which many staff spend their working hours. 
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Chapter 2 
Performance Pay at the Inland Revenue:  
1991 and 1996 Compared 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
The Inland Revenue, the British tax service, has been at the forefront of the changes in pay systems 
within the Civil Service. It was among the first government departments to have performance related 
pay, introduced by the 1988 Pay Agreement. Despite reductions in staff in recent years through job 
losses, early retirement schemes and transfer of functions to the private sector, it remains one of the 
larger departments with about 56,000 staff. Most are directly employed in assessing and collecting 
taxes. Local offices are organised into 10 regional “Executive Offices”  (including Northern Ireland). 
There are also a number of smaller executive offices which deal with specialist areas of taxation and 
a Valuation Office Agency which deals with the rating of property. 
Unlike most other Government Departments, it already had its own separate pay and 
grading structure before pay delegation in the 1990s.1 Staff were organised primarily by an 
independent departmental trade union, the then Inland Revenue Staff Federation (IRSF). 2 The 
IRSF union recently merged with the National Union of Civil and Public Servants (NUCPS) to form 
the Public Services, Commerce and Taxation Union (PTC). Union membership has remained 
consistently high in the Department, with over 90% of employees organised.3  
The survey reported in this chapter, carried out in November 1996, analyses staff judgements 
of the current performance pay scheme and compares them with the results of an earlier survey of 
Inland Revenue staff carried out in 1991, reported in Marsden and Richardson (1991, and 1994). 
Although there have been some major changes in the Inland Revenues performance management 
system since 1991, the same basic principles apply. The scheme is based on annual goal setting and 
performance appraisals for individual staff by their line managers, and depending on the results of the 
appraisal, staff receive larger or smaller annual pay increases. The main changes, some of which 
addressed problems highlighted by the 1991 survey, have been improved goal setting, the abolition of 
incremental pay scales, and the explicit removal of any quotas on good appraisals and performance 
pay. 
In this chapter, we ask a number of questions: 
 
· What are employees’ attitudes to performance pay?  
· Does performance management help set clear work objectives? 
                                                 
1. The Revenue grading structure mirrored that of the rest of the Civil Service. Thus for each of the traditional 
Civil Service grades (e.g. Administrative Assistant (AA), Administrative Officer (AO), Executive Officer (EO), 
Higher Executive Officer (HEO) and Senior Executive Officer (SEO)) there were Revenue equivalents (Revenue 
Assistant (RA),  Revenue Officer (RO), Revenue Executive (RE), Collector Higher Grade (CHG) and Inspector, 
and Regional Collector and Inspector (S). This resulted in Revenue grades gaining pay leads over employees in 
the rest of the Civil Service. 
 
2. Senior staff were organised by the First Division Association (FDA), the Institution of Professionals, 
Managers and Specialists (IPMS) and the National Union of Civil and Public Servants (NUCPS). The NUCPS and 
the Civil and Public Servants Association (CPSA) also organised a small minority of remaining staff. 
 
3. Membership stood at 91.65% at 31.12.95 
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· Does it assist in dealing with poor performance? 
· Do staff consider the system fair? 
· Do staff feel that opportunities under PM are equal? 
· Does performance pay motivate staff? 
· What are its performance outcomes, and how does it affect team working and cooperation with 
management? 
 
 
2.2  Performance Management at the Inland Revenue 
 
Performance pay was first introduced into the department as part of the 1988 Pay Agreement. That 
scheme can be seen more as an ‘add-on’ to the existing performance appraisal system.4 
Performance Pay was awarded in the form of additional movements up the existing incremental 
salary scales, and there was no financial penalty for poor performance. Performance was evaluated 
against  a common set of criteria applied to all jobs, and so not equally applicable to all jobs, rather 
than against individual targets. 
The 1993 Pay Agreement, which formalised pay delegation in the department,  introduced 
the current system of performance related pay, Performance Management. It combines the 
processes of goal-setting, appraisal, and pay incentives for all their staff individually. Its goals, as set 
out in the Inland Revenue staff manual (The Guide) are:  
 
· to improve the quality of management, especially the process of goal setting;  
· to motivate staff and release their full potential;  
· to help them focus on what is really important in their jobs;  
· to achieve a higher level of job satisfaction and recognition; and  
· to lead to further improvement in the Revenues performance. 
 
The system was based on two agreements; one for the senior grades and one for majority 
of staff.  The agreement for the senior grades is still in place although the most senior grades are 
now covered by a central PRP scheme for all Senior Civil Servants.  The Valuation Office, as an 
Executive Agency attached to the Department, has a separate agreement. 
 
2.2.1 Performance assessment 
 
Performance is assessed against a ‘Performance Agreement’ drawn up by individual jobholders and 
their line managers. The Guide emphasises the importance of this ‘contractual principle’. The 
agreement should take account of individual capabilities, and set ‘stretching’ objectives for the officer 
(rather than meeting a particular norm for the job). It should also contain the officers’ key 
responsibilities and set both quantitative and qualitative objectives. To aid both parties in identifying 
the latter, the following are given special emphasis: 
 
· the reason for the particular job; 
· how it links to the Revenues ‘Four Cs: customer service, compliance, cost efficiency, and caring 
for staff; 
· the role of teamwork; and 
                                                 
4. There was a separate appraisal system for promotion purposes. 
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· identifying customers and what they want; 
· and in general, quality. 
 
Throughout the year managers should meet their staff individually to discuss how their work 
is going. This should allow for changes in duties and is meant to keep staff on target and ensure that 
they have an idea of what is likely to be their final assessment. Additionally, if an officer is in a post 
with greater than average demands, the post can be determined as ‘extra loaded’. 
At the end of the year, staff are appraised by their line managers as to how far they have 
achieved their objectives, and classified as follows: 
 
 Exceed:  having achieved performance well above that agreed 
 Succeed:  having achieved what the person set out to do 
 Not Met:   performance below that agreed 
 
The appraisal takes account of whether jobs have been extra loaded or not. 
When individual staff cannot reach a Performance Agreement with their line manager, an 
agreement may be imposed (without their signing). This should afford a limited degree of protection 
should the assessment be unsatisfactory. Where there are disputes over the assessment, there is an 
appeals system which ultimately can go to an independent committee involving management and 
unions. This was set up after the First Review of Performance Management in 1994. 
 
2.2.2 Performance pay 
 
The old grading structure was replaced by a system of pay bands and pay spans.  Five pay bands 
were set up: A-B for the senior grades, and C-E covering the majority of staff. Jobs were then 
allocated to pay bands following a job evaluation exercise. Most pay bands are subsequently 
divided into two or more spans.  Movement between pay bands is governed by promotion, and that 
between pay spans, by a formal procedure for progression. Once staff reach the top of a pay band 
or span additional performance pay increases are not consolidated into basic salary. The pay ranges 
for pay bands after the 1996 award are given  in  Table 2.1. 
Within a pay span, pay is determined by three factors: 
 
· A performance assessment of “Exceed”, “Succeed” or “Not Met”  
· The position of the employee within a pay band/span 
· Whether the job is weighted as “normal” or “extra-loaded” 
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Table 2.1  Inland Revenue national pay bands 1995/96 
 
Pay band Job example No. of 
spans 
Min Max % rise: 
Min - Max 
C1 Compliance manager, collector in charge 2 18,400 28,200 53 
C2 Welfare officer, accounts investigator 3 15,050 24,350 62 
D PAYE auditor, Schedule D Case Worker 2 11,400 19,725 73 
E1 Revenue Officer, Personal secretary 1 9,200 14,550 58 
E2 Telephonist, Clerical Assistant 2 7,150 11,800 65 
 
Note:  Pay structure for main PTC grades from 1 August 1996, national rates. Source: PTC. Bands B and above, in 
which PTC has some members, include tax inxspectors, policy advisors and higher management. 
 
For the purpose of calculating each individual’s annual salary award, each pay span is 
divided into five layers. Following negotiations between management and unions, each layer is 
assigned a percentage increase for each of the performance assessment categories. The lower layers 
have received higher percentages because, under the old pay scales, there had been larger 
incremental steps for the lower paid staff. 
Those whose performance is not satisfactory receive ‘Not Mets’ and are denied a 
performance award. Pay differentials are also established between those assessed as ‘Exceeds’ and 
those as ‘Succeeds’. Those officers succeeding in an extra-loaded post are awarded the same 
percentage as an Exceed in a normal post.  An officer exceeding in an extra-loaded post receives a 
higher percentage award.  As an illustration, Table 2.2 shows the pay matrix for band D effective at 
the time of our survey. 
 
Table 2.2 
Pay awards for pay band D 
 
 General 
increase (‘A’) 
Performance increase (‘B’) 
 
Layer  Not Met 
% 
Succeed 
% 
Exceed 
% 
Exceed in  
Extra-Loaded 
% 
5 £175  + 0 3.4 4.8 6.5 
4 £175  + 0 3.6 5.5 7.2 
3 £175  + 0 4.2 6.7 8.1 
2 £175  + 0 5.5 7.8 9.2 
1 £175  + 0 7.1 9.1 10.5 
 
Note: effective from 1 August 1996. 
 
The system is notionally based upon an ‘A’ cost of living element and a ‘B’ performance 
element. The ‘A’ element is universally paid regardless of an officer’s performance. However after 
an initial payment in the first year of implementation, there was no ‘A’ element in 1994 and 1995.  
In 1996 a one-off payment of £175 was agreed as an ‘A’ element, payable to all except those 
facing disciplinary action and adverse performance procedures. 
The Guide stresses that there is no quota on performance pay, nor is there any fixed or 
recommended distribution of appraisal ratings. It states in bold: ‘There are not quotas or guidelines 
for the number or percentage of the Assessment markings and loadings that should be given. 
Managers and jobholders should agree what Assessment marking and loading is deserved, solely on 
the basis of the jobholders performance’ (The Guide, para 12.2). It stresses that good performance 
should attract its reward. When it appeared that some line managers were in fact operating quotas 
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during the first year of operation, top management stressed again to managers and staff alike that 
this should not happen.5 
There is built-in monitoring of appraisal ratings and extra-loadings by higher management, 
and departmental managers are expected to assist their junior management colleagues carrying out 
appraisals to ensure there is fairness and consistency, and to ensure that equal opportunities are 
adhered to. 
 
2.2.3 Issues arising out of performance management and the pay system 
 
Mostly, when organisations introduce new performance pay systems there is a problem of transition 
from the old to the new system. Consequently, some of the reactions of staff to the new system 
reflect the difficulties of transition. There are always winners and losers and certain teething 
problems in such cases, and it is important to be aware of such factors as they might colour staff 
attitudes to the current PRP scheme. 
The first such problem was that Performance Management was replacing fixed annual pay 
increments for staff: under the new scheme appraised performance is intended to replace length of 
service. This raises the problem of the speed of progression from minimum to maximum point on 
any pay band. Staff who found that progression was generally slower than under the increment 
system could well resent PM, not because they felt it was unjust to link pay to performance, but 
because their expectations of pay progression had been cheated. 
Revenue management originally promised by that no-one would reach the maximum of a 
pay band/span later than they would have done under the old system of departmental pay scales. 
Since an increment was worth roughly 7% in pay terms for those at the lower end of the old pay 
scales for those in the middle management grades and the awards for those with Succeeds have 
been lower, officers have taken longer to reach scale maxima than they had originally envisaged6. 
This has been complicated the unions policy that pay span and band maxima should be increased in 
order to reduce the amount of non-consolidated pay. At the same time, minima have remained 
frozen so that officers formerly in civil service grades (usually administrative staff) still lag behind in 
pay terms. 
A second, related, problem arising out of the scheme initially agreed was that of overtaking. 
Officers at the top of a layer were receiving higher percentage awards than those at the bottom of 
the layer above and were thus overtaking them, despite receiving the same assessments. This was 
caused in part by giving higher percentage increases for performance pay to the lower pay bands to 
compensate for the loss of what had been larger percentage incremental steps under the old 
agreement. The system was patched up, so that those moving into a higher level could not have a 
new salary which exceeded the officer at the lowest point of the new layer (who received the same 
assessment). The basis of the system is that overtaking is only possible as a result of higher 
assessments. As a consequence of this officers at the top of their layer have often had their pay 
restricted. 
 
                                                 
5 . Chairman’s Review of Performance Management, 1993. 
 
6. New arrangements in the Inland Revenue: text of the agreement between HM Treasury and the Board of the 
Inland Revenue (on behalf of the Official Side) and the Inland Revenue Staff Federation, 29.1.1988. For Revenue 
Executives, the first half of their pay scale consisted of 7% increments, and the latter half, of increments dropping 
progressively to just over 5%. For Inspectors, they declined progressively from 6.6% to 4.0%. 
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2.2.4  Comparison with commonly accepted ‘good practice’ 
 
As described, the Scheme builds in a number of features that seek to observe to the canons of the 
main theories of individual work motivation, and of good personnel practice as set out by ACAS 
(1990). Goal setting theory stresses the incentive effect of clearly defined and achievable goals over 
pay incentives, and considerable effort is devoted to this in individual staff-line management 
discussions (Latham and Locke, 1979) Equity theory predicts employees will seek to give a fair 
days work for a fair days pay, and the theory of the negotiation and agreement of individual work 
targets is that employees should consider them fair (Lawler, 1971). Finally, Expectancy theory 
predicts that individual workers will respond to financial incentives if they value the rewards, are 
able to enhance their performance, and believe management will then reward improved performance 
(Lawler, 1971). Again, the idea behind negotiated targets, as set out in the Guide, is that they should 
be stretching but achievable, and the appeals procedure should provide some guarantee of 
managements good faith, as should providing information for monitoring the overall working of the 
scheme to staff representatives. Most important, one of the main causes of perceived unfairness 
found in the 1991 survey, namely the existence of a quota on good appraisals was expressly ruled 
out in the Guide. When it appeared that some line managers were in fact operating quotas in the first 
year of operation, top management again stressed to staff and line managers alike that this should 
not be done7. Good performance should attract reward. It is, therefore, a serious scheme by the 
current standards of personnel practice, and so much can be learned from its success or failure. 
 
 
2.3 Research Methods and the Sample 
 
In 1996 we approached both Inland Revenue management and the PTC8, the trade union 
representing the main grades of staff, with a view to carrying out a questionnaire survey of staff 
attitudes to and experiences with performance pay similar to the survey carried out by Marsden and 
Richardson in 19919. Although the management expressed an interest in the project, they declined to 
support it. 
The PTC, whose membership in the Inland Revenue is roughly 90%, agreed to support the 
survey and a sample of around 4,000 members was randomly selected from the union membership 
database.  Only in band B is PTC membership substantially below 90% because many staff are 
members of another union. The questionnaire was developed in consultation with the PTC and 
piloted with a group of experienced lay representatives in London. The questionnaires were then 
issued by the union direct to members with a pre-paid postage sticker for freepost returns. 
Of the 4,000 questionnaires issued, 1195 questionnaires were returned. Three of these were 
spoiled. This represents a 30% response rate, lower than that of our 1991 survey. From our 
discussions with PTC and management, the most likely reasons appear to be that Revenue 
management did not this time allow time for staff to complete questionnaires during work hours, and 
the greater pressure of work owing to staff reductions and the introduction of Self Assessment. 
                                                 
7 . Chairmans Review of Performance Management, 1993. 
 
8. PTC: Public services, taxation and commerce union - resulting from the merger of the IRSF and NUCPS. 
 
9. The 1991 survey was funded by the IRSF, and Revenue management cooperated with the research, drawing a 
stratified sample of 4000 staff from their personnel records and allowing the questionnaires to be distributed 
using the internal mailing service.  
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The profile of the current sample differs slightly from that of the 1991 survey. In 1991, the 
survey covered staff working in the Taxes (assessment) and Collection sections of the Revenue in 
grades up to and including Inspector. The current sample includes additionally some more senior staff 
in pay band B. Furthermore staff working in the administrative sections of the department, outside 
Taxes and Collection, were also sent questionnaires10. 
A final difference between the surveys arises from organisational changes in the Revenue. The 
Department is now divided into Executive Offices, some of which are regionally based (covering 
taxes and collection work) and others, functionally based. This therefore replaces the regional 
breakdown given in the 1991 survey. 
The response by pay band shows a good representation of all pay bands with the exception of band 
B. In that pay band, many staff, although covered by a similar agreement, are represented by another 
union. Otherwise, the response pattern across bands is very similar to that obtained in the 1991 
survey, with a higher response among the higher paid bands, except for band B. Then too the 
response rate for the Inspectors was roughly double that for Revenue Assistants, declining from 
about 75% to 40-45% for the lowest paid staff grades. 
 
Table 2.3  
Analysis of Revenue staff, sample and responserate by pay band 
 
Pay Band/Span Revenue staff numbers Revenue % in 
Band/Span 
Sample % Estimated response rate 
B 2,926 5.2 1.9 * 
C1 1,662 2.9 5.4 51.7 
C2 5,475 9.7 17.7 51.7 
D 12,862 22.8 29.9 37.1 
E1 19,211 34.1 26.7 22.2 
E2 14,213 25.2 18.3 20.6 
Totals  56,349 100.0 100.0 28.4 
Total sample   1192 29.8 
 
Source: Inland Revenue, at 1.10.96 and sample. Response rates by pay band were estimated assuming that 
questionnaires had been distributed in proportion to numbers in each band as the sample was random. * 
response rate could not be calculated for Band B. 
 
The sample also gives good representation of staff who received different performance appraisals. 
 
                                                 
10. As part of the re-organisation of the Revenue structure, many taxes and collection offices are being merged 
into New Office Structures (NOS).  Executive Offices formerly organised by NUCPS include the Capital Taxes 
Office (CTO), the Enforcement Office, Stamps, Solicitors Office, and Finance Division. These now form a 
‘Constituency B’ section of the PTC’s Inland Revenue Group. Members working in the Valuation Office Agency 
(VOA) were not included in the survey, since a different performance management scheme is in operation in the 
Agency.  
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Table 2.4 
Performance assessments in the IR during 1996, and in our sample 
 
Assessment IR results (May 96) Sample (Nov. 96) 
Not met 1.1 1.0 
Succeed 76.5 67.3 
Exceed 22.4 31.7 
of which: Extra loaded 17.5 22.2 
 
Source: ‘One in three awarded better than succeed’, Insight, July 1996, pp. 4-5, (results for Pay Bands B to E), 
and sample. Note: uneweighted results. 
 
The sample also gives a good regional spread across executive offices, by gender, reported ethnic 
background and full/part-time which are shown in Appendix 1. 
Staff views shown in this report have been weighted to adjust for the differences in response 
between pay bands thus giving a clearer picture of for staff as a whole. The biographical data, which 
are also needed for methodological checks, have been left unweighted. In practice, the overall effect 
of weighting is rather small. 
 
 
2.4  Staff Attitudes to the Principle of Performance Pay 
 
On the whole, Revenue staff appear favourable to the general principle of linking pay to performance 
among Inland Revenue staff, and most staff reject the idea that it is fundamentally unfair. The Cabinet 
Office’s Efficiency Unit made a similar observation regarding civil servants generally in the late 1980s, 
which was confirmed by the 1991 survey. Indeed, there is remarkable continuity in the attitudes of 
Inland Revenue staff to the principle of relating pay to performance: 58% agreed with the principle in 
1996, against 57% in 1991. Likewise, there appears to be a strong continuity over time in the 
number rejecting the idea that PRP is fundamentally unfair: 52% in 1996 and 58% in 1991 (Table 
2.5).  
 
 
Table 2.5 
Attitudes to the principle of performance pay 
 
Year  No. Question Disagree % Agree % 
1996 
1991 
1 
1 
The principle of relating pay to performance is a good one 37.3 
40 
58.1 
57 
1996 
1991 
2 
2 
The idea of performance pay is fundamentally unfair 51.5 
58 
39.2 
36 
 
 
However, the general acceptance of the principle of performance pay does not extend to the idea 
that all pay should be made dependent upon performance. Two thirds of the respondents disagreed 
that pay should depend solely on performance (Table 2.6, Q5). A likely reason for this is that they 
believed that a number of other principles for determining pay were also important. Notable among 
these are that a person’s pay should:  
 
· take account of different work loads of staff within the same pay band (Q4); 
· reflect job demands rather than individual performance (Q8); 
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· take more account of experience (Q3); 
· compensate for rises in the cost of living (Q9); 
· continue to follow nationally negotiated pay scales (Q7); and 
· to some extent, reflect recruitment difficulties (Q6).  
 
Some of these views can be accommodated within the current Performance Management 
system while others are more problematic. Job demands are, to some extent, reflected in the 
provisions for ‘Extra Loading’. That pay scales continue to be nationally negotiated is a part of the 
current system to which staff remain attached despite the moves towards greater pay devolution. 
Experience as years in the job, on the other hand, clearly is one of the main losers in the shift 
to performance management. Likewise, the idea that pay should reflect job demands rather than 
individual performance represents a major difference of emphasis. That pay should reflect recruitment 
and retention difficulties has a strong pedigree for certain categories of staff, for example, the data 
processing allowance, but it may be difficult to integrate with a system that is based on pay for 
individual performance. 
 
Table 2.6  
Staff views on different payment criteria - 1996 
 
No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
5 Staff should be paid solely on the basis of individual performance 64.7 29.4 
4 Pay should take into account different duties carried out by staff in the band/span 23.5 63.2 
8 Pay should reflect the demands of the job and not the performance of individual  
Job holders  
28.8 57.8 
3 Experience (i.e. years in the job) should count more towards determining pay levels  37.0 52.7 
9 Annual pay rises should be used primarily to compensate for rises in the cost of living 24.0 66.9 
7 People should be paid according to nationally negotiated pay scales 13.4 76.4 
6 Staff should be paid more if their skills are in short supply 40.0 44.4 
 
 
2.5  The Quality of Management and Goal Setting 
 
One of the goals of Performance Management, stated in ‘the Guide’, is to clarify the setting of 
individual staff objectives, and by linking them to the overall objectives of the Department, to increase 
staff awareness of these. This can be judged at two levels: first, are the relevant procedures actually 
taking place, and do staff understand their goals and agree with their evaluations; and secondly, do 
they feel the resulting goals are set any more clearly as a result of Performance Management. 
 
2.5.1  Staff judgements of the goal-setting and appraisal process 
 
To examine any performance management scheme, it is logical to start with the the goal setting and 
appraisal process to see whether the procedures are being carried out as designed, and whether staff 
feel they understand them. In these terms, the Inland Revenue scheme appears to be working. Four 
fifths of staff said they understood how PM operated (Table 2.7, Q38), and a clear majority 
considered they had had sufficient opportunity to discuss their performance with their line managers 
(Q51). On the whole, staff also thought they had been able to change their objectives when their 
workloads changed (Q52), and that the goal posts had not been moved during the year so as to 
prevent them gaining an ‘Exceed’ (Q60). The responses to the last question is particularly revealing 
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because the First Chairman’s Quality report had uncovered fears of ‘ratcheting up’ of goals during 
the year, and instructions had been given that this should not happen. 
 
Table 2.7   
Staff views of how individual goal setting and appraisal work 
 
Year  No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
1996 38 I do not understand how PM operates in the Revenue  78.3 13.9 
1996 51 Throughout the year, I had sufficient opportunity to dis cuss my  
Performance with my line manager 
38.2 56.6 
1996 52 I have been able to change my work objectives when my work  
allocation has altered 
29.3 49.4 
1996 60 It was difficult to achieve and ‘Exceed’ because my performance  
agreement was altered during the year 
56.0 13.9 
1996 
1991 
53 I understand why I was awarded my most recent performance assessment 14.0 
14 
79.1 
79 
1996 
 
1991 
54 My most recent performance assessment was a fair reflection of my  
Performance 
 
28.4 
 
27 
63.8 
 
66 
 
Turning to the appraisal process itself, as in 1991, four fifths of the staff understood the 
reasons for their latest assessment (Q53), and just under two thirds considered it a fair reflection of 
their performance (Q54). 
 Nevertheless, a number of responses reveal an underlying unease (Table 2.8). Whereas just 
over 60% thought themselves capable of doing the work required for an ‘Exceed’, this percentage 
was down sharply from the 80% who thought themselves capable of getting a good appraisal (Box 1 
or 2) in 1991. Nearly two thirds of the staff thought they would not get an ‘Exceed’ even if they 
deserved one, up strongly on 1991, and a similar proportion thought their current job demands left 
very little scope for an ‘Exceed’ (Q59), roughly double the percentage saying so in 1991. 
 Despite The Guide’s stress on the contract principle, two thirds thought staff felt pressured 
to accept management’s performance objectives without discussion (Q61), and that in reality all 
staff were given the same targets (Q62). One test of how far staff felt their personal performance 
agreements take sufficient account of individual circumstances lies in the treatment of temporary 
drops in performance owing to personal illness or distress. Risk of illness affects everyone, so seeing 
others lose out is a warning of what could easily happen to oneself sometime in the future. Here, 
there is a general perception that staff suffering in this way lose out under PM (Q31). 
This suggests a degree of cynicism about the language of The Guide about individual 
performance targets, which is reinforced by the replies to the last two questions. Many staff are 
keener to avoid a ‘Not Met’ than to gain an ‘Exceed’ when agreeing their targets (Q63), and a 
substantial number believe that whether or not you get an ‘Exceed’ depends upon how cleverly you 
negotiated your peformance targets in the first place (Q64). 
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Table 2.8 
Appraisals and performance targets 
 
Year  No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
1996 
 
1991 
56 I am personally capable of doing what is necessary to get an ‘Exceed’  
in the future 
21.4 
 
6 
62.4 
 
81 
1996 
1991 
58 Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt I will receive an ‘Exceed’ 27.6 
40 
63.3 
45 
1996 
 
1991 
59 The nature of my present job makes it very hard for me to exceed the 
objectives in my Performance Agreement 
26.3 
 
53 
64.4 
 
31 
1996 61  Staff feel pressured into accepting performance objectives set by 
management without discussion 
25.78 61.67 
1996 62 For all that is said about individual performance objectives, in reality 
everyone is given the same targets  
25.7 63.2 
1996 31 Staff suffering illness or personal distress lose out under PM 19.9 58.3 
1996 63 In agreeing objectives, I am more concerned to avoid a ‘Not Met’ than to aim 
for an ‘Exceed’ 
33.9 55.9 
1996 64 The staff who gain ‘Exceeds’ are those who are cleverest at negotiating  
their Performance Agreements 
40.5 43.3 
 
2.5.1  Is PM leading to goals being set more clearly? 
 
The responses shown in Table 2.9 cast doubt on the system’s effectiveness in goal setting. A 
majority of staff disagreed that it has raised awareness of the objectives of PM (Q10), and that it 
has made managers set targets more clearly (Q14). Three quarters of the staff believed it was 
simply a device to increase the amount of work done (Q21), whatever the emphasis on goals, 
quality, and teamwork in The Guide. 
To set these views in perspective, it is worth comparing them with the results for 1991. 
Despite Marsden and Richardson’s general conclusion at the time that PRP had not motivated, and 
had probably demotivated staff at that time, overall, staff judgements on increasing awareness were 
positive, and those on goal setting noticeably less negative than now. 
 
Table 2.9  
Attitudes to work goals 
 
Year  No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
1996 
1991 
10 Performance Pay raises staff awareness of the objectives of PM 52.4 
28 
38.1 
57 
1996 
1991 
14 PM has made managers set work targets more clearly 53.7 
43 
31.5 
27 
1996 
 
1991 
21 For all that is said about quality, PM is simply a device to get more work 
done. 
13.2 
 
31 
76.8 
 
55 
 
The perception that PM is a device to get more work has been greatly reinforced since the 
1991 survey, up to three quarters agreeing now against 55% then. We do not have any detailed 
quantitative evidence on whether work loads have increased to explain the perception. However, 
conversations with management have confirmed that the level of work done by the Revenue staff 
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has remained at roughly the same level while numbers of staff have diminished considerably11. We 
return to this question when examining the impact of PM on the Revenue’s performance as a whole 
(§9 below). 
The lack of success of PM in raising staff awareness of Revenue goals is reflected in the 
judgements of staff on their own personal experience of PM’s operation (Table 2.10). 
 
Table 2.10 
Staff experiences of their personal performance management targets — 1996 survey 
 
No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
39 PM has made me more aware of the targets of the Revenue  48.0 39.4 
102 * PM has made staff more aware of the Inland Revenue’s targets 46.6 45.6 
23 The individual performance targets are a suitable basis for determining 
Performance Pay 
57.4 26.6 
13 PM is difficult to operate because the type of work done in the Inland  
Revenue is hard to measure 
16.6 75.7 
26 The link with pay makes staff question the fairness of PM 5.9 86.4 
 
Note: * Only Managers assessing staff performance were asked this question. 
 
Nearly half of the staff disagreed that PM had made them more aware of the Revenue’s 
targets. This view is also echoed among managers’ judgements of staff reactions (Q102). A 
majority of staff rejected the view that individual performance targets are a suitable basis for 
performance pay (Q23). Some of this may be explained by a general scepticism that the kind of 
work done by staff could be measured reliably (Q13). 
The outcome of these perceived failings on PM would appear to have led an overwhelming 
majority of staff (86%) to agree that the link with pay has made staff question the fairness of PM 
(Q26). 
Our findings reflect those reported in the First and Second Chairman’s Reviews of 
Performance Management, which also provides a valuable check on the reliability of our survey 
results. These reported concerns that the scheme had been implemented too rapidly in 1993 with 
insufficient time taken to explain its goals to staff, and that the scheme was seen as too ‘top down’. 
 
2.5.2  Dealing with poor performance  
 
A common goal of performance management schemes is to deal with poor performance, partly to 
maintain overall standards, and partly to prevent ‘passengers’ from depressing the morale of other 
staff who have to ‘carry’ them. A number of questions were therefore asked about poor 
performance (Table 2.11).  
 
                                                 
11. Part of the reduction of staff levels at the Inland Revenue over the past three years has been achieved by 
conracting out some work, notably data processing work to EDS. However, the latter case involved only 2,000 
jobs. A small number of others has been contracted out from other parts of the IR. In the other notable case of 
market testing, Inland Revenue staff won the contract. The greater part of the reduction in jobs has taken place 
without a corresponding drop in workload. Part of this has been achieved by the ban on new recruitment for the 
last three years (hence the small numbers of staff with less than three years’ service, Q.92). 
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Table 2.11 
PM  and poor performance in 1996 
 
No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
27 PM is a good way to identify poor performance 60.3 27.8 
109* PM has made it easier for me to deal with poor performance 60.7 25.0 
49 Managers know enough about the jobs of  their staff to identify poor performance  43.9 48.8 
 
*  Only managers assessing staff performance were asked this question.  
 
It would appear from these results that PM is not seen as an effective way of identifying 
poor performance. Neither managers (Q109) nor staff in general believe it to be (Q27).  There was 
also some scepticism as to whether managers knew enough about the jobs of their staff to identify 
poor performance. This perception may have been boosted by the amount of management 
delayering and reorganisation of offices in the Revenue network which has made management seem 
more distant from individual staff. 
Lack of confidence in the system may be reflected in the number of staff taking a cautious 
approach to setting their performance targets, being more anxious to avoid the risk of sanctions for 
poor performance by agreeing over-difficult targets rather than to gain an Exceed (Q63, Table 2.8). 
Thus, whatever the actual ability of the Scheme to identify ‘passengers’, its perceived failure 
to do so accurately may damage performance by making staff over-cautious. 
 
 
2.6  Staff Views on the Fairness of PM 
 
An essential attribute of any incentive payment system, if it is to motivate staff in the way management 
intend, is that it should be seen to be fair. In describing the responsibilities of management in the 
Performance Management scheme, ‘the Guide’ places great emphasis on the need for ensuring 
fairness and consistency, and for encouraging equal opportunities (para 12.5). Our responses suggest 
two different types of perceptions relating to the Scheme’s operation in general, and in their own 
particular case. 
 
2.6.1 The operation of PM in general 
 
A first test is whether staff feel that PM rewards the kind of work the Guide says it should. So we 
asked whether it meant that good work was recognised and rewarded (Q15) (Table 2.12). Nearly 
three quarters disagreed with this, up strongly on the same figure for 1991. This more negative 
response is surprising given the increased emphasis on individual work targets in 1996. The previous 
scheme had applied the same set of thirteen criteria to all jobs, each reflecting different aspects of 
behaviour which were not equally appropriate for all kinds of work. Thus, on paper, the PM system 
should be much more sensitive to the demands of a wide variety of jobs. Yet, staff are more doubtful 
of its ability to recognise good work than they were of its more bureaucratic predecessor. 
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Table 2.12 
The perceived fairness of PM 
 
Year  No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
1996 
1991 
15 PM has meant good work is recognised and rewarded at last 72.7 
50 
18.6 
41 
1996 
1991 
16 Managers use the scheme to reward their favourites 21.3 
45 
57.4 
35 
1996 
 
1991 
18 Staff are frequently denied the performance assessments they deserve, 
because in practice there is a quota on ‘exceeds’ and ‘extra-loaded’ jobs 
13.6 
 
10 
77.5 
 
74 
1996 30 The appeal system ensures unfair assessments are corrected 49.3 12.3 
1996 
1991 
24 Extra-loaded posts are used as a substitute for progression and promotion  11.1 
32 
77.2 
43 
 
A second test is whether management are believed to play according to their own stated rules. 
Two important rules in this respect are equal treatment of all staff, and the commitment not to use a 
quota on appraisals as a device to control costs. 
 
Favouritism 
 
Despite the provisions to ensure consistency or operation within and between departments, and for 
appeals12, nearly three out of five staff believe management use the scheme to reward their favourites 
(Q16). In 1991, just over a third shared this view, indicating a sharp deterioration in staff views about 
the fairness with which the Scheme is operated. Moreover, the appeals system was not felt to be 
effective (Q30). According to the Second Chairman’s Quality Review (1994)13, many staff felt that 
the financial gain from appealing was too small compared with the effort, and the possible damage to 
future promotion prospects. 
 
Quotas 
 
The Guide explicitly states that there should be no quotas on assessment ratings, thus avoiding one of 
the demotivating factors found by Marsden and Richardson in the earlier scheme. The 1988 
Agreement envisaged that ‘if the reporting and marking criteria are properly observed, the cost (of 
performance pay) will not exceed the cost of giving 25% of the staff in the grades covered a range 
increase on the spine which they are on’ (para 13 vi). This was widely seen as implying a quota, and 
because pay was directly tied to ratings, this would also imply a quota on good ratings. The Guide 
states explicitly, and in bold print, ‘there are no quotas or guidelines for the number or percentage of 
the Assessment markings and loadings that should be given. Managers and jobholders should agree 
what Assessment marking and loading is deserved solely on the basis of the jobholder’s 
performance’. 
Yet, more than three quarters of the staff believe a quota is in operation and that it causes 
staff to be denied assessments and extra loadings they deserve (Q18), and nearly two thirds believe 
                                                 
12. The Guide, para 12.5: ‘All managers’ managers are responsible for monitoring the operation of Performance 
Management by their staff. And Directors and Controllers are responsible for monitoring the operation of 
Performance Management in their own parts of the Department, through their Quality Assurance and Quality 
Control (QA/QC) programmes. They should take appropriate action to ensure that the Scheme is operating fairly 
and consistently in their own parts of the Department’. 
  
13. Chairman’s Second Quality Review of Performance Management: Summaries of the Reports, p.4, March 1994. 
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that even if their performance merits an ‘exceed’ they will not get one (Q58, Table 2.8). Thus, the 
perception is that management use their discretion to reward their favourites, and to withold rewards 
when they are due, and these views are more pronounced than in 1991. 
 
2.6.2 Individual experiences with PM 
 
Despite the rather negative views of staff about the operation of PM in general, their own personal 
experiences paint a rather different picture. We have already seen (Table 2.7 above) that four fifths of 
staff said they understood their most recent assessment, and that nearly two-thirds considered it a fair 
reflection of their performance (Q54), and these figures are little changed on 1991. On the whole, 
staff did not think their personal workloads had been adjusted unfairly. About half said they had been 
able to alter their agreement during the year to take account of changes in workloads (Q52), and only 
a few thought they had been deprived of the chance of an ‘Exceed’ because their workloads had 
been ratcheted up during the year (Q60). Thus, the belief that there are both frequent favouritism and 
a quota in operation is not reflected in their own personal experience of the Scheme. 
On the other hand, staff often experience a discrepancy between the performance philosophy 
of the Scheme and the constraints of their own jobs. Many reported (see Table 2.8 above) that the 
nature of their present job left them little scope for exceeding their objectives (Q59), and many were 
sceptical that even if they improved their performance they would not get an ‘Exceed’ (Q58). The 
feeling too that staff feel pressured into accepting management’s targets (Q61) perhaps means that 
they feel the targets they are given are set too high for them to have a fair chance of an ‘Exceed’. 
The rules of the game, as set by management, are about improving one’s performance to earn 
an additional reward, but these are seen as violated because many staff feel they do not have a fair 
chance of ‘winning’. Staff members’ personal line managers may not have treated them unfairly out of 
favouritism or because they shifted the goal posts, but there is a feeling that this happens widely to 
other colleagues. However, the more fundamental unfairness which affects the personal assessment 
by many staff is that they do not feel that either the constraints of their jobs, or the targets they are set 
give them a fair chance of winning. 
 
 
2.7  PM and Equal Opportunities 
 
Concern has been expressed, notably by trade unions about the effects of performance pay on equal 
opportunities for all groups. It is often feared that its individual focus, the negotiation and appraisal 
procedures, discriminate against women, staff from ethnic minorities and those who work part-time. 
One factor in particular giving cause for concern is the largely subjective nature of appraisal. The 
Inland Revenue are aware of this possibility. Management carried out an internal study into PM and 
equality which was reported during March and April 1996. Its report included the following 
statements:  
 
“Women tend to receive proportionally more extra-load markings, and fewer not mets 
than men, but men received more exceeds” 14 
 
“Part-time staff were found to have received more succeed markings and 
proportionally fewer extra-load, exceed or not met assessments” 
                                                 
14.  It is perhaps interesting that in Insight, an internal staff magazine, the problem to be addressed was why men 
receive more ‘not mets’ than women, not why women receive fewer ‘exceeds’! Insight (date unknown). 
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“Overall results for people in ethnic minority groups did not compare as well with 
those groups of white staff. And women in ethnic minority groups fare worse than 
men from this group and white women.” 
 
Our survey asked a number of questions on equal opportunities issues. While it is impossible 
for an attitudinal survey to identify whether performance-related pay actually ‘leads to’ discrimination, 
the responses from those staff groups can indicate whom they perceive to be losing out under the 
scheme. 
 
Table 2.13   Do particular groups feel they lose out under PM? 15  
(results cross-tabulated with actual assessment reported) 
 
Question 17 Women Lose out under PM  
Gender Disagree % Agree % Valid response 
Male  58.1 7.3 474 
Female  48.2 19.0 679 
Question 20 Members of ethnic minorities lose out under PM 
Ethnic 
Background 
Disagree % Agree % Valid response 
White 41.4 8.4 1095 
Non-White  32.2 54.0 50 
Question 36 Employees working part-time lose out under PM 
Status Disagree % Agree % Valid response 
Full-Time 37.2 20.6 979 
Part-time   33.3 56.6 180 
 
Note: unweighted data used. Overall totals may differ from category totals they include also those who did not 
reply to the relevant biographical questions. 
 
Table 2.13 shows the views of staff on these equal opportunity questions, comparing those of 
the groups directly affected with those of other staff. Overall, members of the particular categories 
are more likely to feel that fellow members of their group lose out under PM. The difference is less 
pronounced for women, most of whom do not believe that women lose out, but strong for both 
ethnic minorities and part-timers. Among the latter categories, the majority believe their group loses 
out. 
These results may be attributable to a number of factors, such as different expectations of 
managers of the relevant staff groups, especially for part-time staff, and their case, additionally, less 
time to complete the appraisal process, or the lack of opportunity to carry out training associated 
with the work that attracts better assessment marks. 
                                                 
15. Statistical significance tests show the following results:  
Statistics relating to the male/female cross tabulation: Pearson chi2(4) =  89.7668   Pr = 0.000; gamma =   0.3029  
ASE = 0.043; 
Statistics relating to the white/non-white cross tabulation: Pearson chi2(4) =  79.6955   Pr = 0.000; gamma =   
0.3337  ASE = 0.117; 
Statistics relating to the part/ full time cross tabulation: Pearson chi2(4) = 139.0215   Pr = 0.000; gamma =   0.3386  
ASE = 0.063; 
The chi-squared statistic is testing whether the answers are independent of gender. The p-value of 0.000 means 
that a null hypothesis stating that there the answers are independent of gender can be rejected. The gamma-
value of 0.3029 gives a measure of the association of the answers by gender. This is positive and moderately 
strong. 
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Overall it would appear that the problems identified with PM by the Revenue are reinforced 
by these staff group’s perceptions of Performance Management. 
 
 
2.8  The Motivational Effects of PM  
 
The effects of an incentive scheme on staff motivation can be assessed from a number of angles. 
Rather than ask about motivation in general, we have preferred to ask about ‘motivation to do 
what?’. Since the Scheme was designed by management, and The Guide is intended to communicate 
its goals to staff, it is reasonable to start with the objectives set out there. Because we are also 
interested in comparison with 1991, we have also used elements of the appraisal scheme then in 
force. As mentioned earlier, the 1991 goals have been more or less incorporated into the more 
general and systematic framework presented in the Guide. We therefore start by looking at 
motivation to improve certain concrete aspects of one’s personal job performance; then we look at 
cooperation with management and teamworking; and at work atmosphere. Finally, we consider the 
strength of financial incentives. 
 
2.8.1 Incentives to do one’s job better 
 
In this study, we measure the effect of the Scheme on job motivation by asking whether staff felt that 
it has given them an incentive to alter their performance in certain specific directions. Thus, our view 
of motivation could be expressed as the existence of a willingness, or preparedness of staff to 
undertake certain actions. This was the same approach as that taken in the 1991 survey. 
One important advantage of asking the question in this way is that it enables us to focus on a 
rather narrow part of the linkage between motivation and performance, and to concentrate on that. If 
we had instead asked about people’s actions, for example, do they actually do something differently 
as a result of the Scheme, it might be hard to reply positively because of some obstacle even though 
they felt motivated to do so. For example, some staff have said the nature of their job leaves them 
little scope to get an ‘Exceed’. 
On the whole, the results summarised in Table 2.14, show a rather similar picture to that of 
1991. Performance Management has not given many staff a greater incentive to alter their personal 
work patterns, and if anything, the response is slightly more negative in 1996 than in 1991. Few 
believe it has given them an incentive to work beyond the requirements of their job (Q40), to be 
more sensitive to the their colleagues (Q42) or the public (Q44), and few feel it has encouraged them 
to get their work priorities right (Q45). Rather less than in 1991 believe they have an incentive to 
show more initiative (Q46). One factor behind this generally sceptical view may be that staff believe 
they already work at the appropriate standard (Q48), and that PM in some way is felt to imply that 
they are not. 
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Table 2.14 
Individual Motivational effects of PM 
 
Year  No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
1996 
1991 
40 PM has given me an incentive to work beyond the requirements of the job 77.4 
70 
17.5 
21 
1996 
1991 
42 PM has made me more aware about being sensitive to my colleagues  61.2 
63 
17.7 
14 
1996 
 
1991 
44 PM has given me the incentive to be more effective in my dealings with  
the public 
69.1 
 
68 
14.6 
 
9 
1996 
1991 
45 PM has given me a greater incentive to get my work priorities right 63.7 
67 
23.6 
22 
1996 
1991 
46 PM has made me want to show more initiative in my job 70.1 
61 
19.6 
27 
1996 
 
1991 
48 PM has had no effect on the quality of my work because it was already at the 
appropriate level 
8.6 
 
8 
83.8 
 
82 
2.8.2 Incentives for better cooperation and teamworking 
 
The importance of cooperation with colleagues and with managers, and teamworking were heavily 
stressed in the Guide, and are clearly presented as outcomes management are seeking through PM. 
Table 2.15 presents staff replies to questions on these issues. PM appears to make staff less willing 
to help colleagues experiencing work difficulties (Q11), and is widely believed to cause jealousies 
(Q12), and undermine staff morale (Q19). Notable also in the change between 1991 and 1996 is the 
sharp decline in those expressing ‘no view’, implying a stronger polarisatin of views on these 
questions. 
 
Table 2.15 
Effects of PM on team-working and cooperation 
 
Year  No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
1996 
 
1991 
11 PM makes staff less willing to assist colleagues experiencing work 
difficulties 
30.3 
 
53 
63.1 
 
28 
1996 
1991 
12 PM causes jealousies between staff 8.6 
21 
85.5 
62 
1996 
1991 
19 PM has helped to undermine staff morale  10.4 
25 
81.1 
65 
1996 
1991 
41 PM has reduced my wish to co-operate with management 51.2 
75 
30.3 
10 
1996 
 
1991 
104 * PM has reduced the willingness of many of the staff to co-operate with 
management 
36.7 
 
65 
45.0 
 
20 
1996 25 Performance Management discourages teamworking  22.9 66.9 
1996 
 
1991 
32 It would be better to base PM on the performance of groups of staff than 
of individuals  
50.3 
 
73 
27.8 
 
19 
 
Note: * Only managers assessing staff performance were asked this question.  
 
Likely reasons for this would seem to be the emphasis on achieving individual work targets 
which could be jeopardised by helping colleagues. The jealousies could be related to the feeling that 
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management show favouritism under PM so that some get easier targets and may be rated more 
favourably than others. Staff morale would likewise be undermined by the feeling that the system was 
not being operated fairly, and that staff would not be rewarded even if they do well, or are not given 
the opportunity to do well. On all of these questions, staff judge the system more severely than they 
did in 1991 by a large margin. 
Although most staff still say PM has not reduced their willingness to cooperate with 
management, now a significant minority, 30%, believe that it has, a threefold increase on the figure for 
1991 (Q41). Even more striking are the views of managers themselves of whom 45% believe that it 
has reduced the willingness of their staff to cooperate with them (Q104). These views also respresent 
a sharp deterioration of cooperation with management compared with 1991. 
With much work in Revenue offices being dependent on good working relations between 
staff, what are the possible consequences of PM on teamworking? Two thirds of staff believe it 
discourages teamworking (Q25). It also asked about the idea of group performance pay, an idea 
under consideration in the Revenue, but staff do not appear convinced that group PRP would be a 
solution, at least under the current system of Performance Management.16 
 
2.8.3 Effects on work atmosphere: staff commitment and organisational citizenship 
 
Work atmosphere, and in particular, whether staff feel emotionally ‘committed’ in some sense to the 
organisation in which they work, and whether they feel they should behave as good organisational 
‘citizens’ are widely believed to affect performance, especially in areas where it depends upon 
cooperation and understanding among colleagues and between staff and their managers. 
It has been common to measure affective commitment by asking a number of questions 
about whether people feel ‘part of the family’ in their workplace, how ‘emotionally attached’ they 
feel, whether working there means alot to them, whether they think they could be as attached to 
another organisation, and whether they would be happy to spend the rest of their careers there. 
Likewise, whether staff feel they ought to behave as good organisational citizens, and its possible 
effects on similar kinds of performance, have attracted much interest recently (van Dyne et al. 
1994). This view is captured, imperfectly, by asking how far staff are willing to put themselves out in 
order to complete urgent work, or to undertake training likely to benefit the organisation rather than 
stick to a more restrictive view of their obligations to their employer. As raising revenue is such an 
important input into financing public services, we decided also to ask how far staff saw their work 
as contributing to an important public service. 
Even in 1991, the nature of work in the Inland Revenue made it unlikely that many staff 
would feel ‘part of the family’ in the Revenue, and staff expressed much warmer feelings about their 
current office (Q74 & 76). On all of the commitment to the Revenue questions, in 1996, the 
responses were on balance negative. The one exception was that still many staff would feel happy to 
spend the rest of their career there (Q77), although in a period of high unemployment and economic 
uncertainty, many staff may still value the relative job security that is still enjoyed there. Indeed, 
almost 90% of staff overall agreed that job security was important to them in their current job 
(Q65). Another indicator of feelings about the organisation was expressed in the view that 
employees usually lose out whenever there is change (Q83). 
 
                                                 
16.  Question 73 also needs to be considered. This question asked how important working as a member of a team 
was to the employee. Of the responses 52% agreed that it was important while 26% disagreed. 
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Table 2.16 
Attitudes to working in the Inland Revenue 
 
Year  No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
1996 
1991 
74 I feel ‘part of the family’ in my current office 32.3 
26 
55.9 
62 
1996 
1991 
75 I feel a strong sense of commitment to my current office 30.3 
25 
53.3 
58 
1996 
1991 
76 I feel ‘part of the family’ in the Inland Revenue 65.2 
41 
16.1 
35 
1996 
1991 
77 I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career in the Inland Revenue 29.3 
28 
49.4 
53 
1996 
1991 
78 I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ to the Inland Revenue 25.0 
23 
58.2 
58 
1996 
 
1991 
79 I think I could become as attached to another organisation as the  Inland 
Revenue 
14.7 
 
16 
64.5 
 
58 
1996 
1991 
80 I feel a strong sense of commitment to the Inland Revenue  42.5 
32 
35.1 
41 
1996 
1991 
84 Working in the Inland Revenue means a great deal to me   38.7 
36 
29.2 
30 
1996 
1991 
68 Contributing to an important public service is important in my job 19.2 
19 
56.2 
62 
1996 81 I always show goodwill to complete an urgent task 3.7 92.9 
1996 82 I keep myself well-informed and undertake training when I think this may 
benefit the Revenue 
11.9 72.2 
1996 83 Whenever changes are made in this organisation employees usually lose out 
in the end 
13.1 72.9 
1996 86 I have confidence and trust in my fellow staff 24.3 53.2 
1996 47 PM has caused greater stress in my job 25.8 63.6 
 
Turning to Revenue staff’s office and their immediate colleagues, the responses were much 
more positive, with the majority feeling ‘part of the family’ in their current office (Q74), and feeling 
strongly committed to it (Q75). A similar percentage also expressed confidence and trust in their 
fellow staff (Q86). The first of the ‘citizenship’ questions, showing goodwill to complete an urgent 
task (Q81), probably relates most strongly to immediate work colleagues as these are the ones 
most likely to benefit in terms of less disturbance to their own work roles. On the other hand, 
keeping well-informed and undertaking training when of benefit to the Revenue (Q82) probably 
reflects on both office and wider organisation. 
Looking at changes between 1991 and 1996, the most striking feature is the strong 
deterioration of work atmosphere. The affective bonds to the Inland Revenue have declined as the 
third who felt part of the family in 1991 are down to one sixth by 1996, and more feel they could 
become equally attached to another organisation, and fewer expressed a strong emotional 
attachment to the Revenue. This has also spread to people’s current office, where there has also 
been a decline in affective bonds. This leaves the relatively steady percentages saying they would be 
happy to spend the rest of their careers there as possibly doing so on a more calculative basis than 
in the past: a relatively stable job is still worth having even though the atmosphere is less good, and it 
may be more stressful (Q47). 
Despite the drop in measures of commitment to the organisation, staff have maintained a 
commitment to public service. Still about 60% said they valued contributing to an important public 
service (Q68), and a steady 30% found working in the Revenue meant a great deal to them (Q84). 
So it would appear that whatever the drop of affective ties to the Revenue, the organisation 
continues to benefit from an important capital of belief in the value of the public service provided. 
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2.8.4  Effectiveness of financial incentives 
 
A tricky question with any performance scheme is to decide how large the incentive for any one 
period should be in relation to base pay. One view is that the larger the payment, the stronger the 
incentive. But this has to be tempered by the greater uncertainty it introduces into employees’ lives. 
As their employment income usually represents the lion’s share of their total income, they are not in 
a position to spread risks in the way that organisations can. Luhmann and Mayntz have argued that 
public servants are likely to be more averse to risk-taking than the average citizen because it was 
the relative job security that attracted them into the public service in the first place (Mayntz, 1985). 
Another consideration is that the degree of uncertainty felt by staff is increased if they lack 
confidence in the fairness and objectivity of the performance scheme. For example, many 
respondents expressed the view that even if their performance were to merit an ‘Exceed’ they 
would not be given one, and many said they were more concerned to avoid a ‘Not met’ than to gain 
an ‘Exceed’. We therefore asked whether staff felt the amount of money awarded should be 
substantially increased. 
 
Table 2.17 
Financial incentives and PM 
 
Year  No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
1996 
 
1991 
37 The amount of money an individual receives for an ‘exceed’ or an ‘extra-
loaded’ should be substantially increased 
34.2 
 
31 
45.8 
 
41 
1996 
 
1991 
57 The personal satisfaction I derive from my work is sufficient incentive for me 
to do what is needed to get an ‘Exceed’ 
54.9 
 
26 
32.1 
 
63 
 
Both in 1991 and 1996, rather more said the amount of money should be larger, but a large 
minority held the opposite view. As might be expected, more of those who had been awarded an 
‘Exceed’ than who had other assessments thought the amount should be increased, but even among 
these, a quarter disagreed. There was, however, a strong feeling that the non-financial rewards of a 
satisfying job were no longer sufficient to stimulate higher performance (Q57). 
Finally, any gain that might stem from a greater incentive effect from larger payments has to 
be set against possible losses arising from strong demotivating effects of PM. Could one be sure, for 
example, that staff feelings of unfairness over perceived favouritism and jealousies among staff 
would not become more of a problem if the financial stakes were higher? 
 
Table 2.18  Views on the scale of rewards by Performance Assessment received 17 
 
Question 37 The amount of money an individual receives for an ‘exceed’ or an 
‘extra-loaded’ should be substantially increased 
Assessment Disagree % Agree % Valid response 
Exceed 24.3 63.3 354 
Succeed 38.5 37.5 761 
Not Met 45.8 23.3 12 
   1127 
 
                                                 
17.  Pearson chi2(8) = 85.8263    Pr = 0.000; gamma = -0.3921  ASE = 0.041. 
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2.9  Conclusion: the Impact of PM on the Revenue’s Performance 
 
On balance, the effect of Performance Management, as seen through staff responses to our 
questionnaire, has been to damage motivation with little sign of any positive incentive effect to offset 
that. It is seen to cause jealousies, and allow favouritism. Many staff and line managers believe it has 
damaged cooperative work relations, and few staff said it had given them incentive to improve 
different aspects of their performance. The only rays of light were the experiences of individual staff 
in their assessments that were better than their judgements of the process as a whole would suggest, 
and the continued belief in the social value of their work. 
We have no hard evidence on the overall performance of the Inland Revenue except that 
work loads of the organisation as a whole have remained roughly constant while staff numbers have 
been cut quite severely. This implies a potentially large increase in productivity. 
Further evidence that people have been working harder is available from our own survey in 
line manager responses (Table 2.19). 
 Although still not a majority, the proportion of line managers believing that PM has caused 
staff to work beyond the requirements of their jobs (Q103) more than doubled to almost two fifths 
between 1991 and 1996. A similar increase occurred in the percentage reporting an increase in the 
quantity of work staff do, up to 40% (Q107). This contrasts with the perception of a relatively small 
effect on work quality (Q106), sustained high performance (Q105), and on commitment (Q108). 
 
Table 2.19 
Line management assessments of whether PM has caused staff to work harder 
 
Year  No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
1996 
 
1991 
103 The existence of PM has caused many of the staff to work beyond the 
requirements of their job  
55.5 
 
79 
37.1 
 
15 
1996 
1991 
107 PM has led to an increase in the quantity of the work many of the staff do  51.2 
71 
41.6 
22 
1996 
1991 
106 PM has helped to increase the quality of the work of many of the staff 72.2 
82 
16.7 
10 
1996 
1991 
105 PM has led to many of staff giving sustained high performance at work   67.8 
77 
17.5 
14 
1996 
1991 
108 PM has made many of the staff more committed to their work 72.8 
79 
12.9 
12 
 
How then can this be reconciled with the damaging effects of the incentive scheme upon 
individual motivation, work group relations, and its apparent ineffectiveness in goal setting? 
The main outcome appears to have been an increase in work loads. For this, the elaborate 
considerations of the goal setting process as set out in the Guide have probably been unnecessary, 
so their apparent ineffectiveness has had little effect on productivity. Likewise, the dimensions of 
motivation that we sought to measure were again made largely irrelevant by the general pressure to 
increase work loads. Here the high and much increased percentage of staff who replied that their 
current jobs gave them little scope to gain an ‘Exceed’ is surely relevant. Motivation is critical if staff 
are to exercise independent judgement about their work, to take initiative, and to look for better 
ways of doing things, but if the pace of work is such that all they can do is to apply established 
routines, then discretion and motivation have a smaller part to play. Of course, there has been 
substantial change and reorganisation as staff prepare for Self Assessment, so the work routines 
cannot be that static, but still an increased work pressure, and targets that stress, or are felt to 
stress, quantity over other criteria place less demands on individual staff motivation.  
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There is however another change that appears to be under way. That is shown in the 
increased focus on individual targets, the greater reluctance to help colleagues experiencing work 
difficulties, and the general decline in attitudes favourable to team working and cooperation. The 
former rather than the latter are seen as what bring the rewards. Indeed, too much helping 
colleagues that led to a ‘Not Met’ would be penalised. The belief that staff who gain ‘Exceeds’ are 
those who are cleverest at negotiating their performance agreements is surely a worrying sign that 
people are beginning to believe that the rewards go to those who ‘play’ the system most effectively. 
Likewise, the beliefs that managerial favouritism can help get an ‘Exceed’, and more generally that 
management are not playing by their own rules, again indicate the rewards to manipulating the 
system rather than working within its spirit. 
Judging by the responses on public service, on citizenship behaviour, and the reasons for 
appreciating one’s job in the Revenue, the department remains a very long way from the piecework 
bargaining jungle that characterised much of the British engineering industry in the 1960s, but the 
apparent growth of cynicism among the staff does lead one to ask how long the growth in 
productivity will be sustainable given the damaging effects of Performance Management on many 
aspects of staff motivation. 
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Chapter 3 
‘Equity Shares’ at the Employment Service 
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
The Employment Service was established as an Executive Agency, attached to the Department of 
Education and Employment (DfEE), under the Next Steps programme in April 1990. Its main 
function is paying out unemployment benefit and running job centres to assist unemployed people 
seeking work. It currently employs around 35,000 staff, with the headquarters in Sheffield, and local 
offices organised into 9 regions. It recognises four unions for negotiation purposes; the Public 
Service, Taxation and Commerce Union, (PTC), the Civil and Public Servants Association 
(CPSA), the First Division Association (FDA) and the Institution of Professionals, Managers and 
Specialists (IPMS). 
The decision to delegate pay from the Treasury to individual government departments and 
agencies led to the development of a variety of schemes which sought to strengthen the link between 
employee performance and pay, so that the assessment of an individual’s performance became the 
central focus in determining pay awards and pay progression. 
Prior to pay delegation in 1994, the Employment Service followed the traditional Civil 
Service pay and grading structures and was bound by the central civil-service wide pay agreements. 
The then central performance pay system was built onto the existing appraisal system, and was 
awarded on top of normal salary increases and increments, and there was no automatic financial 
penalty for poor performance. Performance was also measured against the demands of job grades 
rather than individual targets. 
With pay delegation, the Employment Service Agency broke away from the central civil 
service agreements and set up its own new pay and grading structure, in which its ‘Equity Share’ 
scheme of individual performance related pay plays a central role. 
The survey reported in this chapter analyses staff attitudes to performance pay in the 
Employment Service. It is based upon the responses of a sample of Employment Service executive 
grade staff, organised by the PTC, surveyed in January and February 1997.  
In this chapter we ask a number of questions: 
  
• What are employees’ attitudes to performance-related pay?  
• Does performance related pay help set clear work objectives?  
• Do staff consider the performance related pay system to be fair?  
• Does performance related pay motivate staff?  
• Does PRP affect teamworking and co-operation with management?   
• Does performance-related pay actually improve performance?  
 
Shortly after our survey was completed, The Guardian newspaper reported that the then 
government had set up an internal enquiry to look into allegations of widespread abuse of 
performance targets within the Employment Service. Although we could not explore this directly in 
our survey, these events do broaden the criteria for the scheme’s effectiveness. Our survey was 
mainly designed to address the questions just outlined, and is geared to evaluating the impact on 
different dimensions of job performance and workplace cooperation. However, according to The 
Guardian’s sources, over-reporting was serious and widespread, and could have inflated job 
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placement figures, one of the scheme’s chief performance targets, nationally by up to 30%. At the 
heart of The Guardian’s reports was the performance pay scheme. One question we address in 
our conclusion on the scheme’s effects on staff performance is how it might have contributed to the 
scale of abuse reported. Thus although the scheme, like that of the Inland Revenue, appears to have 
boosted the quantity of work done by a significant number of staff, it is likely that its reputation for 
unfairness in the eyes of the staff contributed to its demoralisation and subsequent abuse. 
 
3.2   Performance Related Pay in the Employment Service 
 
Introduction of the ‘Equity Share’ scheme at the Employment Service involved major changes in 
performance management at the agency, notably, a new pay and grading structure, a new system of 
performance appraisal, and the establishment of a pot of money from which performance pay in the 
Agency would be funded, and mechanisms for determining its size. 
 
3.2.1 New grading structure 
 
Pay delegation in the Employment Service was implemented in 1994 and was linked to a variety of 
changes in pay structures and working conditions. The most significant of these was the creation of a 
new grading structure. The unified civil service grading structure (Grades 4-7, Senior Executive 
Officer, Higher Executive officer, Executive Officer, Administrative Officer and Administrative 
Assistant) were replaced following a job evaluation scheme.  
The middle management (executive) grades were split up into seven Management Pay 
Bands (MPBs). Each pay band has a minimum, mid-point and maximum value. Following the 
implementation of the new grading structure, those staff initially disadvantaged by the job evaluation 
process were allowed to remain on Assimilated Pay Bands (APBs) until their pay matched that 
available under the new Management Pay Bands. The structure for MPBs 1-6 and the APBs 
represented by the PTC is shown below (Table 3.1):  
Initially arrangements for support, clerical and administrative grades were not changed. In 
1995, however, two subsequent Pay Bands (PB 8 and PB 9) were set up to cover most staff in this 
group. MPB 7 spans the former Executive Officer and Administrative Officer grades. 
 
Table 3.1 
Management Pay Bands Maxima and Minima 1996/97 
 
Old Grade  Management Pay Band Minimum Mid-point Box C Bar Maximum 
SEO MPB 1 22,600 24,700 25,728 26,800 
 MPB 2 20,600 22,500 23,520 24,500 
 APB SEO 19,215 21,504 22,841 23,793 
HEO MPB 3 18,500 20,300 21,216 22,100 
 MPB 4 16,500 18,250 19,200 20,000 
 APB HEO 15,363 17,388 18,636 19,412 
EO MPB 5 14,800 16,325 17,136 17,850 
 MPB 6 13,000 14,800 15,936 16,600 
 APB EO 11,208 13,679 15,504 16,150 
 
Source: PTC: Employment Service MPB/APB Pay Agreement 1996/7. Note: the Box C Bar operated until 1996. 
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3.2.2  Performance appraisal 
 
The appraisal method used in determining performance pay was introduced in September 1994. 
The characteristics of the scheme include: 
 
• performance appraisal, judged against specific responsibilities and objectives for the post; 
• a means of demonstrating performance against competencies in the post, in order to assist 
vacancy filling; 
• an assessment of individual development needs which relate to performance in the post and future 
career development needs; 
• a four box marking system  for performance assessments: 
   
Box A: Outstanding performance in which objectives have been exceeded 
Box B: Good Performance in which objectives have been met 
Box C: Generally satisfactory performance in which some objectives have not been met 
Box D: Performance not satisfactory in which objectives have been missed 
 
The new system focuses entirely on the achievement of business objectives and individuals’ 
performance in their jobs. These objectives include targets for the number of people who are placed 
in vacant posts as well as paying benefit accurately and on time. Individual employees draw up a 
Performance Agreement with their line managers, indicating the nature of the job and a number of 
performance objectives. Progress should be reviewed quarterly allowing for changes to the 
agreement where necessary. The manager will then make an assessment of the employee’s 
performance based upon the four box marking system (IDS 1995). An appeal system is in 
operation for staff who believe their assessments to have been unfair. 
 
3.2.3  Performance pay through ‘equity shares’ 
 
The performance pay element of the pay system, like the grading changes, was implemented in 
stages, with the system for executive grades agreed in April 1994 and that for administrative, clerical 
and support grades reached in 1995.  
The overall budget for performance pay is determined annually in discussion with the 
Treasury and then in negotiation with the unions. This is then distributed by means of ‘Equity shares’ 
whose actual value depends upon the size of the budget, the number of shares awarded, and the 
individual’s pay band.1 The Box Markings determine the number of shares to which each employee 
is entitled. The Agency operates an ‘indicative box mark distribution’.  Although there is no fixed 
quota for the range of box markings, management informed the unions of its expected distribution 
where around 5% of staff achieve a Box A, 75% a Box B, 19% a Box C and 1% a Box D (PTC, 
                                                 
1. In the 1994 Pay and Grading Agreement (para 47), the formula set out was: 
a) the value of a single performance ‘share’ to be calculated by applying a percentage to the mid-point of each of 
the agreed MPB and APB pay ranges; 
b) the percentage to be used for this purpose will be subject to negotiations, taking into account the overall 
budget available for such awards; 
c) the number of performance pay ‘shares’ to allocated in the following ratio: Box A, 3 shares, Box B, two shares; 
Box C, one share; Box D, nil. 
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1996).2 With such ratios, the great majority of staff are clearly expected to meet their targets, and 
subsequently to receive performance pay, albeit of varying amounts. The cash value of equity shares 
is based on the mid-point of each pay band to maintain differentials between pay bands. The shares 
are then allocated in the following ratio:  
 
Box A: 3 Shares 
Box B: 2 Shares 
 Box C: 1 Share 
 Box D: No shares 
 
Initially, the annual pay award was based solely on the number of shares an employee 
gained as the result of the performance assessment. All pay progression was, in this way, made 
performance-related. This method was called into question following the 1995 award, when 
employees assessed as Box B received an award below inflation.3  Thus, the 1996 agreement saw 
the introduction of a standard performance award (SPA). This is a flat-rate payment awarded to 
everyone receiving a Box C or better and paid in addition to the equity share-based performance 
award. Both awards are consolidated up to the pay band maxima or performance bar. Where 
awards take staff over the pay band maximum, pay above this point is non-consolidated. Table 3.2 
shows the share distribution for the 1996/7 award. 
Until 1996, a Box C Performance Bar also operated. The bar was set at 96% of the pay 
band maximum (see Table 3.1). Staff who continue to receive Box C marks did not consolidate 
their pay award above this level, but received non-consolidated pay. Pay was only consolidated 
again when they received a Box A or Box B. 
 
 
Table 3.2 
Share values allocated in the 1996/7 pay award  
(share value as % of mid-point of pay band) 
 
Management Pay Band Standard award (SPA) % Box A % Box B % Box C % 
MPB 1 2.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 
MPB 2 2.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 
APB SEO 2.1 3.1 2.1 1.0 
MPB 3 2.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 
MPB 4 2.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 
APB HEO 2.1 3.1 2.1 1.0 
MPB 5 2.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 
MPB 6 2.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 
APB EO 2.2 3.2 2.1 1.1 
 
Source: PTC: Employment Service MPB/APB Pay Agreement 1996/97 
 
                                                 
2.  From April 1997, the target distribution was modified to give Box A, 10%, and Box C 14%. This change was 
known about at the time of our survey. 
 
3. The PTC successfully balloted members against rejecting the original offer in 1995.  
 
 41  
3.2.4 Discontent with the new pay and grading structure 
 
One notable area of discontent with the new structure arose from the job evaluation and regrading 
exercise, and this may have affected the views of the whole performance pay system in the eyes of 
some staff. Discontent was greatest among the assimilate pay bands (APB bands), which included 
many who felt they were the ‘losers’ under the new system. 
Our results confirm that those on the APB bands were more likely to reply that their pay 
band prevented them from being awarded a higher Box Mark (Q62). However, such staff represent 
only about one fifth of our sample, and so are unlikely to affect our conclusions dramatically. 
 
 
3.3 The Sample 
 
In 1996 we approached both management and the PTC in the Employment Service with a view to 
carrying out a questionnaire survey of employee attitudes to and experiences with performance pay 
similar to those carried out in the Inland Revenue in 1991 and in 1996 (Marsden and Richardson 
1992, and Chapter 2).  
Employment Service management declined to take part in the survey. However, the PTC 
did agree to do so and a sample of 1,000 members in the ES was randomly selected from its 
membership database.  A questionnaire was developed in consultation PTC full-time officers and 
the Employment Service Group Advisory Committee, a senior body of lay representatives. The 
questionnaires were then issued by the union direct to members at the end of January 1997, with a 
pre-paid postage sticker for freepost returns. 
Of the 1,000 questionnaires issued, 326 questionnaires were returned. Of these 34 were 
spoiled. This corresponds to a response rate of 32.6%.  It should be noted that time off was not 
granted by management for staff to complete the survey, and that the survey coincided with the 
implementation of the Job Seekers Allowance, a system designed to replace the traditional issuing of 
unemployment benefit and social security (carried out by the Benefits Office) which involved large 
scale organisational changes.  
In the Employment Service, the PTC represents the executive and support grades as well as 
some senior grades and the CPSA represents the administration and clerical grades as well as some 
in the lowest middle management grades (MPBs 6-7). Among executive grades (middle 
management level), union membership stands at approximately 60% overall, and at about 40% for 
the PTC.4 In gauging the representativeness of the study, we estimated response rates using the 
sample fraction and employment details for the ES as a whole (see Appendix 1). 
Although we obtained a good response across pay bands and regions, the estimated 
response rate was somewhat lower for the lower pay bands and for London and the South East 
region, and for women. The main reasons we could ascertain were that the CPSA has a number of 
members in the lower pay bands (MPB6 and APB EO) and their members would have been 
outside our sample. The under-representation of London and the South East and over-
representation of the Head Office is probably explained by a larger number of middle management 
jobs being located in Sheffield Head Office and not in London as is the case with other departments 
                                                 
4. According to the PTC 1995 Membership Report,  membership for the Department of Employment group stood 
at 32%. This included  both  job centres,  where membership was 48%, and skill centres, Astra, and Tecs, where 
membership was 8%. According to the PTC, its membership of the ES ‘executive grades’ stands at about 40%. 
CPSA membership accounts for a further 20% in these grades. 
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such as the Inland Revenue. The lower estimated response for women, which is based on the 
gender breakdown for the ES as a whole, reflects the smaller percentage of women in the MPB pay 
bay bands, and is therefore an underestimate of the likely true response rate. 
Because of the uneven sampling caused by variations in PTC membership by job grade, we 
decided to weight the survey results adjusting for differences in response between pay bands, in 
order to give a clearer picture for staff in executive grades overall. Personal data, which are also 
needed for methodological checks, have been left unweighted (see Appendix 2). In practice the 
overall effect of weighting is rather small. 
Finally, we checked our sample for any serious discrepancies between the actual 
distribution of Box Markings and that in our sample. One concern was that there might be a bias in 
response towards either staff who felt they had done badly under the scheme, or towards those who 
had done especially well. In fact, the Box Markings of those in our sample matches the actual 
distribution very closely (Table 3.3). 
A final check on representativeness is the spread of performance appraisals in the sample 
against the ‘indicative box marking’ set by the Employment Service as a guide for the actual 
distribution of box markings. The responses indicate an over-representation of Box As and Box Bs 
compared to Boxes C and D. This might be related to executive grades receiving higher marks than 
lower pay bands, a degree of ‘drift’ in box markings, but it could also indicate a slight biased in 
response towards those ‘doing better’ under PRP (Table 3.3). 
 
 
Table 3.3 
Box markings in our sample compared with the indicative box markings (%) 
 
Assessment  Indicative Box Markings  Sample Box Markings Actual Box Markings 1996/97 
Box A 5 11.2 9.6 
Box B 75 79.4 81.3 
Box C 19 9.4 9.0 
Box D 1 0.0 0.1 
 
Source: Sample data (1.1.97) and ES 
 
 
3.4 Staff Attitudes to Performance-related Pay and Other Elements of 
Pay Determination 
 
Nearly three quarters of Employment Service staff approve of the general principle of linking pay to 
performance and reject the idea that it is fundamentally unfair (Table 3.4). This echoes the findings 
from the Inland Revenue in the previous chapter.  
 
 43  
Table 3.4 
Attitudes to the principle of performance pay by organisation 5 
 
No.   Question Disagree  
% 
Agree  
% 
1 The principle of relating pay to performance is a good one 26.4 72.2 
2  The idea of performance pay is fundamentally unfair 70.6 23.2 
 
However, general acceptance of the principle of PRP clearly has limits, since staff do not 
accept the idea that pay should be made entirely dependent on performance. Over three-quarters of 
staff do not believe that individual PRP should be the sole determinant of pay (Table 3.5, Q5).  
Instead, they identify a number of other principles of pay determination as important. These 
include:  
 
• compensating employees for rises in the cost of living (Q9) 
• taking into account differing workloads within the same pay band (Q4) 
• ensuring that pay reflects job demands rather than individual performance (Q8) 
• continuing to follow nationally negotiated pay scales (Q7) 
 
Some of these views are accommodated, to a certain degree, by the equity-share scheme. 
The introduction of the standard performance award (SPA) goes some way to meeting the view that 
pay should include a cost of living element. Pay also continues to be determined through national 
negotiations across the Employment Service and has not been devolved to regional or office level. 
However, while the creation of management pay bands allows greater pay differentiation than the 
old civil service grading system, no additional differentiation within pay bands is possible.6   
Furthermore, the belief that pay should reflect job demands rather than individual performance 
conflicts with the principles of the equity share scheme of performance appraisal. 
 
                                                 
5. A 5 point scale was used in both surveys. Staff were asked to respond to questions  by expressing whether 
they ‘strongly disagreed’, ‘disagreed’ had ‘no view’, ‘agreed’ or  ,’strongly agreed’. For ease of presentation the 
strongly disagrees and disagrees have been grouped together as “disagrees”, and the strongly agrees and  
agrees as “agrees”. 
 
6. By contrast the  Inland Revenue has a mechanism of ‘extra-loading’ whereby staff with heavier workloads can 
receive larger pay awards than other staff in the same pay band/span. 
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Table 3.5 
Staff views on different payment criteria 
 
No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
5 Individuals should be paid solely on the basis of individual performance 76.0 17.0 
9 Annual pay rises should be used primarily to compensate for rises in the cost of 
living 
17.8 72.9 
4 Pay should take greater account of different duties carried out by staff in the same 
band 
24.3 67.9 
8 Pay should reflect the demands of the job and not the performance of individual  
Job holders  
26.2 61.8 
7 People should be paid according to nationally negotiated pay scales 12.4 78.5 
3 Experience (i.e. years in the job) should count more towards determining pay  
Levels  
50.5 36.3 
6 Staff should be paid more if their skills are in short supply 42.9 38.8 
 
In contrast to some of our other case studies, the majority of ES executive grade staff do 
not believe that experience should play a larger role in determining pay (Q3). This suggests that the 
majority of staff do not regret the removal of increments from the salary system (Q95). Somewhat 
surprisingly, in view of the increased scope for payment to those at the top of their pay bands, it was 
this group that was most strongly in favour of greater reward for experience. 7 
Finally, staff were generally not keen on higher pay for those whose skills were in short 
supply even though this has become a commonly used argument in pay negotiations. 
 
3.5 Using Performance Pay to Set Clear Objectives 
 
One of the arguments frequently used in support of performance pay is that it helps to ‘drive’ 
assessment procedures, because they must be completed before performance awards can be paid. 
We turn, therefore, to examine whether Employment Service’s Equity Share scheme has led to an 
improvement in objective setting and appraisals for staff. 
In the Agency, staff’s individual performance agreements stress the contribution to the 
explicit targets of its business objectives, notably job placements and accurate and timely benefit 
payments. These objectives are additionally tied to the state of the labour market. We would, 
therefore, expect the Equity Share scheme to play a role in raising staff awareness of Agency 
targets. The linking of Agency goals to individual performance agreements and ultimately to 
appraisal and pay also requires clarity in objective setting, since employees must know the quantity 
and quality of work expected of them. 
Table 3.6 identifies staff responses to the goal setting aspects of the scheme. Firstly, most 
staff understand how the scheme operates (Q39), although almost one quarter claim not to 
understand its operation. This figure appears high given the fact that the scheme has been operating 
since 1994, and many of the staff surveyed are in management pay bands. 
                                                 
7. 63% of those already on the top of their payscale believe that experience should count more towards to 
determining pay levels compared to 46.63% of those yet to reach the top of their pay scale. However, while this 
different is statistically significant (chi-squared = 0.082 ; significant at 10% level), a majority of both  groups 
disagree with the question. 
 
 45  
Table 3.6 
Staff views on goal setting 
 
No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
39 I do not understand how the Agency’s PRP scheme operates  68.0 22.8 
11 Performance Pay raises staff awareness of Agency objectives (APA Targets) 46.6 49.6 
40  Performance Pay has made me more aware of the targets of the Agency  56.4 39.0 
97 Performance Pay has made staff more aware of the Agency’s targets. * 47.8 47.9 
15 It (PRP) has made managers set work targets more clearly 44.8 49.8 
 
*  Only those officers carrying out performance appraisals were asked this question. 
 
Performance pay has contributed to raising awareness of the Agency’s targets amongst 
staff. Almost half of those responding agree that PRP has raised overall awareness of APA targets 
(Q11); a view confirmed by those staff carrying out appraisals (Q97). This figure drops however, 
when individuals are asked if the PRP scheme has raised their own personal levels of awareness 
(Q40). This could imply two things. It may be a reflection of the lack of understanding among a 
sizeable minority of staff surveyed (Q39 above).  
The difference may also be explained in terms of grade. Middle managers probably feel that 
they already know about the Agency’s targets and overall: PRP has not added to that knowledge. 
However, they believe it has raised awareness overall, and thus by implication the awareness of staff 
in lower pay bands. This view is reinforced by the responses of those carrying out assessments who 
also believe that PRP has been influential. Since PRP is not the only way in which the Agency’s 
targets are communicated to staff, a large number of ‘disagrees’ does not necessarily imply 
ignorance of these targets.  
Similarly, a majority of staff do believe that PRP has made managers set clearer work 
targets (Q15). However, a large proportion of staff do not agree with this view (44.8%). Again, this 
does not mean that managers have not set clear work targets independent of PRP, but it suggests 
that a large number of staff surveyed do not believe that PRP has had a positive influence on 
objective setting.  
Turning to the appraisal process itself (Table 3.7), the results suggest that the process of 
appraisal is operating satisfactorily with over 60% of staff having sufficient opportunity to discuss 
their performance with their line managers (Q52). However, a significant minority feel that they have 
not had such opportunities (36%).  Nevertheless, over 70% of staff surveyed understood their most 
recent box marking (Q53) and almost two-thirds believe it a fair reflection of their performance 
(Q54).  
Three-quarters staff believe that they are capable of achieving the top box markings (Q56).  
However, although a small majority of staff claim to know what they need to do to receive a Box A 
or B in the future (Q55), the number of staff who claim not to know suggests that widespread 
doubts exist about what is expected of them.  
Doubts also exist amongst staff when it comes receiving the correct box marking (Q58). 
Over half of those responding to this question believe they would not receive the box marking they 
deserved. And over two-thirds of those surveyed also disagree that PRP properly recognises and 
rewards good work (Q16). 
Why should two thirds of the staff believe their latest mark a fair reflection of their 
performance, and yet doubt they will get the mark they deserve even if their performance warrants 
it, and believe that their current job makes it hard for them to meet or exceed objectives? There is a 
number of reasons for this apparent inconsistency. The main answer probably lies in the sheer size 
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of the Box B which includes 80% of staff. A second factor lies in the lack of discretion staff have in 
agreeing their performance targets: most staff feel their targets are not agreed but are imposed by 
management (Q61). This instills a degree of resignation among staff, encouraging them to play safe 
and aim for a B rather than an A. Like the Inland Revenue staff, they are more concerned to avoid 
the penalties associated with failing to meet their targets and getting a low box mark than to aspire to 
a Box A and to higher pay.8 
 
Table 3.7 
Staff views on appraisal 
 
No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
52 Throughout the last year, I had sufficient opportunity  to discuss my performance 
with my line manager 
36.1 61.4 
53 I understand why I was awarded my most recent Box Marking 21.3 72.6 
54 My most recent Box Marking was a fair reflection of my performance 31.1 64.8 
55 I know what I have to do to get a Box A or B in the future 46.7 48.2 
56 I am personally capable of doing what is necessary to get a Box A or B in the future 13.3 77.0 
58 Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt I will receive the box marking I 
deserve 
32.5 54.4 
59 The nature of my present job makes it very hard for me to meet or exceed  objectives 33.6 58.6 
61 Staff feel pressured into accepting performance objectives set by management 
without discussion. 
26.9 63.4 
16 It (PRP) has meant good work is recognised and rewarded at last 69.0 23.9 
 
It would appear that PRP has had some impact in raising employee awareness in Agency 
objectives and in improving managers’ goal-setting. The majority of staff also believe the 
performance appraisal system is working correctly. However, doubts were expressed when staff 
were asked if they knew how to get the top box markings in the future (Q56) and there was also a 
belief that these appraisals may not reflect actual performance (Q58). The element of pressure felt 
by staff in the setting of their objectives (Q61) suggests that performance pay has provided 
management with a channel through which pressure for greater output can be exerted. When staff 
also reply that performance pay has not meant that ‘good work’ is at last recognised and rewarded 
(Q16), it suggests that the pressure is experienced primarily in the direction of greater work intensity 
rather than what the staff consider to be better quality. 
 
3.6 The Fairness of PRP 
 
A central requirement of any pay system if it is to motivate staff is that they should believe it 
operates fairly. This is especially true of the Employment Service’s scheme where appraisal decides 
the size of an employee’s annual pay increase. The scheme includes a variety of mechanisms which 
could undermine staff’s acceptance of the pay system if they thought they had been applied 
incorrectly or unfairly. We therefore included a series of questions intended to capture staff 
perceptions of the scheme’s operation. These are reported in Table 3.8.   
 
                                                 
8. We did not ask this question of the ES staff because the procedures for agreeing personal targets were much 
less central than in the IR scheme. 
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Table 3.8 
Views on the appropriateness and fairness of PRP  
 
No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
14 It (PRP) is difficult to operate because the type of work done in the ES is hard to 
measure 
19.1 72.4 
25 The individual performance targets are a suitable basis for determining 
performance pay 
66.8 23.4 
106 Performance Pay is a bad idea because not enough staff have sufficient control 
over their work to change their ways * 
23.0 63.8 
17 Managers use the scheme to reward their favourites 31.9 41.4 
19 Staff are frequently denied the Box Marking they deserve because  there is a 
quota system of Box Markings 
15.5 74.5 
31 The appeal system ensures unfair appraisals are corrected  45.6 13.0 
38 The amount of money an individual receives for a Box A should be 
substantially increased 
44.7 34.7 
34 Non-consolidated pay an acceptable method for distributing performance pay  67.0 9.4 
23 PRP is simply a device to cut the pay bill 12.1 74.1 
22 For all that is said about quality, the Agency’s PRP scheme is simply a device 
to get more work done 
21.2 64.7 
29 The link with pay makes staff question the fairness of performance appraisals  10.4 77.9 
 
*  Only those officers carrying out performance appraisals were asked this question. 
 
A central issue is the suitability of a performance related pay system to work in the 
Employment Service. In this respect it is important to identify whether staff believe that their work 
can be accurately measured, whether it is suited to individual assessment and whether they have 
sufficient control of their work to achieve the objectives which form the basis of their appraisal. 
In each case staff surveyed believed this not to be the case. Over 70% of staff believed that 
their work was difficult to measure (Q14), and over two thirds, that it was inappropriate to use 
individual performance targets to determine performance pay (Q25). The nature of the problem is 
illustrated by what we were told, in our feedback discussions with PTC lay officials. If one were to 
ask ES office staff about their work, they would often talk about how they had helped someone find 
a job, and this was what they regarded as ‘doing a good job’ rather than meeting specific placement 
targets. Often it was hard to place someone to their satisfaction in a short 20 minute interview. For 
example, sometimes it might take 40 minutes to make a good placement, but the queue of other job 
seekers awaiting their interviews maintains pressure on staff to keep to the standard time. Finally a 
large majority of line managers doing appraisals do not believe their staff have enough control of 
their work to operate performance pay (Q106). 
A second question is that of openness. For a PRP system based upon (subjective) appraisal 
to be seen as fair, it must be seen to be free from manipulation. However, in three important areas 
this does not appear to be the case in the Employment Service. Firstly, a large proportion, over 
two-fifths, of staff believe that line managers use the PRP scheme to reward their favourites (Q17). 
More significantly, almost three quarters of  staff believe that the indicative box marking system 
operates as a de facto quota to withhold higher box markings from those staff who deserve them 
(Q19). Finally, staff also appear to have little faith in the appeal procedure (Q31). It is clear from 
these responses that staff view the pay system as open to manipulation, with little faith in the appeal 
system to redress incorrect markings. 
At first sight, our findings on favouritism might be contrasted with the small number of 
complaints actually made, a fact which had surprised the lay officials with whom we discussed our 
results. However, a number of factors militate against making formal complaints. The procedure is 
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rather cumbersome, and the prospective gain rather small as four fifths of staff get Box Bs in any 
case. In addition, the replies on personal performance appraisals, which were rather positive (Table 
3.7, Q52, 53 and 54), suggest most staff had not experienced favouritism personally in their own 
appraisals, but rather knew of cases among their acquaintances. It was therefore reflecting not so 
much individual experience with the scheme as its reputation in the eyes of the staff. 
At a more instrumental level, ‘fairness’ does not only mean receiving the box marking which 
performance deserves, but receiving an appropriate level of pay for that level of performance. One 
issue is the size of rewards for better performance. ‘Disagrees’ outnumber ‘agrees’ on whether the 
extra pay for a Box A should be substantially increased. However, among the ten percent who were 
awarded Box As, over 60% believe the amount of money should be raised.9  So the high 
performers themselves were not feeling well-rewarded for their efforts. As only 10% get Box As, 
this leaves a fair number of those getting Box Bs who also felt that the incentive needed to be 
increased. 
A second issue concerns consolidation of performance payments. When staff reach the top 
of their pay bands, pay awards become non-consolidated lump-sum payments which do not count 
towards their superannuation. Although this is an improvement for many of those at the top of their 
pay scales compared with the previous system when they would have got nothing, staff did not seem 
impressed by the lack of consolidation. Two thirds of staff did not believe it to be suitable (Q34), 
and the view of those at the top of their pay scale did not differ significantly from those of other 
staff.10 One possible explanation for the unpopularity of non-consolidated payments may be that 
pay is now directly based upon an individual’s performance with all the uncertainties that brings. 
A final issue concerns staff perceptions of the whole pay system. The ES performance pay 
scheme was introduced with the intention of clarifying objectives, motivating and rewarding staff and 
subsequently improving employee performance. However, if  the fairness of such a system is called 
into question, then employees may identify other motives behind the application of the system. In the 
case of the Employment Service, this manifests itself in two ways. Firstly, almost two-thirds of staff 
surveyed see the scheme as a means simply to intensify work (Q22). And secondly almost three-
quarters perceive the operation of the scheme as designed to cut the overall paybill (Q23).    
Overall, staff believe that the link between pay and performance and appraisal calls into 
question the fairness of the appraisal process (Q29). Thus performance pay, as far as the equity 
share scheme in the Employment Service is concerned, is generally perceived as contaminating 
rather than driving employee appraisal.  
 
                                                 
9. The differences in opinions on differentials when broken down by box markings is statistically significant at 
the 1% level (chi-squared = 0.002).  48.68% (111) of staff receiving a box B believe the differentials should not be 
widened while 30.26 (69) do. Surprisingly opinion is almost equally divided amongst the staff receiving a Box C.  
  
10. When  responses to the question on non-consolidated pay are  broken down by those staff on the top of 
their pay scale and those yet to reach it no statistically significant differences were found (chi-square = 0.315) 
Similarly when broken down by box marking their was no significant difference (chi-square = 0.313). 
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3.7 Performance Pay and Poor Performance 
 
If a performance pay scheme is to reward staff who perform well, then logically it has to be able to 
identify and penalise poor performance, in order to stop ‘free-riding’. In the Employment Service 
the removal of incremental progression means that pay awards are determined by box marking. 
Those judged to have performed unsatisfactorily receive a Box D, get no Equity Shares and no pay 
rise. They are even excluded from the standard performance award (SPA). Those judged to have 
performed generally satisfactorily but not to met all their objectives receive a Box C, and one equity 
share. They are also entitled to the SPA, but have their progression held back through the 
performance bar.  
However, the central question is whether such mechanisms are actually applied and 
effective. Table 3.9 identifies employee attitudes to the management of poor performance.  
 
Table 3.9 
PRP and poor performance 
 
No. Question Disagree % Agree % 
28 The Agency’s PRP scheme is a good way to identify poor performance. 63.7 25.5 
104 It (PRP) has made it easier for me to deal with poor performance * 64.4 25.0 
51 Managers know enough about the jobs of their staff to identify poor performance 44.9 47.8 
27 Performance Pay has made staff less willing to tolerate absence in their section.  31.3 44.8 
 
*  Only those officers carrying out performance appraisals were asked this question. 
 
These results indicate that the PRP scheme is not generally seen as an effective way of 
identifying poor performance. Neither managers (Q104), nor staff overall (Q28), believe this to be 
the case. Opinion is also divided amongst staff as to whether managers know enough about the jobs 
of their staff despite the scheme’s emphasis on a more direct reporting procedure than in the past 
(IDS, 1995).11  
However, it would appear that instead peer pressure is operating to the same end in the 
Employment Service to maintain performance levels. Sick leave is often closely monitored by 
management. But the scheme has has made staff less tolerant of absence among their colleagues 
(Q27). ‘Unwarranted’ sick leave will not only be seen as ‘free-riding’, but will also affect 
workloads of staff who have to provide cover. This in turn may prevent them from meeting 
performance objectives and affect their own pay. While such peer pressure may be more effective 
than direct management action, there are two attendant dangers. Firstly, it may push staff who are 
genuinely ill to come to work. And secondly, it may cause tension and resentment within the office 
and so damage teamworking. 
 
3.8 Personal Motivation, Morale and Team Working 
 
                                                 
11. In the example given it was stated that ‘whereas under the three-grade structure two HEOs would need an 
SEO to report to, under the new structure an ex-HEO on MPB 3 can now report to another ex-HEO on MPB 2.’ By 
breaking down the old structure in such a way, one would expect managers to have closer contact with their staff 
and subsequently more knowledge of their work.  
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One of the explicit or implicit aims of performance related pay schemes is that of improving 
motivation. By clarifying objectives for individuals and linking their achievement to financial reward, 
such a scheme is designed to motivate employees to do better and improve their performance and 
subsequently that of the organisation. 
As in our other case studies, we define motivation as the willingness or preparedness of staff 
to do something  (rather that the actual performance of individuals). Staff were asked whether they 
felt performance pay had given them an incentive to alter their performance in certain specific 
directions. One important advantage of asking the question in this way is that it enables the analysis to 
focus on a rather narrow part of the linkage between motivation and performance, and to concentrate 
on that. If employees had been asked instead about their actions, it might be hard to reply positively 
because of some obstacle even though they felt motivated to do so. For example, as already 
reported, staff have said the nature of their job leaves them little scope to exceed their objectives. 
  
Table 3.10 
The individual motivational effects of PRP 
 
No. Question Disagree % Agree % 
41 Performance Pay has given me an incentive to work beyond the requirements of the 
job  
84.9 12.2 
43 Performance Pay has made me more aware of the importance of  being sensitive to 
my colleagues 
66.3 11.1 
45 It has given me the incentive to be more effective in my dealings with the public 79.9 8.6 
46 It has given me an incentive to get my work priorities right 68.0 21.3 
47 It has made me want to show more initiative in my job 73.0 20.0 
50 Performance Pay has had no effect on the quality of my work because it was already 
at the appropriate level 
8.4 82.7 
44 It (PRP) has caused me to work longer hours  72.0 18.7 
 
The results reported in Table 3.10 show that PRP is not perceived by employees to be a 
source of motivation. A fifth of staff report that it has encouraged them to prioritise their work 
better, to show more initiative, and to work longer hours, but in all cases a large majority of staff 
deny there being any effect on their motivation. By contrast, over 80%  of staff surveyed believed 
that PRP has not affected the quality of their work, since it was already at the appropriate standard 
(Q.50).  
Thus performance pay has not motivated most staff to perform better individually at their 
own jobs. However, many jobs involve close collaboration with colleagues, and so good 
organisational performance will depend upon the cooperativeness and general attitudes among 
colleagues. We asked a number of questions about the possible effects of performance pay on 
relations and cooperation among colleagues (Table 3.11). 
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Table 3.11 
Effects on morale and cooperation 
 
No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
13 PRP causes jealousies between staff.  14.3 78.0 
20  PRP has helped undermine staff morale 13.7 77.6 
42 PRP has reduced my willingness to co-operate with management 58.5 26.2 
99 It has reduced the willingness of many of the staff to co-operate with management* 40.5 38.5 
48 PRP has caused greater stress in my job 31.8 57.0 
 
* Question asked of line managers undertaking appraisals. 
 
The results indicate that staff strongly associate PRP with divisiveness. Over three-quarters 
of those surveyed believe that the scheme causes jealousies (Q.13) and undermines morale (Q.20).  
However, for most the staff, this does not appear to have affected the willingness of most staff to 
co-operate with management (Q42). Only a quarter claim that PRP has reduced willingness to co-
operate. Of more concern, however, is that 40% of reporting officers believe this to be the case, 
with only a small majority of those surveyed  disagreeing (Q.99). Finally, while a large majority of 
staff disagree that PRP has caused them to work longer hours (Q.44), 57% of staff attribute greater 
stress to the scheme (Q.48).  
Clearly the Equity Share scheme is not only failing to motivate many of the staff, but it also is 
believed to damage relations between managers and staff amongst a sizeable minority of staff. Given 
these responses, it would be fair to surmise that the net effect of performance pay on motivation has 
been negative. 
Turning to team working, the Equity Share scheme in the Employment Service is centred 
very much on individual objectives. This compares with much of the work in job centres depending 
upon effective teamwork. Given staff perceptions that PRP causes jealousies and undermines 
morale and affects co-operation to a lesser degree, can it be reconciled with teamworking?  
 
Table 3.12 
Teamworking and PRP 
 
No. Question Disagree % Agree  
% 
12 It (PRP) makes staff less willing to assist colleagues experiencing work difficulties 34.6 52.4 
26 The Agency’s PRP scheme encourages teamworking 76.6 13.4 
32 It would be better to base PM on the performance of groups of staff than of 
individuals  
48.4 35.6 
33 Group-based PRP is a bad idea because there are always some colleagues who do 
not pull their weight 
23.6 61.1 
49 It has led fellow staff to pressure me to work harder 59.7 26.0 
 
Table 3.12 presents staff replies to questions on teamworking issues. PRP appears to make 
staff less willing to help colleagues experiencing work difficulties (Q.12). Overall over three-quarters 
of staff believe that the scheme does not encourage teamworking (Q.26). A likely reason for this 
would be the emphasis on achieving individual work objectives. These could be jeopardised by 
working with and assisting colleagues, especially if such work is not recognised within performance 
agreements.  
However, most staff do not believe that a system of group-based performance pay would 
be more appropriate than the current system of individual appraisal (Q.32). One main reason for 
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this appears to be the fear that group-PRP would be particularly prone to free-riding (Q.33).  This 
is reinforced by the fact that the largest group of staff which oppose group-PRP is the group in 
favour of the principle of linking pay to performance.12 
Finally, only one-quarter of staff believed that PRP had caused their colleagues to pressurise 
them to work harder. Although the proportion of staff who believed this to be the case increased 
with lower box markings, it was not statistically significantly.13  This would suggest that the 
orientation of the equity share scheme towards individual performance does not create ‘peer 
pressure’ for improved teamworking. Instead, as was noted with sickness absence (Q.27 Table 3.9 
above), the peer pressure appears to have been motivated by fear for one’s own prospects of 
performance pay. 
 
3.9  Performance Pay and Performance 
 
Beyond staff judgements of the effects of performance pay on their own performance, we have two 
sources of evidence on performance more generally. The first is indirect. In the Employment 
Service, staff numbers have decline declined sharply from 52,000 in 1993 to 35,000 in 1997. In 
contrast, work loads, whose main determinant is the rate of unemployment, have not fallen 
proportionately. 
The more direct evidence stems from the replies by line managers who had carried out 
appraisals. In their view, has performance pay encouraged the staff they supervise to perform 
better? Our key results are presented in Table 3.3. Just under 30% of line managers believe their 
staff are working harder as a result of performance pay, and just under 20% believe it has caused 
their staff to work beyond their job requirements. Assuming these middle managers direct the work 
of roughly similar numbers of staff, which is likely because of their concentration in one or two 
grades, then it would seem that performance pay has caused about 30% of the staff to work harder, 
but that it has not boosted the efforts of the other 70% (‘disagrees’ plus ‘no views’)14. The impact 
on quality, again following line manager judgements, has been rather smaller, improvements for 
around 20% of the staff, and only ten percent being induced to give sustained high performance or 
more commitment. 
 
                                                 
12. Of the 191 staff questioned about group-based PRP, 124 (42.6%) of those who opposed its introduction  were 
in favour of the principle of PRP. Against this only 19  (6.5%) of staff opposing PRP in principle also opposed 
the idea of group based PRP,. 40 staff (13.7%), although against the principle of PRP, believed group PRP would 
be an improvement. Finally, 55 staff (18.9%) of staff in favour of PRP believed group-based PRP would be a 
better solution.  
 
13. Chi-square = 0.363      
 
14. We also checked there was not strong variation in response to this question by pay band. In fact, the 
disribution of replies on whether staff were working harder was very similar across pay bands. 
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Table 3.13 
Line manager assessments of whether PRP has caused staff to work harder 
 
No. Question Disagree % Agree % 
102 PRP has led to an increase in the quantity of work many of the staff do 58.5 27.9 
98 The existence of Performance Pay has caused many staff to work beyond the 
requirements of their job. 
72.3 18.7 
101 PRP has helped to increase the quality of the work of many of the staff. 71.9 18.0 
100 PRP has led to many staff giving sustained high performance at work. 77.9 9.6 
103 PRP has made many of the staff more committed to their work.  76.6 10.2 
 
Interpreting the ‘disagrees’ requires more care. Strictly speaking, they imply that PRP had, 
at best, no effect on these issues. However, if they were simply agnostic, they could report ‘no 
view’. The fact that so many actually disagreed, and about one tenth did so ‘strongly’, suggests they 
believed the impact was negative. The one exception was on work quantity where only one in 
twenty strongly disagreed. 
The other evidence from line managers on staff performance bears mainly on the quality of 
cooperation. In Table 3.11 above, it was shown that about 40% of line managers appraising staff 
believed performance pay had damaged staff willingness to cooperate with management (Q99). 
Thus, it would seem that performance pay has led to an increase in the quantity of work 
done by a substantial minority of staff (a view supported by our interviews with PTC lay officials). In 
line with the staff replies about their own experience, the effect in improving the qualitative aspects 
of work has been smaller. There is also clear indication that it has strained work relations between 
staff and their managers, and generated a degree of peer group and line manager pressure to raise 
performance. The latter points can be seen in the 25% of staff who replied that they felt pressured 
by their colleagues to work harder (Q49), and the 60% who said staff felt pressured by 
management into accepting performance objectives without discussion (Q61). 
Shortly after our survey was completed, an event was reported which revealed a major 
weakness in the Employment Service’s performance pay scheme. The Guardian newspaper ran a 
series of short articles on the artificial inflation of job placement figures by staff in the Agency15. The 
then government had launched a confidential internal enquiry into the over-recording of job 
placements in a number of offices across the country. From the reports, and our own fieldwork, it 
appears that what began as a minor abuse, recording as definite placements that had still to be 
confirmed, had begun to escalate under the incentives provided within the scheme. As managers, 
and even the minister responsible, were being judged on the same target of achieving large numbers 
of job placements, there was a strong temptation for management to turn a ‘blind eye’. Indeed, as 
the Equity Share scheme fixed the budget for performance pay, there was no additional financial 
cost to the Agency in such practices. In the run-up to the general election, the government was 
under pressure to show that it was tackling unemployment, and the then shadow Employment 
Spokesperson, Peter Hain, accused the government of pressuring managers and staff to inflate the 
job placement figures. Some the practices reported by The Guardian, such as wholesale double 
recording of large numbers of placements at major local employers, went beyond a bit of optimistic 
reporting by individual staff, and would have required management involvement. Indeed, The 
Guardian reported estimates the placements had been inflated nationally by between 10% and 
30%. 
                                                 
15. Guardian (29.3.97)  ‘Jobcentres “fiddled figures to boost employment statistics”; Guardian (1.4.97)  
‘McDonald’s job data “abused”; Guardian (16.4.97)  ‘Fake job figures scandal exposed’. 
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Although wisdom is easy with hindsight, the design of the scheme at the ES clearly lent itself 
to such abuse. If managers have the same targets at staff, then they have little incentive to prevent 
over-recording as this feeds into achievement of their own targets. In addition, the scheme is 
potentially unstable in that once over-recording practices become established, staff who do not 
behave likewise will be penalised as it becomes harder for them to achieve the same measured 
performance as those who over-record. So the scheme begins to punish those who behave 
honestly. The scheme may also have become more vulnerable to such abuses because, as our 
survey results show, staff felt that the targets stressed only one aspect of their job, and not 
necessarily the most important one, and that they were imposed without proper agreement. 
Fortunately for the ES, most staff still felt that their work consisted of helping real people to find real 
jobs, and that this was what their managers and the service as a whole wanted. The targets were 
just numbers in a game, except that if staff missed their targets, as a result of playing by the explicit 
rules and being ‘too honest’, they would run the risk of being penalised. 
The other source of instability in the scheme that can be inferred from our study is the lack 
of commitment staff felt to the scheme because it was felt to be unfair in its operation. Because of 
this, one needs to be cautious about judging the scheme a success because a considerable 
proportion of the staff appear to be working harder. There are clear signs of demoralisation which 
weaken the scheme’s legitimacy in the eyes of the staff. First are the feelings of injustice in the 
scheme, that line managers were guilty of favouritism, and higher management cheated by imposing 
a quota on good ratings, even if this were a feeling and not the reality. Secondly, many staff felt that 
they were being pushed into targets which they thought did not reflect the totality of what they 
considered to be ‘good performance’: the emphasis on quantity rather than quality of performance. 
Finally, in setting individual targets, most staff felt that ‘agreement’ was a misnomer as they felt 
pressured into accepting what management wanted without discussion. All this has engendered a 
degree of cynicism about the Equity Share scheme so that, despite some of its good points, it 
became vulnerable to the kind of scams reported by The Guardian. 
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Chapter 4 
The Inland Revenue and the Employment Service Compared 
 
 
4.1   Introduction: Why the Comparison? 
 
The separate studies of performance pay in the Inland Revenue and the Employment Service 
provide a general picture of how effective have been the schemes in the two departments, but 
because our surveys cover rather different populations, it is difficult to draw more general 
conclusions. In this chapter, we focus on one particular occupational group, well-represented in 
both studies, to ask two main questions. First, to what extent are the findings of the Inland Revenue 
study representative of the situation across the civil service; and second, how far different ways of 
handling the overall amount of money available for performance payments can lead to a more 
positive effect on motivation. 
The first question is an obvious one to ask. The Inland Revenue is but one department of the 
British civil service, and like all departments has its own distinctive traditions and history which differ 
from those of the others. In particular, a number of factors might be thought likely to affect Revenue 
staff attitudes to performance pay, causing them to differ from those of other departments. The 
Inland Revenue has long had its own separate staff federation for its main grades; the specialist 
nature of the skills used, and a more active external labour market they command, might be thought 
to affect attitudes; and it was among the first departments to link pay to performance so that its staff 
are more accustomed to it. 
The department chosen for comparison, the Employment Service, was formerly an integral 
part of the central civil service, in the Employment Department. Like the Inland Revenue, it has a 
large network of local offices responsible for providing a locally based service to the public: job 
placement and the payment of unemployment benefit, and more recently, the job seekers allowance. 
The Service, in common with the other large functional groups within the civil service, was 
established as an Executive Agency, in April 1990, under the governments Next Steps programme 
for devolving civil service management. It applied for pay delegation in 1992, establishing its own 
pay and grading system with the agreement of 1994. Other groups to establish their own pay and 
conditions in that year include HM Customs and Excise, and the Benefits Agency, responsible for 
administering social security benefits. 
 Staff at the Inland Revenue have long had a distinctive identity in the Civil Service owing to 
their representation by a departmental union, the Inland Revenue Staff Federation (IRSF) now part 
of the PTC (Public Services, Tax and Commerce Union). In contrast, staff in the Employment 
Service, when part of the Employment Department, shared an inter-departmental system of 
representation by grade. This was the pattern enshrined on the old Civil Service National Whitley 
Council up to the early 1980s (ACAS, 1980). The Employment Department shared the grade titles 
of Administrative Office and Assistant, Executive Officer, Higher EO, Senior EO and Principals, 
with the other main civil service departments, whereas the Inland Revenue had its own grades of 
Revenue Assistant, Revenue Officer, Revenue Executive, Inspector and Collector. Inland Revenue 
staff have had their own separate agreement since 1988 (IDS Public Sector Pay, 1988: 27). 
 Behind this separate identity at the Revenue lie distinctive skills that set Revenue staff apart 
from many other civil servants. Their work involves detailed knowledge of the tax system, which 
makes them less inter-changeable with civil servants in many other government departments who 
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have developed general administrative skills required by the civil service1. Apart from IT staff, tax 
specialists are one of the few civil service groups to have a well-established market for their skills in 
the private sector, and this reflected in the regular advertisements of vacancies by private firms in the 
Revenue staff union journals. Employment Service staff may well have skills of use to private job 
placement agencies, but their prospects are less lucrative. As a result, one might expect Revenue 
staff to be more aware of job and pay opportunities outside the civil service, and for management to 
have to deal with the pressures these create. 
 Finally, the Inland Revenue was one of the first government departments to develop a fully-
fledged performance pay scheme for all its staff, in 1988. In other departments, the schemes initially 
introduced often also gave performance pay to those whose performance fully met normal 
requirements, and so were less thoroughgoing than at the Revenue (Kessler, 1993). Thus, it might 
be thought that the culture change associated with performance pay would be more deeply rooted 
there, and staff would be more familiar with its basic principles. 
 For all these reasons then, one might expect staff at the Inland Revenue to respond to 
performance pay differently from those from other government departments. They might have grown 
to accept its principles, or they might have been so put off by their experience that they have come 
to reject them. The same set of reasons might lead one to expect staff in the Employment Service to 
be much closer to the mainstream views of civil servants. Hence, the comparison between the two. 
 The second purpose of comparing the reactions to PRP at the Inland Revenue with those of 
the Employment Service lies in the nature of the schemes, and in particular, the different methods for 
resolving the tension between rewarding good performance of individual staff while at the same time 
maintaining control of the pay bill. The results of the study of the first Inland Revenue scheme 
suggested that a failure to resolve such tensions in the eyes of the staff had caused them to doubt the 
fairness with which management operated the scheme (Marsden and Richardson 1994). Many staff 
believed that management manipulated the appraisal ratings in order to keep within budget. As a 
result, they felt that good ratings had been frequently denied when they were deserved. The belief in 
a quota on good appraisals no matter how many staff performed well was pervasive. Evidence from 
the operation of performance pay in the US Federal Service shows that many staff also thought their 
system unfair because they believed a quota was in operation despite government regulations 
forbidding management to set such limits (MSPB 1988, p. 33). Clearly, where productivity is hard 
to measure, it is difficult for management to be sure whether good performance as measured by staff 
appraisals corresponds to the levels of organisational performance needed to pay for it, so it takes a 
bold management to do away with any kind of ceiling. In addition, for staff used to working in an 
environment in which everything has a budget, a natural calculation is that the amount of money for 
PRP is also subject to one. Since, in theory, all staff could improve their performance, there is an 
apparent contradiction between everyone’s potentially increased performance and the fixed budget. 
 The Inland Revenue and Employment Service schemes examined in this paper adopt 
different strategies for reconciling these tensions. The current Inland Revenue scheme offers pre-
agreed percentage increases in pay according to the appraisal ratings of staff in different positions, 
and officially does not apply a quota either on ratings or on performance payments. The 
Employment Service agrees an overall budget for PRP payments with the unions, and operates a 
system of equity shares to translate appraisal scores into performance payments. Both schemes 
could be seen as addressing one of the major weaknesses identified in the first Inland Revenue 
scheme which ran from 1989 to 1993. 
                                                 
1. There are, of course, some other groups, such as staff in the Crown Prosecution Service, or at the Patents 
Office who have similarly specialist expertise. 
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 Some other less fundamental differences between the schemes in the two departments can, 
and are, also explored owing to the rich variety of questions addressed in the questionnaire. 
 Finally, because of differences in the employment structures of different government 
departments, it was decided to concentrate the analysis on a small range of staff grades. We took 
the executive or middle-management grades in both services. This has the advantage of providing a 
fairly large and central group of employees in both organisations, while at the same time including a 
large number in the sample who both were the subject of staff appraisals and were responsible for 
appraising others. Inclusion of the latter group gave us the opportunity of gauging the effects of the 
schemes on some aspects of organisational performance as seen by line managers. 
 
 
4.2  Performance Pay in the Two Departments 
 
The starting point for performance pay in both departments was rather similar. Until the late 1980s, 
both had incremental pay scales which in theory were not automatic as increments could be withheld 
for bad performance. But in practice, as the Megaw Inquiry observed, management had made little 
use of such provisions (Megaw 1982: para 320). Both departments embarked upon PRP in the late 
1980s and early 1990s with schemes that gave accelerated increments for outstanding performance, 
the Inland Revenue after its 1988 agreement, and the future Employment Service, after the civil 
service agreements for scientists and professionals represented by IPMS in 1992, and executive 
and support grades represented by NUCPS in 1993 (IDS 1995: 33 ff.). Since then, both 
departments have abandoned incremental scales in favour of setting only scale minima and maxima, 
and making progression from one to the other dependent entirely upon performance as assessed by 
staff appraisal: the Inland Revenue in 1993, and the Employment Service in 1994. 
 Both the Inland Revenue and the Employment Service have introduced complex 
remuneration systems following pay delegation, in which performance related pay plays the central 
role in determining salaries.  Both systems are based upon formal performance appraisal linked to 
targets and both differentiate between levels of good, acceptable and poor performance. This now 
includes financially penalising staff who perform poorly.  Increments have been abolished in both 
systems, thus giving management more influence over paybill growth than under the former 
incremental system. A comparison of the pay systems is provided in Table 4.1. 
 The two schemes differ primarily in their treatment of the budget constraint and its relation 
with performance appraisal. In the Inland Revenue scheme, the union agreement stipulates a matrix 
of cash increases for performance levels by pay band, and there is no official limit on the amount of 
performance payments. In the Employment Service, there is a fixed budget for performance pay, 
but the rules for translating individual performance into cash amounts are made more transparent by 
means of variable values for Equity shares. In principle then, both schemes offer a way round the 
problem of perceived quotas on good appraisals that poisoned the first Inland Revenue scheme. 
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Table 4.1 
Pay Systems in the Inland Revenue and Employment Service 
 
Organisation  Inland Revenue Employment  Service 
Implementation Date 1 April 1993 1.4.94  Middle Managers 
1.4.95  Support, Clerical & Admin. 
Covered by PRP  56,000 35,000 
Bargaining Groups   2     Pay Bands A-B, 
       Pay Bands C-E 
 
3   Senior Grades 
     MPBs 1-6 
     MPB 7 :PB 8-9 
Unions Recognised  Pay Bands A-B -  PTC/IPMS/FDA 
Pay Bands C-E     PTC/CPSA 
Senior Grades - PTC/FDA  
MPBs 1-6          - PTC/CPSA 
MPB 7: PB 8-9  - PTC/CPSA 
Regrading  Pay Bands/Spans   (Management) Pay Bands  
Assimilation Pay Bands 
Performance Pay  A percentage increase based on 
individual's appraisal score and 
position within pay span 
Equity Shares   - value of shares  
calculated by reference to mid point 
of each pay band. 
Assessment Categories  3     Exceed 
       Succeed 
       Not Met  
4       Box A  
         Box B 
         Box C 
         Box D 
Penalise poor 
performance 
Yes Yes 
Cost of living element  Yes  (Pay Bands C-E only)  Yes  
Progression  Consolidation of PRP and cost of 
living element up to pay band/ span 
maxima 
Consolidation of PRP and cost of 
living element up to pay band 
maxima/Performance Bar 
Annual pay increments  No: loss of larger incremental steps at 
lower end of old pay scales 
compensated by higher percentage 
payments at lower end of pay 
span/band. 
No  
Appeals System Yes Yes 
Additional Elements Extra-Loading for heavy workloads Performance Bar to make progression 
conditional on good performance, 
until 1996. 
 
 A second difference lies in the linking of individual performance objectives to those of the 
organisation. In the Employment Service stress is placed in individual performance agreements on 
contribution to the explicit targets of the agency’s business objectives in job placements and 
accurate and timely benefit payments. These objectives are additionally tied to the state of the 
labour market. In the case of the Inland Revenue, the link with the organisations objectives is less 
specific and more diffuse, stressing the Four Cs of customer service, compliance, cost efficiency, 
and caring for staff. 
 Finally, it would appear that the size of performance payments is somewhat larger in the 
Inland Revenue, although a precise comparison would require taking account of the probability of 
receiving them, and the incidence of consolidated and non-consolidated payments, affected for 
example, by the numbers at the top of their respective pay scales. 
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4.3  Two Workforces with Similar Job Demands and Work Orientations 
 
One of the notable features of our sample are the strong similarities between the workforces of the 
Inland Revenue and Employment Service. This relates to work pressures, demographic 
characteristics of the two work forces, at least in the middle management grades covered in this 
study, and a number of their basic work orientations. This greatly simplifies analysis of the effects of 
differences in the two performance pay schemes. 
 
4.3.1  Similar types and pressures of service 
 
First of all, despite the differences in activity discussed earlier, the types of work undertaken in the 
two departments share many common features. Both involve a large amount of office work, but 
most important, both involve assessment of demands of citizens on central government resources. In 
the case of the Inland Revenue, the prime task is assessment and collection of taxes. Because 
entitlement to unemployment benefits, and the Job Seekers’ Allowance which has replaced them, 
depends upon willingness to accept suitable job offers, Employment Service staff have also to 
exercise a certain compliance function. 
 Both groups have had to cope with major changes in workload in the two years before our 
survey: the Inland Revenue staff with the introduction of ‘self-assessment’ whereby tax payers take 
over the responsibility for assessing their tax liabilities, and the Employment Service, with the 
introduction of the new Job Seekers’ Allowance. 
 Finally, staff in both departments can have a difficult relationship with the public: tax officials 
in dealing with erroneous and possibly fraudulent tax returns, and Employment Service staff who 
may face violence from some members of the public when benefit payments are refused.2 
 
4.3.2 Demographic similarity 
 
For the grades covered in this paper, there are many similarities in the type of employee and service 
conditions in the two departments. About half the respondents are women, 45% in the Revenue, 
and 57% in the Employment Service; and about half are aged over 40, 58% in the Revenue, and 
48% in the Employment Service; about 90% in both departments have been in the civil service for 
more than ten years, and half of the Revenue staff, and three quarters of the ES staff have been in 
their current office for more than five years, and slightly over half in each department reported being 
at the top of their pay scale. About nine out of ten staff work full time, and one third in both 
departments held their previous job in the private sector. 
 Thus in both departments, we are dealing with staff who have considerable employment 
stability, and will have known the pay and conditions prevailing before the introduction of 
performance pay. But even though many of them probably consider themselves ‘career civil 
servants’, this does not preclude direct knowledge of private sector conditions. 
 
4.3.3 Similar scores on work orientations  
 
Employees in the two samples share a large number of work priorities affecting their orientations to 
work. Job security and level of income rate highly as important issues in their current jobs, as do 
interesting and varied work, and the opportunity to exercise responsibility (Table 4.2). 
                                                 
2. For example, the PTC has been pressing for the use of security screens to protect all staff. 
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Table 4.2 
Employee work priorities by organisation 
 
Organisation Question Disagree  
% 
Agree  
% 
Valid 
Response 
 
The following issues are important to me in my job: 
 
   
Employment  Job Security  9.63 87.04 270 
Revenue   6.04 90.78 596 
     
Employment   My level of income 4.80 92.99 271 
Revenue   9.38 88.44 597 
     
Employment  Varied and interesting work 14.81 76.30 270 
Revenue   19.77 71.86 597 
     
Employment  Opportunity to exercise  10.34 79.34 271 
Revenue  Responsibility 11.07 73.65 596 
     
Employment  Contributing to an important  14.12 65.80 269 
Revenue  public service 26.00 50.84 596 
     
Employment Working as a member of a 14.13 68.40 269 
Revenue  Team 30.77 44.79 585 
 
 The sense of contributing to an important public service also counts highly, albeit it less so in 
the Revenue than in our 1991 survey. Team working also figures less highly at the Revenue than at 
the ES, but nevertheless was valued by a majority of those expressing a view  (Table 4.2)3. 
 Another aspect of employee work attitudes to attract much attention recently has been that 
of ‘organisational citizenship behaviour’: do employees consider themselves to be under a kind of 
moral obligation to behave as ‘good citizens’ of their organisations. In concrete terms, this might be 
expressed in terms of a willingness to engage in activities that are beneficial to the organisation, but 
not necessarily immediately useful to the person concerned. Subject to the limitations of a 
questionnaire survey, we asked whether people tried to keep well-informed and undertake training 
if beneficial to the organisation, and whether they showed goodwill to complete urgent tasks. Both 
of these activities are usually beyond the minimal requirements of most people’s normal work roles. 
On this index, the great majority of middle management staff in both departments considered they 
behaved as good organisational citizens (Table 4.3). 
 
                                                 
3. The data from the survey shown in this paper are all unweighted. It was felt preferable to leave them thus on 
account of the greater homogeneity of the grades surveyed than in our other surveys, the broad similarity of 
response across grades, and the fact that each agency had a different grade structure. 
  
  
 
  
61 
 
  
  
Table 4.3 
Attitudes relating to organisational citizenship 
 
Organisation  Question Disagree  
% 
Agree  
% 
Valid 
Response 
Employment  
 
I keep myself well-informed and undertake  
Training when I think this may benefit the ES/IR 
10.70 78.23 271 
Revenue  11.88 76.59 598 
     
Employment  I always show goodwill to complete an  6.27 90.41 271 
Revenue  Urgent task 3.50 92.99 599 
 
 Middle management staff in the two departments are also very similar in terms of their 
greater attachment to their current office than to the department as a whole (Table 4.4). Most feel 
‘part of the family’ and committed to their current office, but the departments themselves do not 
inspire strong affective bonds among their staff. Thus, the broadly similar percentages being happy 
to spend the rest of their careers in to two organisations probably reflects a mix of a belief in the 
value of their public service, attachment to their office, and the material benefits of pay and relative 
job security. 
 
Table 4.4 
Attitudes to working in the Revenue and Employment Service 
 
Organisation  Question Disagree  
% 
Agree  
% 
Valid Response 
Employment  I feel 'part of the family' in my current 28.41 59.41 271 
Revenue  Office 33.89 54.59 599 
     
Employment   I feel a strong sense of commitment to 28.04 61.25 271 
Revenue   my current office  28.26 56.36 598 
     
Employment  I feel 'part of the family' in the Agency/ 72.59 13.33 270 
Revenue  Revenue  69.13 14.76 596 
     
Employment  I would be very happy to spend the rest 41.85 41.11 270 
Revenue  Of my career in the ES/IR 25.76 54.38 594 
     
Employment  I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ to the 26.39 59.10 269 
Revenue  ES/IR 28.36 57.04 596 
     
Employment  I feel a strong sense of commitment to 47.39 36.94 268 
Revenue  The ES/IR 40.43 36.92 596 
     
Employment  Working in the Agency/Revenue  means a 52.77 20.66 271 
Revenue  Great deal to me 42.98 30.27 598 
 
 Lest it be thought that such responses are somehow conventional, and so of little interest, 
we know they can change over time, as is illustrated by comparison of the 1996 Inland Revenue 
results with those of 1991 (see French and Marsden, 1996). There high levels of dissatisfaction with 
Performance Management have been associated with a sharp drop in the various measures of 
affective commitment to the organisation and even to the office. 
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4.3.4 Similar views on pay principles 
 
A final similarity between the middle management staff of the two departments can be found in their 
views concerning the general principle of relating pay to performance, and to other principles of pay 
determination. A clear majority in both organisations thought the principle a good one, and rejected 
the idea that it is fundamentally unfair (Table 4.5). So there is no question that differences in 
response to the workings of performance pay in the two departments arise from differences in pre-
existing views on the subject. 
 
Table 4.5 
Attitudes to the principle of performance pay by organisation 
 
Organisation  Question Disagree  
% 
Agree  
% 
Valid Response 
Employment  The principle of relating pay to  26.94 71.59 271 
Revenue  Performance is a good one 34.34 62.17 600 
     
Employment  The idea of performance pay is  71.11 22.23 270 
Revenue  Fundamentally unfair 58.35 34.57 593 
 
 On a whole array of widely used pay principles, the views of staff in the two organisations 
are remarkably similar. Most staff would not want pay to be based solely on individual 
performance; there should be more recognition of differences in workloads among people in the 
same pay band, and pay should reflect job demands not individual performance (Table 4.6). 
Compensation for cost of living rises, and an attachment to nationally negotiated pay scales were 
also important. On the other hand, on more rewards for experience and pay being responsive to 
labour market pressures, replies were more evenly divided, in both organisations. 
 Thus, staff in the two organisations share a great many beliefs about their work and their 
pay, the spread of replies to these questions proving remarkably similar. Without comparable data 
on private sector organisations, and on other branches of the civil service, it is impossible to say 
whether these represent part of a distinctive work and pay culture across the civil service. 
Nevertheless, surveys by the authors in two NHS trust hospitals suggest similar views there of pay 
principles, and a small scale study by Carroll (1993), replicating the questionnaire of the 1991 
Inland Revenue survey in a high street bank indicated some notable differences. 
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Table 4.6 
Staff attitudes to different pay principles 
 
Organisation  Question Disagree  
% 
Agree  
% 
Valid 
Response 
Employment  Staff should be paid solely on the basis of  75.92 17.40 270 
Revenue  Individual performance 69.28 24.54 599 
     
Employment  Pay should take into account different duties  
Carried out by staff in the 
26.29 65.19 270 
Revenue  Band/span 26.21 61.27 599 
     
Employment  Pay should reflect the demands of the job and  
Not the performance of individual 
28.89 59.63 270 
Revenue  Job  holders 31.27 56.35 598 
     
Employment  Experience (i.e. years in the job) should count  
More towards determining pay 
53.14 32.47 271 
Revenue  Levels  41.38 47.91 597 
     
Employment  Annual pay rises should be used primarily  
To compensate for rises 
19.19 72.33 271 
Revenue  In the cost of living 28.48 64.32 597 
     
Employment  People should be paid according to 12.64 79.18 269 
Revenue  Nationally negotiated pay scales 10.89 79.90 597 
     
Employment  Staff should be paid more if their skills  43.91 37.64 271 
Revenue  Are in short supply 42.34 43.17 600 
 
4.4 Impact of Performance Pay in the Employment Service and the 
Inland Revenue 
 
As stated earlier, this paper has two main goals: to test how far the response to performance pay by 
staff at the Inland Revenue could be taken as typical of major government departments; and to 
examine the impact of different types of performance pay scheme, the most important of which 
being the handling of potential conflicts between staff performance and budgetary constraints which 
poisoned staff views of the scheme’s operation in 1991. In this section, we start therefore by 
looking at staff views on the schemes’ fairness of operation and on the existence of ‘quotas’. 
 
4.4.1 Quota and budgetary effects 
 
The most striking response is that despite the different approaches to the ‘quota’ problem, three 
quarters of staff in both departments believe good appraisals are frequently denied because 
management operate a quota on good appraisals. A similar percentage (of all grades) thought the 
same in 1991. Moreover, a high percentage of those actually conducting appraisals also believed 
there was a quota which deprived some deserving staff of the highest ratings.4 This is surprising 
                                                 
4. In the Employment Service, 76% of line managers carrying out appraisals believed a quota was in operation 
compared with 71% of other executive grade staff. In the Inland Revenue, the corresponding figures were 65% 
among line managers, and 82% among other staff. 
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because it seems that no matter what signal management give staff to the contrary, they are not 
believed. In the Revenue, as in the US Federal Service, strongly stated top management policies 
that there should be no quota appear to have had little impact. Nor does making the value of Equity 
Shares variable, so that in theory everyone could get a top rating without upsetting the department’s 
budget, appear to have much impact on the belief. Line managers appear to have taken the 
indicative distribution of box markings mentioned in the agreement (§42) as a ceiling. 
 The existence of an appeals system might be thought to counter-balance such scepticism as 
staff who believed they had been affected by a quota system could challenge their rating. However, 
a number of practical limitations on appeals systems were raised during internal reviews within the 
Inland Revenue, notably, that many staff believed the potential financial gain to be small compared 
with the trouble involved and the potential risk to future promotion (Chairman’s Review). 
 The problem is driven home by the very large percentages of staff, roughly four out of every 
five, who believe the link with pay has caused staff to question the fairness of performance 
appraisals (Table 4.7). This perception would seem to be reinforced by the widespread belief that 
managers use performance pay to reward their favourites. Perhaps as a result, there was general 
scepticism that the existence of performance pay meant that good work was at last being rewarded. 
 Performance pay having replaced annual pay increments in both departments, the amounts 
of money awarded to individuals under the schemes gives an additional twist to the question. A 
quota on appraisals, and hence on awards, means that the issue is at stake is not simply a bonus 
which may, or may not, be gained, but the pay progression to which staff had previously been 
accustomed. Thus, staff may be in two minds over increasing the amount of money available for 
individual awards. Raising it would potentially improve the rate of pay progression, but it would also 
increase the uncertainty they face, which is a sensitive issue because of their feeling that the 
schemes’ operation is unfair. 
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Table 4.7 
The perceived fairness of Performance Pay  
 
Organisation  Question Disagree  
% 
Agree  
% 
Valid 
Response 
Employment  Staff are frequently denied the appraisal 16.30 74.07 270 
Revenue  Ratings they deserve because of a quota on good 
ratings * 
18.00 74.17 600 
     
Employment  The appeal system ensures unfair 45.18 13.33 270 
Revenue  Appraisals are corrected 55.30 12.10 595 
     
Employment  The link with pay makes staff question 10.37 77.41 270 
Revenue  the fairness of performance appraisals  6.22 88.06 595 
     
Employment   Managers use the scheme to reward their  34.45 40.00 270 
Revenue  Favourites 27.86 48.15 596 
     
Employment  The amount of money an individual 46.67 33.33 270 
Revenue  Receives for a Box A/'exceed' or an 'extra-loaded' 
should be substantially increased 
39.06 43.94 594 
     
Employment  PRP has meant good work is recognised 67.78 24.44 270 
Revenue   and rewarded  at last 75.25 17.73 598 
 
* For exact text of the question, see Appendix 2 
 
Thus, a first conclusion is that the different approaches to handling potential budget constraints on 
performance pay systems have not succeeded in eliminating one of the major sources of perceived 
unfairness in performance pay schemes. In this, both departments’ experience is very similar. 
 
4.4.2 Performance pay and goal setting 
 
Apart from seeking to link pay to performance, most performance pay systems place great 
emphasis on the process of staff appraisal and goal setting. Indeed, some practitioners argue that the 
pay element is secondary, and is needed simply to force line managers and staff to take the 
appraisal process seriously.5 As noted earlier, the two departments have approached appraisal and 
objective setting in different ways, the Employment Service placing greater store by linking individual 
performance targets to explicit targets for the agency as a whole expressed in the language of 
business objectives. In contrast, the Revenue has adopted more diffuse and qualitative overall 
targets, but sought to tailor performance objectives to individual members of staff. The advantage of 
the first could be clearer identification of overall organisational goals by individual staff members, 
whereas the latter places greater store on the idea that staff need personal targets, adapted to their 
own abilities, if they are to be motivated effectively. In practice, this is probably more a difference of 
emphasis by the two managements than of basic philosophy. But given the high management and 
staff time cost of rigorous appraisal procedures, the difference is surely more than cosmetic. 
                                                 
5. This view was put to us very strongly by personnel managers in one of the NHS trust hospitals whose scheme 
we surveyed. 
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 A first set of questions addresses staff views on how effectively the two performance pay 
schemes have been in helping to define their work objectives and linking these with overall 
organisational objectives (Table 4.8). On balance, it seems that the ES scheme has been more 
successful in drawing staff attention in general to the agency’s overall business objectives among 
middle managers: about half believed it has in the ES compared with only a third in the Revenue. 
The question was also put to those carrying out appraisals concerning their staff. Here the results are 
rather evenly divided between agrees and disagrees, with no clear difference between the two 
departments. Slightly less than half of the line managers thought the scheme had raised staff 
awareness of organisational objectives, and a similar share thought the opposite. 
 Turning to staff views about the effects on their own personal awareness of their 
organisation’s objectives, only about one third reported a positive effect (Table 4.8). Among the 
others, presumably, some felt the scheme had no effect because they were already aware, and 
others, simply that the scheme had not enlightened them. 
 An important feature of both performance management schemes lies in the break with the 
former civil service appraisal system that stressed a number of general work criteria, the version 
used by the Inland Revenue in 1991 used about a dozen such criteria, such as getting work priorities 
right, being sensitive to colleagues, cooperation with management, being effective in dealings with 
the public and so on. Both of the new schemes shift the emphasis towards job-related objectives, 
this being most fully developed in the Inland Revenue’s system of individual performance 
agreements. In both departments, although many middle management staff believe the schemes have 
led managers to set individual performance targets more clearly, there is a distinct difference 
between the two: about half believe the effect positive in the ES, but less than a third do so in the 
Revenue. 
 For all the staff and line manager effort put into appraisal and its link with pay, in both 
organisations, there is a widespread belief that the basic, underlying, performance objective is 
greater quantity. Qualitative objectives, it is felt, are given only secondary importance. Staff resent 
this because they believe the qualitative aspects of their jobs are important (see the earlier discussion 
of public service and citizenship), but hard to measure, which makes performance pay hard to 
operate. Given these responses, it is easy to understand why so few staff believe that their individual 
performance targets are a suitable basis for determining performance. 
 To recapitulate, on goal setting, the differences in middle management views between the 
two departments are rather small, but criticism of the perceived ineffectiveness of goal setting and 
the stress on quantity despite the references to qualitative goals is markedly stronger at the Revenue. 
In particular, Revenue staff are much more dubious that performance pay has led managers to set 
work goals more clearly. 
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Table 4.8 
Goal setting functions of PRP 
 
Organisation  Question Disagree  
% 
Agree  
% 
Valid 
Response 
Employment  Performance Pay raises staff awareness 46.86 48.71 271 
Revenue  of the objectives of the Agency /PM 58.86 34.28 598 
     
Employment   Performance pay/PM has made staff 47.24 46.73 199** 
Revenue  more aware of the Agency’s/ Revenue’s targets 49.16 43.03 258** 
     
Employment  Performance Pay has made me more 58.15 37.03 270 
Revenue  aware of the targets of the Agency/ Revenue 56.11 34.17 597 
     
Employment  PRP has made managers set  work 45.01 49.08 271 
Revenue  targets more clearly 58.43 31.56 599 
     
Employment  For all that is said about quality, the 22.96 61.11 270 
Revenue  Agency's PRP scheme/PM is simply a device  
to get more work done 
17.39 70.23 598 
     
Employment  It is difficult to operate because the type 21.03 69.74 271 
Revenue  of work done is hard to measure 15.64 79.03 601 
     
Employment  The individual performance targets are a  67.41 22.22 270 
Revenue  suitable basis for determining performance  62.17 23.99 592 
 
 ** Only managers assessing staff were asked this question 
 
 If we follow the lines of ‘expectancy theory’, then for performance pay to motivate staff, 
they must believe their increased effort can lead to higher performance, and to greater reward. Our 
study has already highlighted a good deal of scepticism among staff that appropriate rewards will 
follow good performance, but as everyone knows life is full of rough justice it might not be too 
damaging to the schemes. They might still believe there is a good enough chance or reward, 
particularly if they believe they can achieve the kinds of performance the schemes are intended to 
promote. It is therefore important to discover how far staff understand their operation and whether 
they know what they have to do in order to get good ratings, and whether they think they have the 
ability and the opportunity to do so. 
 The great majority of staff in both organisations believe they understand how their respective 
scheme works, and why they got their most recent appraisal rating (Table 4.9). This was no doubt 
helped by the fact that around 60% believed they had had sufficient opportunity to discuss their 
performance with their line manager during the year, which suggests that the main appraisal 
procedures were being applied. However, for all the rhetoric of staff agreeing their objectives with 
their line managers, over 60% in both organisations report that staff feel pressured into accepting 
objectives set by management. 
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Table 4.9 
Staff understanding of how the schemes work 
 
Organisation  Question Disagree  
% 
Agree  
% 
Valid Response 
Employment  I do not understand how the Agency's PRP 71.75 19.70 269 
Revenue  scheme/ PM operates 88.42 7.55 596 
     
Employment  Throughout the last year, I had sufficient  35.69 61.71 269 
Revenue  opportunity  to discuss my performance  36.06 59.10 599 
     
Employment  I understand why I was awarded my most  22.68 71.01 269 
Revenue  Recent Box Marking /performance assessment 11.19 84.48 599 
     
Employment  Staff feel pressured into accepting  28.26 62.82 269 
Revenue  performance objectives set by management  26.25 61.87 598 
 
 Even though staff feel they understand how their scheme works, there remains a rather 
pervasive feeling that they do not know what they need to do in order to gain a high rating, even 
though many of the respondents themselves carry out appraisals (see Table 4.10). Nevertheless, 
most believe they are personally capable of doing what is necessary. The apparent contradiction 
with the previous question may be explained by the belief among many staff, and their line managers, 
that their current job does not give them scope to excel, or exceed their objectives. Thus 
constrained, it is quite consistent for many to believe that their last appraisal was a fair reflection of 
their performance. 
 Nevertheless, there remains one item that echoes the earlier discussion of quotas, and the 
later discussion of motivation effects, namely, the belief that even if they perform well, staff will not 
gain high appraisals. This reply may reflect a tendency among many staff to lower their expectations 
of reward, and to adjust their performance accordingly. They know what they need to do to get an 
‘A’, but they do not believe they will get one even if they perform well, so they give standard 
performance. Hence, their middle-grade appraisals are felt to be a fair reflection of their 
performance. 
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Table 4.10 
Staff views on their ability to obtain performance pay awards  
 
Organisation  Question Disagree  
% 
Agree  
% 
Valid 
Response 
Employment  I know what I have to do to get a Box A or 47.39 47.01 268 
Revenue  B/’Exceed’ in the future 55.78 40.20 597 
     
Employment  I am personally capable of doing what is  12.64 77.70 269 
Revenue  necessary to get a Box A or B/’Exceed’ in the future 18.89 69.90 598 
     
Employment  The nature of my present job makes it  34.20 57.99 269 
Revenue  very hard for me to meet or exceed my objectives* 32.61 60.87 598 
     
Employment Performance pay is a bad idea because 22.3 65.2 183** 
Revenue staff have insufficient control over their 
work to change their ways ** 
27.0 56.7 259** 
     
Employment  My most recent Box Marking/ 33.83 62.45 269 
Revenue  performance assessment  was a fair reflection  
of my performance 
29.26 65.56 598 
     
Employment  Even if my performance is good enough , 33.46 53.90 269 
Revenue  I doubt I will receive the Box Marking I  
deserve/an ‘Exceed’ 
34.28 57.86 598 
 
* For precise wording see Appendix 2. 
** Replies by line managers doing appraisals. 
 
 Finally, performance management schemes often have an important function in dealing with 
poor performance.  This can be beneficial to organisations in tightening up minimum performance 
standards and so boosting average performance. But more important, poor performance by some 
colleagues can be a cancer that eats away at the morale of others, especially if it adds to their 
workload, and management seems to do little about it. 
 
Table 4.11 
Effectiveness in dealing with poor performance 
 
Organisation  Question Disagree  
% 
Agree  
% 
Valid Response 
Employment  The Agency's PRP scheme/PM is a good 64.81 24.07 270 
Revenue  way to identify poor performance 63.85 26.01 592 
     
Employment   Managers know enough about the jobs of  42.59 48.52 270 
Revenue  their staff to identify poor performance 38.57 55.43 599 
     
Employment  PRP  has made it easier for me to deal 63.31 24.12 199** 
Revenue  with poor performance 63.71 27.03 259** 
 
**  Only Managers assessing staff performance were asked this question 
 
 Here, once again, the replies of staff in both organisations were remarkably similar. About 
two thirds thought the schemes were not good at identifying poor performance, but the majority of 
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staff thought their line managers knew enough about the jobs in question to identify it. What may 
seem puzzling, is that despite the increased opportunity given to managers to discuss performance 
with their staff, annual appraisals and regular meetings in between, only a quarter felt the schemes 
had made it easier for them to deal with poor performance. Part of the answer may lie in the fact 
that certain types of poor performance are not due to lack of motivation but to outside pressures. 
For example, common causes of absenteeism include problems with childcare arrangements, and 
other family responsibilities. Another part can be found in the response by line managers (Table 
4.10) that many staff have insufficient control over their work to change their ways: job demands 
may not always match employees’ abilities, the remedy being training, job redesign or assignment to 
other duties, rather than withholding performance pay. 
 
4.4.3  Work motivation effects 
 
Work motivation is a very general concept, and to get meaningful replies from staff we broke it 
down into willingness to undertake a number of different kinds of activity. In this we were guided by 
a number of aspects of work performance mentioned by management in the previous appraisal 
schemes and under the new performance agreement approach. We ask first about a number of 
aspects of individual performance, and then about team working and cooperation with other 
colleagues and with management. 
 Very few staff said performance pay had given them an incentive to work beyond the 
requirements of their job in either organisation. One, optimistic, reading of this is that many staff do 
this anyway, as suggested by their earlier replies on ‘organisational citizenship’: showing goodwill to 
complete an urgent task, and willingness to undertake training. A less optimistic reading is that the 
scope for such ‘extra role’ activity is limited by the job demands staff face: suggested by the replies 
of both staff and line managers concerning the scope staff have to vary their performance (Table 
4.12). Taking the broad view of one’s job, and avoiding ‘who does what?’ arguments, might be a 
classic way of posing the question of extra role responsibilities, but it is not a terribly helpful one in 
an environment of ‘stretching’ individual performance targets and individual accountability for certain 
tasks. 
 Between only a tenth and a fifth of middle management staff seemed to think that 
performance pay had given an incentive to get work priorities right, show more initiative, be more 
sensitive to work colleagues, or to be more effective with the public. Against this, large percentages 
of staff felt performance pay had been without effect. 
 
  
 
  
71 
 
  
  
Table 4.12 
Individual motivation and performance pay 
 
Organisation  Question Disagree  
% 
Agree  
% 
Valid 
Response 
Employment  Performance Pay has given me an incentive 85.18 11.48 270 
Revenue  to work beyond the requirements of the job  81.91 15.58 597 
     
Employment  PRP has given me an incentive to get my  66.66 22.96 270 
Revenue  work priorities right 71.24 21.07 598 
     
Employment  PRP has made me want to show more  72.87 20.08 269 
Revenue  initiative in my job 78.90 15.41 597 
     
Employment   Performance Pay has made me more 67.78 10.37 270 
Revenue  aware of the importance of being sensitive to  
my colleagues 
69.69 13.07 597 
     
Employment  PRP has given me the incentive to be 77.24 8.96 268 
Revenue 
 
more effective in my dealings with the public 78.72 10.05 597 
     
Employment  The personal satisfaction I derive from 37.31 49.62 268 
Revenue  my work is sufficient incentive for me to do  
what is needed to get a Box A or B/’Exceed’ 
54.62 34.79 595 
     
Employment  Performance Pay has had no effect on the   8.15 82.59 270 
Revenue  quality of my work because it was already at  
the appropriate standard 
9.20 86.79 598 
 
 Lack of any strong effect on individual incentives may not matter much if staff are strongly 
motivated by non-financial rewards, or if job responsibilities are already well-defined and adhered 
to. Intrinsic motivation is clearly a strong factor, as about half of ES staff, and a third of IR staff say 
that the personal satisfaction from their work is incentive enough to work at a high standard. 
However, over a third of ES, and more than half of the IR middle managers replied that satisfaction 
was not enough. In IR the figure was well up on 1991, indicating that ‘intrinsic’ factors now hold 
less influence than in the past. 
 The other factor, that staff believed they already worked at the appropriate standard for 
their jobs commanded wide support in both organisations. The implication is that staff felt the margin 
for additional improvement was small, which is logical if jobs are designed with a specific 
performance standard in mind and with a strong norm of personal accountability. 
 
4.4.4   Cooperation and team working 
 
More problematic, however, are the responses on the way each relates her or his work to that of 
other colleagues: cooperation and team working. Clear majorities in both organisations said that 
performance pay made staff less willing to help colleagues experiencing work difficulties. Even larger 
majorities reported performance pay causing jealousies between staff, and undermining staff morale. 
 About a quarter of respondents reported that performance pay had reduced their own 
willingness to cooperate with management, striking because most of those in the sample were 
themselves middle managers. Further, a majority of those expressing a view among Revenue line 
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managers reported that performance pay had reduced the willingness of staff to cooperate with 
management. Generally, it was felt that performance pay discouraged team working, but there was 
no strong view that group-based performance pay would be the solution. 
 It is hard to judge whether this is an ‘unintended consequence’ of performance pay or not. 
Both departments’ appraisal schemes place heavy emphasis on individual performance agreements 
and individual accountability for achievement of work targets. Given the perception noted earlier 
that these are primarily quantitative (Table 4.12), and are not seen as stressing cooperation in 
practice, it is logical that staff should respond by giving first priority to fulfilling their targets, and 
should believe their colleagues are behaving in similar fashion. Thus the pressure against team 
working may not be explicit, but it is certainly a logical implication of the messages given to staff by 
management.6 
 
Table 4.13 
Team-working, cooperation, and performance pay 
 
Organisation  Question Disagree  
% 
Agree  
% 
Valid Response 
Employment  PRP makes staff less willing to assist  36.16 51.66 271 
Revenue  colleagues experiencing work difficulties 25.71 67.95 599 
     
Employment   PRP causes jealousies between staff 14.93 77.24 268 
Revenue   7.35 88.31 599 
     
Employment  Performance Pay has helped to 14.87 75.84 269 
Revenue  undermine staff morale 10.05 84.75 597 
     
Employment  PRP reduced my wish to co-operate with  58.89 27.04 270 
Revenue  management 56.95 27.64 597 
     
Employment  PRP has reduced the willingness of many  41.71 37.19 199 ** 
Revenue  of the staff  to  co-operate with management 39.62 47.31 260** 
     
Employment  The Agency's PRP Scheme/ Performance 11.90 77.70 269 
Revenue  Management discourages team working 20.97 70.13 596 
     
Employment  It would be better to base PRP on the  49.63 33.70 270 
Revenue  performance of groups 50.25 25.38 595 
 
*  Only managers assessing staff performance were asked this question.  
 
 On motivational effects, the ES results confirm that the picture at the Inland Revenue is to be 
found elsewhere in the civil service, and so are not due to any departmental particularities. Personal 
motivation effects are rather similar between the two organisations, but the damage to team working 
and cooperation is markedly stronger at the Inland Revenue than in the Employment Service. 
                                                 
6. Similar effects may be generated in other areas. The Employment Service was reported as piloting a new 
system of ‘job-based’ career development. This treats promotion as primarily a mechanism for filling internal 
vacancies, and requires that staff demonstrate the competencies appropriate for the vacancy to be filled. Under 
the previous system, for promotion, they had to demonstrate ability to perform across a wide range of jobs 
covered by the higher grade before promotion (IDS, 1995: pp. 22-26). Thus promotion would signal assignment 
to a specific, more demanding, job, rather than elevation to a higher rank in the organisation. 
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4.5 PRP and Actual Performance 
 
We have few indicators of overall organisational performance by which we may judge the schemes’ 
effects. However, at the Inland Revenue, we were told, in conversations with management, that the 
overall workload of the organisation has remained more or less constant while staff numbers have 
been cut, indicating an increase in productivity. Both the Revenue and ES spend considerable sums 
on monitoring the performance of their organisations, as illustrated by the 1989 NAO study of civil 
service manpower planning7, so such reports are likely to be based on reasonably sound internal 
evidence, although it was not disclosed to us. 
 We have better evidence on performance outcomes from the views expressed by line 
managers responding to our questionnaire. A first indication comes from the number of managers 
who believe that performance pay has led staff to increase the quantity of work they do: one third in 
the Revenue, and just under 30% in the ES. Likewise, a substantial minority of line managers believe 
it has led staff to work beyond the requirements of their jobs, one fifth at the ES and nearly one third 
at the Revenue. To be sure, a majority of line managers disagree on both counts, but as line 
managers are generally responsible at this level for rather small numbers of staff, it is very likely that 
they are talking about their experience with different groups of staff. Unfortunately, the survey gives 
no further indication on this score. 
 While a substantial minority of line managers believe performance pay has raised the 
quantity of work done by staff, rather less believe it has raised quality or induced ‘sustained high 
performance’, and even less believe it has made staff more committed to their work. 
 
                                                 
7. The National Audit Office report on manpower planning in the civil service (NAO 1989) refers to a number of 
quantitative and qualitative indicators of work done and work measurement in order to estimate likely work loads 
both at the Inland Revenue, and in the then Employment Group. For example, the same report refers to an 
analysis of clerical staff productivity in the Taxes and Collection networks which showed a 16% increase in 
productivity between 1982/3 and 1986/7 (§4.29), and shows a more detailed time series for the Valuation Office. 
Likewise, Employment Department calculations of cost per casework unit of the unemployment benefit service 
were cited as illustrations (§4.30). Such efficiency monitoring has been an important part of the overall 
management process, encouraged by the Financial Management Initiative. Such exercises, as the NAO reported, 
are expensive: the Revenue spent £2m over four years on setting up it work measurement framework for Taxes 
and Collection (§4.22), but led to much larger savings. 
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Table 4.14 
Effects of performance pay on productivity (line managers’ views) 
 
Organisation  Question Disagree  
% 
Agree  
% 
Valid 
Response 
Employment  PRP has led to an increase in the quantity 58.37 28.43 197 
Revenue  of work many of the staff do 60.62 34.36 259 
     
Employment  The existence of Performance Pay has caused 71.35 19.10 199 
Revenue  many of the staff to work beyond the requirements  
of their job 
63.84 30.00 260 
     
Employment   PRP has helped to increase the quality of the 71.86 17.59 199 
Revenue  work of many of the staff 79.23 12.31 260 
     
Employment  PRP has led to many of the staff giving sustained 76.88 10.55 199 
Revenue  high performance at work 76.54 13.46 260 
     
Employment  PRP has made many of the staff more committed 76.77 9.60 198 
Revenue  to their work 81.15 11.15 260 
 
4.6  Conclusions 
 
Five main conclusions can be drawn from this study concerning the effects of performance pay in 
the civil service: 
 
· the effects observed at the Inland Revenue in 1991 and 1996 cannot be dismissed as atypical. 
On most questions, replies by Employment Service middle managers are remarkably similar to 
those of the Revenue; 
· the different approaches to handling the tension between budget constraints and the potential for 
all staff to improve their performance have had little effect on reactions to performance pay; 
· the different approaches to goal setting were reflected moderately in staff views about the 
success of the goal setting functions of performance pay, as the simpler goals of the ES appear 
to have been communicated to staff with greater success than at the Revenue; 
· the Inland Revenue appears to have achieved greater success in raising productivity through 
PRP according to the views of line managers, although it has to be said that they were 
expressing a minority view in both departments. At the same time, more Revenue staff have 
been aware of the pressure to raise the quantity of work, and have felt that this prevailed over 
other, more qualitative, goals stressed by the Citizens’ Charter; 
· in both departments, the stress on individual work targets and individual accountability, in the 
eyes of the staff, have undermined team working and cooperation among colleagues, and to 
some extent, even with management. 
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Chapter 5 
Performance Pay in Two NHS Trust Hospitals 
 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
Although the Conservative government’s policy had been that performance pay should be adopted 
across the National Health Service, in practice, it never overcame opposition from staff, their 
professional associations, and indeed from many managers. However, a small number of trust 
hospitals did break away from the national Whitley system of pay agreements to set up their own 
trust terms and conditions, and in doing so, some introduced their own performance pay schemes. 
This chapter explores the performance pay schemes of two such NHS hospital trusts. 
 In contrast to the schemes we examine in the civil service, the management of these NHS trust 
hospitals have enjoyed a great deal of autonomy in both the adoption and design of their schemes. 
Central government pressure, which was a driving force for individual performance pay in the civil 
service and in schools, has been weak at trust level. In the present studies, management chose 
performance pay because they believed it offered certain merits, and they chose schemes they 
believed adapted to their own organisation’s needs.  
 As a result of this local management autonomy, we have the opportunity not only to look at 
the overall impact of performance pay on staff motivation and attitudes, but also to compare the 
effects of an individual and a trust-wide scheme. A third opportunity opened up by the hospital trust 
schemes is that of comparing their effects on administrative and professional staff as hospitals have a 
more diverse mix of types of occupations than the other parts of the public service covered in our 
project. 
 
 
5.2   Why Contrast Individual and Group Performance Pay? 
 
A common complaint by unions and professional associations is that individual performance pay is 
divisive. The concern is not confined to staff and their representatives, as many managers also have 
doubts about individual schemes. So there has long been an interest in group-based performance 
pay if suitable groups can be defined. Trust hospitals, with employment levels commonly in the band 
between three and five thousand, offer much simpler units for experimentation with group schemes 
than do large government departments and agencies. At the same time, they are sufficiently large 
organisations to have the resources to support a formally administered performance management 
system with a certain number of checks and balances. 
 Given these considerations, what are the main theoretical expectations about the different 
effects of individual and group-based performance incentives? If we take the intensity of direct 
financial incentives for high performance, then one would expect individual schemes to show the 
strongest effects because the rewards are focused on key individuals, as are the penalties for poor 
performance. With group schemes, the financial incentive is widely spread and so diffused across 
group members. Individual incentive schemes also provide more limited opportunities for ‘free-
riders’ because the reward is confined to those whose effort and performance are judged to be 
high. In contrast, group incentives are more open to abuse by those who ‘do not pull their weight’. 
Finally, under some circumstances, encouraging individual performance, as is the aim of individual 
PRP schemes, may undermine cooperation among staff as they compete for rewards. In such cases, 
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group incentives may be more effective. Thus the question is not an absolute one of whether 
individual PRP is more effective than group PRP, but rather how far the two approaches actually 
encourage different kinds of performance.  The contrast is summarised in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 
Different expected effects of individual and collective PRP schemes 
 
 Individual Collective 
Intensity of direct financial 
incentive for high performers 
Strong Q focused Weak Q spread widely 
Incentive for ‘free-riders’ Low Q reward exclusive High Q reward inclusive 
Threat to group cooperation Competition for individual reward Incentive to work together 
Cost of monitoring High Low 
 
 There is also an important consideration of cost: monitoring individual performance requires 
careful appraisal if staff suspicion of injustice and favouritism is to be avoided, whereas monitoring 
that of a whole trust for the purposes of PRP is considerably smaller. Indeed, if the trust’s 
performance is already being monitored by government quality of service indicators and financial 
targets, the additional information required may be small. 
 
 
5.3   The Two NHS Trust Hospitals and their Performance Pay 
Schemes 
 
5.3.1 The two Trust Hospitals 
 
Both hospitals opted for NHS trust status in 1992-93 among the second wave of hospitals to do so 
under the reorganisation of the National Health Service and the establishment of an ‘internal market’ 
(Table 5.2). In this reform, local hospital management greatly enhanced its autonomy, but in return, 
had to rely upon winning contracts to supply services to other parts of the NHS. Losing major 
contracts can be a serious blow to a trust and even threaten their financial viability as happened 
when the Anglian Harbours NHS Trust did so in September 1996.1 As a part of the move to trust 
status, these two hospitals also set their own local pay and conditions for all staff except doctors, 
and so broke away from the nationally determined Whitley pay and conditions that had prevailed 
before then. Staff were offered a choice at the time between moving to new trust contracts of 
employment and remaining on Whitley contracts. Those promoted or recruited thereafter would 
automatically move on to trust terms and conditions. At the time of our survey, about two thirds of 
the staff in the individual PRP trust were on trust contracts, compared with just over half at the 
group-PRP hospital. In terms of their occupational composition, both hospitals are remarkably 
alike, reflecting the provision of a large number of similar services to their local communities (Table 
5.3). 
                                                 
1 . Financial Times (14.9.96)  NHS trust faces collapse after losing work. 
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Table 5.2 
Main characteristics of the trust hospitals in 1996 
 
 Individual Trust-wide 
Became a trust 1993 1992 
Scheme started 1994 1994 
Employment size 3k-5k 3k-5k 
% on Trust contracts  65-70% 54% 
% part-time 40 49 
Local labour market Tight Less tight 
 
Table 5.3 
Employment composition in 1996 (per cent) 
 
Staff grades Individual Trust-wide 
Ancillary 9 17 
Admin & clerical 21 19 
Maintenance 2 1 
Nurses 51 50 
Professional 13 12 
Senior managers 4 2 
All 100 100 
 
Note: excludes doctors 
 
 In terms of their organisational performance, both NHS trust hospitals came out above the 
national average for a wide range of services. Although neither hospital’s performance can be 
attributed to the presence of PRP on the evidence we have, it can at least be said that they are alike 
in achieving good standards of quality. 
 
Table 5.4 
Performance of the Trusts in terms of NHS league tables 1995/6  
 
 Outpatient 
Appointments  
% of patients 
seen within 30 
minutes of 
appointment 
time) 
Accident and 
Emergency 
% of patients 
assessed within 
5 minutes of 
arrival 
Operations 
cancelled  
Number of 
patients not 
admitted within 
a month of 
cancellation of 
their operation  
Outpatient Waiting 
times 
% of outpatients seen 
within 13 and 26 
weeks  
 
 
13 Weeks   26 Weeks 
Inpatient waiting 
times 
 
% of patients 
admitted within 3 and 
12 months 
 
 
 
13 Weeks   26 Weeks 
National 
Performanc
e 
90% 94% 
 
8 83% 97% 71% 97% 
Individual 
scheme 
trust 
94% 
**** 
96% 
***** 
0 
***** 
85% 
*** 
100% 
***** 
68% 
*** 
98% 
*** 
Group 
Scheme 
trust 
91% 
**** 
91% 
**** 
1 
**** 
69% 
* 
92% 
** 
71% 
**** 
94% 
*** 
 
Source: The NHS Performance Guide 1995-96 
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5.3.2  Management objectives in the two schemes 
 
In both hospital trusts, the introduction of performance related pay was an integral part of more far-
reaching changes in the management of pay and incentives within the trust, and was closely 
associated with the move to local, trust-based, pay determination for all staff except doctors who 
remain covered by their own national pay arrangements. A common complaint of health service 
management has been that the national Whitley pay arrangements, with their separate pay scales for 
each major occupational group and their service-related pay increments, is that they reflect the very 
strong professional identification of staff and their associations, and so define performance along 
professional lines. Thus, management has seen them as an obstacle to introducing more modern 
human resource management methods with a greater emphasis on flexible team working and on 
performance of the hospital as an organisation. 
 In the group scheme trust, for example, management was particularly keen to develop ‘care 
teams’ as integrated, flexible groups of staff to respond to patient needs. Patient care is multi-
disciplinary, so greater efficiency and better care, it believed, can be provided by means of multi-
skilling with broader, generic, work roles combined with generic management structures2.  In 
contrast, the old Whitley system set separate pay structures for many of the professional groups, 
and so reinforced the distinct functions of each profession. Local pay, with a common structure for 
all employees of the Trust was believed to strengthen the idea that staff had common tasks to 
achieve. The Board also wished to move away from the separate professional hierarchies 
associated with the occupational groups incorporated into the Whitley system, and to involve health 
professionals more in the general management of the Trust3. 
 Over the years too, the Whitley systems had undergone a number of ad hoc adjustments with 
the gradual accumulation of a host of special allowances for different duties that could not be 
adequately rewarded within the national scales. Once such allowances have been granted, they are 
hard to remove even though their original purpose may have long since disappeared. Apart from 
generating feelings of inequity among staff, many managers anticipated an equal value ‘time bomb’ 
as the resulting anomalies often led to pay differences between women and men that could not be 
justified in terms of the work done. 
 The concerns about the Whitley system expressed by our two trust hospitals are fairly typical 
of other trusts even though only a small minority have adopted local pay. In their evidence to the 
1995 Nurses’ Pay Review Body, the two employer bodies, the National Association of Health 
Authorities and Trusts (NAHAT) and Federation of NHS Trusts, argued that local pay 
determination would facilitate a number of personnel management reforms of the kind just 
discussed4. However, despite this belief, and the encouragement of local pay determination by the 
                                                 
2. One example given to us was that physiotherapists work Monday to Friday, and nurses, continuously. 
Patients may need continuous physiotherapy treatment, so why not break down the demarcation, and  allow 
nurses to undertake some types of physiotherapy treatments? 
 
3 . The motives for the change were reported to us by the current Director of Personnel who, with the Board, was 
responsible for introducing the scheme. 
 
4. The views of the employers, government departments and health service employers, favouring local pay were 
summarised by the 1995 Nurses’ Pay Review Body (§64 and §67). Local pay was seen as offering flexibility to 
concentrate organisational and team efforts where most needed to improve quality and quantity of patient care, 
and ‘buying out’ inefficient working practices. The National Association of Health Authorities and Trusts 
(NAHAT) and Trust Federation gave examples including harmonisation of terms and conditions (eg. basic hours 
across different groups), reducing absenteeism, and changing nursing practices to include some tasks done by 
junior doctors. Both organisations were looking for the opportunity, through local negotiations, to change 
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1995 Review body, only a handful of hospital trusts had made the move. The Royal College of 
Nurses listed 24 trusts with local pay schemes for nurses and midwives in mid-1996, out of a total 
of 488 trusts  (RCN, 1996). Two main reasons underlie the slow growth of local pay schemes, and 
they are unrelated to the relative merits of local negotiations: managers had limited experience of, 
and were not ready for, local pay negotiations in many trusts; and the amount of money available for 
negotiation at local level was small. The 1995 Nurses’ Pay Review Body had recommended a 1% 
national increase and indicated that up to a further 2% could be negotiated locally, and by the 
autumn, most trusts had agreed to pay nurses 2% locally (Financial Times 6.9.95). However, 
following the protracted negotiations of 1995, the Review Body recommended a 2% national 
increase for 1996 which inevitably squeezed the money available for local negotiations. 
 There is a further complication in the move to local pay and conditions that may discourage 
many trusts. The government provisions setting up trust hospitals enable management to move to 
trust contracts only for those staff who so agree, and for new recruits. This means that if current staff 
are to change contracts, they have generally to be better off on trust than on Whitley contracts. 
Thus, trusts contemplating the move face the prospect of a difficult transition period in which they 
may have large numbers of staff working under different sets of pay and conditions. This was indeed 
the case in the two trust hospitals in our study. 
 In moving to local pay, both trusts undertook a major restructuring of their pay systems, the 
most important elements being the elimination of length of service incremental pay scales and major 
job evaluation exercises5. The latter were an important step towards rationalising pay differences, 
and in particular, tackling pay anomalies. The former was the main impetus behind the introduction 
of performance related pay. 
 Service incremental pay scales have come into criticism on three main grounds in recent years: 
their automatic nature up to the scale maximum makes them unrelated to performance; many staff 
may be discontented when ‘stuck’ at the top of their pay scales; and the fixed size of the incremental 
steps makes the pay bill inflexible and insensitive to how well the organisation is doing financially. 
Elements of all three were present in the thinking behind both hospitals’ schemes, but the emphasis 
in the individual performance scheme was very much on the first, whereas that on cost flexibility was 
quite important in the second. 
 If these were some of the important organisational objectives behind the two performance pay 
schemes, what can one say about the more detailed objectives communicated to staff within them? 
 
The Individual Scheme Trust 
 
In the trust with the individual scheme, the Trust Board’s mission statement includes ensuring that all 
people employed by the Trust are: 
 
· recognised as individuals 
· challenged to excel  
· suitably trained and rewarded 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
working practices through such methods as job redesign, skill-mix and grade-mix exercises. They were also 
interested in measures to reduce absenteeism, and to offer such benefits such as child-care facilities. 
 
5. They used the Lloyd Masters system at the individual scheme trust, and Medequate, in the group scheme 
trust. 
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 This philosophy is reflected in the foundations of the trust’s performance management scheme 
(Individual Performance and Development Review, IPDR), and the associated performance pay. 
As explained to staff in the user’s guide, IPDR aims to provide every member of staff with:  
 
· a clear expectation of how they can contribute to the Trust goals  
· an opportunity to identify their own development and training plan 
· a chance to discuss their performance - in detail- with their immediate manager 
· an opportunity to be rewarded for their performance 
 
The management presentation to staff additionally stressed: 
 
· an opportunity to understand where their objectives fit into those of the department and the 
Trust  
· clear objectives, tasks and targets 
 
 Central objectives of the scheme, as communicated to staff, include therefore effective goal 
setting and motivational effects of performance pay. The emphasis in the basic principles is very 
much on individual performance, however, recognition of the importance of team working and 
cooperation with other staff enters indirectly through the ‘contribution profile’ established for each 
job in the hospital. These profiles are based on six dimensions on which job demands are measured, 
and include6:  
 
· occupational skills 
· client care 
· decision-making and problem solving 
· interpersonal skills 
· leadership skills 
· planning and administration 
 
 Client care and interpersonal skills stress the degree to which the job requires close 
cooperation with others, patients or staff. 
 The IPDR system and its goals apply to all staff in the Trust, whether on Trust or Whitley 
contracts. The only difference is that the former are eligible for the performance pay element 
whereas the latter are not. 
 
Group-scheme Trust 
 
The objectives of the trust-wide scheme expressed to us by management were four: 
                                                 
6. In summary, these are defined on the following lines. Occupational skills: the clinical, professional, technical or 
other specialist skills and knowledge required by the job; Client care: the level and nature of contribution to 
client care required by the job irrespective of whether the ‘client’ is a patient or another member of staff or 
department within the Trust; Decision making: the extent to which the job holder is required to contribute by 
solving problems and making decisions - including clinical, managerial, technical and operational decisions; 
Interpersonal skills: the level or standard of communication, persuading and influencing skills required in relation 
to patients and other members of staff; Leadership skills: the extent to which the job requires its holder to lead, 
direct or guide others; Planning and administration: the extent to which the job requires its holder to plan and 
allocate resources and to manage time -their own and others- effectively. 
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· to give greater flexibility in managing pay costs (which represent 70% of revenue) 
· to assist in creating a corporate culture and in the alignment of individual goals with those of the 
organisation 
· to encourage and reinforce team working 
· to give some scope for identification of poor performance 
 
Other considerations stressed in the design of performance pay scheme included: 
 
· simplicity of operation 
· the scheme should cost no more than existing service-related pay increments 
· everyone should benefit, including those at the top of their scale 
· for performance pay to be meaningful, the sum available needs to be sufficiently large 
 
 The main difference between the objectives of the two schemes lies in the emphasis, in the 
first, on motivation for individual performance and motivation for team working and, in the second, 
on developing a corporate as opposed to a professional culture. The second scheme’s emphasis on 
cost variability is closely related to its team emphasis. The trust is a non-profit organisation, as are all 
NHS trusts, so cost variability is one way of sharing adversity among all staff. 
 In both trusts, performance pay has replaced annual, length of service based, salary 
increments. In the individual scheme, they are replaced by appraisal-related individual awards, and 
in the trust scheme, by the trust-wide bonus. Performance pay is consolidated into base salary 
completely under the individual scheme, and half is consolidated in the trust-wide scheme. Thus, in 
both trusts, performance pay has come to replace the incremental pay scales that were so strong a 
feature of the old Whitley salary structures. In the individual scheme fixed pay ranges with 
predetermined minima and maxima have also gone, opening the way for potentially unlimited pay 
advancement for excellent performers. In the trust-wide scheme, half of the bonus is consolidated 
into base salary, and half paid as a lump sum. Once staff reach their scale maximum, they receive 
only the lump sum element. The main features of the schemes are summarised in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5 
Summary of the two schemes 
 
 Individual Trust-wide 
Type of payment Appraisal-based individual awards Trust-wide performance bonus 
Length of service 
increments 
No No 
‘Cost of living’ element No Yes 
Pay scale maxima and 
minima 
No Yes 
PRP consolidated into 
base salary 
Yes, but not the 2% & 4% additional 
bonus 
50% 
Targets Individual targets linked to Trust Trust financial & contract 
performance 
Appraisal Integrated into PRP Separate from PB 
Appeals  ‘Grandparent manager’ Grievance procedure 
Determination of 
performance pay 
increase 
PRP negotiated with staff side, line 
managers award 
Bonus determined by Trust Board 
Scheme introduced by 
negotiation? 
No No 
Management’s goals  • Increase awareness of trust goals  
• Reinforce appraisal system 
• Deal with poor performance 
• Team working 
• Increase awareness of trust goals  
• More variable costs 
• Deal with poor performance 
• Team working 
 
5.3.3 Performance pay incentives under the two schemes 
 
The size of performance pay increases in any one year in both hospitals is relatively modest, as is the 
differential effect among staff (Table 5.6). However, their cumulative effects over time are more 
important, owing to the replacement of length of service increments. 
Under the individual performance scheme, management used a target distribution of 
performance ratings with a view to controlling the pay bill and preventing, an upward drift in ratings, 
and informing staff on how many were likely to gain different ratings. 60% of employees should be 
classified as ‘good’, 20% as ‘superior’ or ‘excellent’, and 20% as ‘acceptable’ or ‘poor’. The 
targets are not intended to be rigidly applied, but if a department’s ratings are much out of line with 
the expected outcomes, its managers have to justify them. In the trust-wide scheme, in June 1996, 
of eligible staff, 81% received the full bonus, 4%, half bonus, and none had it withheld. The 
remaining 15% did not qualify mostly because they had joined too recently. 
The incentive effect has to be compared with the general increase for staff on Whitley 
contracts of 3% in 1995 and 3.25% in 1996. To these increases one would have to add the normal 
service increments on Whitley scales, which for Grades A to F nurses represent on average just 
over 3%, except that many staff are at the top of their scales7. 
 
                                                 
7. This calculation is based on the nurses aged 18 or over in Grades A to F, taking the average increment as a 
percentage of the mid-point of the range for 1995. 
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Table 5.6 
Performance pay increases in the two trusts 
 
Individual Scheme 
 
April 1996 Increase % Bonus %* 
Excellent 5.25 4.0 
Superior 5.25 2.0 
Good 5.25 - 
Average 3.25 - 
Poor - - 
 
* non-consolidated 
 
Trust-wide bonus 
 
July 1995  Bonus % * Cost of living % 
Satisfactory to v. good Full bonus 6.4 3.0 
Unsatisfactory: can improve Half bonus 3.2 3.0 
Unsatisfactory: no improvement ® dismissal No bonus 0  
 
* half as lump sum, half as salary advancement. 
Whitley national increases: 1995, 3%; 1996, 3.25% 
 
The method for determining the size of performance pay increases differs between the two 
organisations. In the individual scheme trust, the size of performance pay awards for each 
performance level is negotiated with staff unions and professional associations on the assumption of 
a certain target distribution of appraisal ratings. 
In the trust-wide scheme, the size of the bonus is determined in two stages. Management 
decide the maximum percentage bonus payable for the year based on savings on salary increments 
and other automatic payments, and from improved efficiency. Initially, the maximum was set at 6%, 
to be increased gradually over the years, at no extra cost, to 10% as the proportion of salary paid 
automatically is reduced, and that related to performance, increased. It was raised to 8% from July 
1995. In the second stage, the Non-Executive Directors decide how far the trust has achieved its 
targets on the basis for results for the financial year completed on March 31. These include: 
 
· financial targets (balanced income and expenditure, meeting external finance limit, and 6% return 
on capital) 
· workload targets in contracts with purchasers 
· quality targets required by the Trust, the Department of Health and Purchasers 
· developments in the Trust Business Plan 
 
In the first two years of operation, the Non-Executive Directors judged the trust to have 
fulfilled 80% of its targets, hence the bonus of 6.4% for 1995 (80% of 8%). The bonus becomes 
payable from July 1. 
 
5.3.4 The appraisal systems in the two trusts 
 
Individual and trust-wide performance pay schemes make different demands of staff appraisal 
systems. Individual appraisal-related pay is demanding of management and staff time. Because 
people’s pay depends upon the outcome, appraisals have to be seen to be conducted fairly, so that 
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staff feel they are a fair and honest reflection of their performance. If individuals are to be 
differentially rated, which is the logic of an individual performance pay scheme, then management 
has to obtain reliable information on differential performance. It might be objected that ranking 
employees by their performance, as in some ‘tournament’ performance pay systems for managers, 
would avoid the need for detailed information, but this is not feasible for the great majority of health 
service staff. They have only limited scope for outstanding performance and they are very 
dependent on the work of fellow colleagues. 
 In contrast, hospital-wide schemes do not need such elaborate staff appraisal systems for 
their operation. The emphasis is on overall performance of the trust, and it is against the spirit of 
encouraging group performance to seek to differentiate the contributions of individual members very 
finely. It may still be necessary to discourage potential free-riders as peer group pressures may not 
always be adequate. Many staff may feel it is management’s job to deal with those who ‘abuse the 
system’. Thus, appraisal for the purposes of the trust-wide bonus needs only to identify poor 
performance and to seek to rectify it, by help, or if necessary, by sanctions. The trust has issued a 
protocol detailing the kinds of reasons for which bonus might be withheld. For withholding half 
bonus, these include persistent short-term absence, persistent lateness or poor time keeping and 
persistent errors, omissions, or mistakes. The full bonus could be withheld if such behaviour were 
not rectified in the following year, or if performance had so deteriorated that a final written warning 
had been issued.8 The emphasis then is very much on objective, documented criteria, such as might 
withstand scrutiny in the hospital’s grievance procedure. 
 In fact, both trust hospitals possessed sophisticated staff appraisal systems, but the 
underlying philosophy was different. In the individual scheme trust, managers were of the view that 
some form of PRP was necessary to drive the appraisal process: to make line managers and staff 
take it seriously, and to complete the target setting and appraisal interviews by the appropriate 
dates, for example. In the group-PRP trust, management was rather of the view that performance 
pay would contaminate appraisal, so the bonus was set up with a special minimal appraisal system 
designed to identify poor performance, and kept separate from its main performance management 
system. 
Performance management in the individual scheme trust places a strong emphasis on staff 
agreeing their objectives with their line managers for the coming year. Managers are instructed to 
look at key areas of the job and identify the key tasks, agree individual objectives with the member 
of staff, ensure objectives are designed to encourage improvement, and agree on conditions for the 
performance review, notably, timing and how achievement will be measured. The management 
document does however recognise that in some cases it may be appropriate to focus on the 
contribution profile because it may be difficult to define specific objectives in a number of jobs. Thus 
although the appraisal system is based primarily on agreed objectives, in a number of cases it may 
function more like a criteria based system. 
Both schemes include appeals procedures. In the individual scheme, appeals can be made 
to a ‘grandparent’ manager. In the trust-wide scheme, appeals are handled through the normal 
grievance procedure. 
 
 
5.4  The Survey of Staff Views on their Performance Pay Schemes 
 
                                                 
8. RCN Competence Pay Workshop 4.9.96 Resource Pack, p. 26. 
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Our survey, like those of civil servants and of school head teachers, is designed to measure staff 
views concerning the effect of their own performance pay scheme on different aspects of their 
motivation to work, such as their willingness to work hard, to cooperate with colleagues and with 
management, and on their views concerning the effects on other aspects of their work environment 
likely to affect performance. We did not have any measures of organisational performance enabling 
us to test the effects of performance on wider outcomes, but our sample did include a number of 
managers who experienced the effects of performance pay on both their own performance and on 
that of their staff. We included a special section in our questionnaire for such people. We also ask a 
number of questions about people’s general views on pay and incentives and on their orientations to 
work in the NHS. 
Our questionnaire, the full version of which is included in Appendix 2, was elaborated in 
discussion with senior management and staff side representatives, and in both trusts, was piloted on 
a group of staff from a range of different occupations in both hospitals. We also gave ‘feedback’ 
presentations to management and staff representatives in both hospitals which proved to be a 
valuable check on our interpretations and a source of additional insight. The questionnaire was sent 
out at the end of August 1996 with payslips and an accompanying letter from management and staff 
representatives, and staff were invited to return completed questionnaires to the researchers care of 
the hospital via the internal post. Staff were not given time off work to complete the questionnaire, 
and no follow-up mailings could be sent out because returns were confidential. However, at the 
individual scheme trust staff were given additional encouragement to return the questionnaires by 
posters, and by a ‘thank you’ note sent out after the closing date pointing out that late replies would 
still be analysed. 
Questionnaires were sent to all staff working in the two trust hospitals except doctors. For 
the individual scheme trust, 693 questionnaires were received back giving a 30% response rate, and 
for the group scheme trust, 914 usable replies were received, giving a response rate of 22%. 
Management thought the response may have been depressed by the holiday period, and by an 
element of survey fatigue, especially as the questionnaire was quite long. We checked response by 
staff group, gender and age, and also by whether staff were on trust or Whitley contracts, and by 
appraisal rating. The survey obtained a good response across all these characteristics, although 
there was some variation in response by staff group. Details are shown in the methodological 
appendix. Because of the variation in response by staff group, the replies to all except the questions 
on personal characteristics have been weighted by staff group in order to give a more representative 
picture of the whole. 
To analyse the replies to our questionnaires, we adopt the broad framework of expectancy 
theory as outlined in the introductory chapter. In presenting our results, we start by looking at staff 
orientations to their work in the NHS and their views of performance pay in principle. Then we 
consider its effects on staff awareness of trust targets and on goal setting before turning to the issue 
of cost flexibility in response to how well the trust performs. We then look at the issue of how well 
the schemes are felt to deal with poor performance, and at their effects on team working and 
motivation. We conclude by evaluating the overall impact of the two types of scheme. 
 
Whitley or Trust Contracts 
 
The way the two schemes were introduced means that both hospitals have large numbers of staff of 
different terms and conditions, with performance pay covering only part of the total work force. This 
division raises a number of difficult problems. First of all, it highlights the practical personnel 
management problems faced in both hospitals of having to administer two sets of terms and 
conditions simultaneously. It seems very likely, on these responses, that the interaction between the 
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two sets of conditions would cause friction. Legally, the trusts had little alternative to this if the opted 
for local pay, but even without that, it is not clear that they could have imposed new conditions on 
large numbers of staff against their will. 
Secondly, it complicates the interpretation of the schemes’ impact: should one consider the 
effects on staff as a whole, or should one concentrate on those on Trust contracts as they are the 
beneficiaries of performance pay? 
The argument for doing the first is that management has to be concerned about the 
performance of all staff in the hospital as the organisation’s performance depends on everyone. The 
existence of two sets of conditions may be a medium-term transitional problem, but one has to 
consider the alternatives. Imposing new conditions against employees’ will would be fraught with 
legal difficulties, and would most likely also cause a very costly conflict with staff. Acting in this way 
might alienate even those initially favourable to trust conditions. Alternatively, management could 
seek to make trust conditions so attractive financially that everyone would opt for them, but then, 
clearly, the pay cost would be excessive. Therefore, in practical terms, the two trusts had little 
alternative but to run two systems conjointly, so one should consider the effects on staff as a whole. 
However, because the problem is essentially a transitional one, there is also value in looking 
at how those on Trust contracts have responded. This could be a guide as to the likely long-term 
effects of the two schemes. 
One important caveat is needed. Before one can be sure that the responses of trust contract 
staff represent a possible long-run view, one needs to deal with the problem of ‘self-selection’. New 
recruits and promoted staff have no choice between trust and Whitley contracts, but current 
employees at the time of the changeover did have a choice, so there is a theoretical possibility that 
those favouring performance pay chose trust contracts, and those strongly against it, Whitley 
contracts. While it is almost certain that some staff chose on these grounds, many other reasons also 
motivated the choice, and these were often unrelated to performance pay. One of the most 
important was whether the person would be financially better off or not, and here the important 
issues were the outcome of the job evaluation and of the reform of premia and allowances. In the 
view of the managers who had introduced the scheme, the latter issues were far more salient, and 
problematic for the introduction of the new pay systems, than personal views about performance 
pay. This is borne out by the replies in the section of our questionnaire which invited staff to 
comment on why they were working on trust or Whitley contracts: the most common reasons given 
were the loss of special allowances for working unsocial hours involved in moving from Whitley to 
trust contracts, and the fear that once everyone was on a trust contract the bonus would be 
reduced. Very few mentioned any opposition in principle as the reason. 
Finally, the sample shows that a number of other factors are related to acceptance of the 
principle of performance pay, notably, staff group and length of service. In the first case, work 
measurement problems may be felt to be more tricky (e.g. among ward than among office staff), so 
it would be likely that the difficulties of working performance pay rather than straight opposition to 
the principle explains the views expressed. In the second, longer service employees are more likely 
to opt to remain on Whitley contracts because of their greater familiarity with them, and longer 
acceptance of the ‘psychological contract’ implied by them. These considerations might colour their 
acceptance of the scheme, but not necessarily their perceptions of its effects. 
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5.5  Staff Orientations to Work in the NHS 
 
One of the very striking aspects of staff replies about why they joined the health service and what is 
important to them about their current jobs is the very strong attachment to the intrinsic value and 
interest of their work (Table 5.7). An interest in health care, the opportunity to help people, and the 
belief the NHS is an important public service weighed far more heavily in their reasons for joining 
than did job security, the organisation of work or pay. For simplicity, the tables in the main text 
show only the percentage agreeing. Our survey used a five-point ‘Likert scale’ ranging from 
‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’. The full results are shown in the appendix. 
 It is of course well-known that replies to retrospective questions are not always an accurate 
reflection of what people actually thought at the time, and some respondents joined the NHS many 
years ago. However, such factors are unlikely to swamp either the very strong emphasis on the 
intrinsic qualities of the work done in the NHS, or the great similarity of replies between the two 
hospital trusts. Moreover, in our discussions with staff, it became clear that these considerations are 
not confined to nursing staff as even clerical staff have a good deal of contact with patients and their 
families, for example, in arranging appointments and directing people to the appropriate medical 
services. 
 
Table 5.7 
Reasons staff joined the NHS (% ‘agreeing’) 
 
No. Question Individual Trust-wide 
2 Interested in health care 87.7 85.5 
1 The opportunity to help people 87.4 85.4 
7 NHS an important public service 84.4 88.7 
4 Job security 60.5 64.6 
8 Needed a job at the time 44.3 41.9 
5 Chance to work part time 35.1 30.1 
6 Chance to work shifts 23.6 23.4 
3 Good pay opportunities 9.0 27.0 
 
 The strong emphasis on the value of intrinsic rewards is again reflected in what staff see as 
important in their current jobs (Table 5.8). The dominant factors are the nature of their work, 
interest in health care and relations with colleagues and management. There is some difference 
between the trusts in the value given to job security, level of income and other benefits which figure 
more strongly for staff in the trust-wide scheme hospital. Job security in particular may be more 
highly valued because of the slacker local labour market for that trust, and the region’s greater 
experience of industrial decline. 
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Table 5.8 
What staff value in their present jobs (% ‘agreeing’) 
 
No. Question Individual Trust-wide 
15 Varied and interesting work 90.4 89.6 
14 Opportunity for own initiative 89.4 89.3 
11 Interest in health care 88.5 86.6 
18 Team work & co-operation 86.2 84.0 
17 Relationship with colleagues & manager(s) 86.2 82.6 
  9 Job Security 81.9 88.0 
13 Opportunity to exercise responsibility 81.5 81.0 
10 My level of income 77.6 84.1 
16 Further training 73.3 71.4 
12 Flexible working time 58.3 54.3 
19 Staff Benefits (e.g. childcare provision) 26.7 37.8 
 
 
5.6  Staff Views on the Principle of Performance Pay 
 
Despite the strong emphasis on the intrinsic qualities of their work, a majority of staff in both trust 
hospitals approved of the principle of linking an element of pay to performance (Table 5.9). There 
was strong support for rewarding excellent performance, and less than a third thought performance 
pay fundamentally unfair. On the other hand, only a minority, albeit quite a large one, considered 
that pay should be based solely on performance. At the same time, there was a widespread belief 
that the concept of performance pay is difficult to apply in health care because the work is hard to 
measure (Q40). 
 
Table 5.9 
Staff views on the principle of Performance Pay (% ‘agree’) 
 
No. Question Individual Trust-wide 
28 Excellent performance should be rewarded by additional 
bonuses in pay 
80.7 70.6 
32 The principle of relating pay to performance is a good one 62.0 52.0 
33 The idea of performance pay is fundamentally unfair 27.5 30.5 
27 Individuals should be paid solely on the basis of individual 
performance 
40.6 26.5 
40 PP problematic because NHS work hard to measure 75.7 73.0 
 
The reason for opposition to paying solely for performance is immediately obvious in the 
support shown for a number of other key principles for pay (Table 5.10). That pay should reflect 
different duties in the same grade shows strong attachment to paying according to job demands. Pay 
for qualifications is strongly embedded in health service culture where professional groups play such 
an important part. Support for rewarding experience, pay for cost of living rises, and according to 
national scales all militate against giving a large role to performance pay. Finally, paying more for 
skills in short supply is a commonly used argument in review body evidence. 
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Table 5.10 
Staff views on other criteria for pay (% ‘agree’) 
 
No. Question Individual Trust-wide 
25 Different duties in same grade 85.6 76.5 
26 Pay for additional qualifications 73.5 67.5 
24 Experience should count more 67.2 74.0 
31 Cost of living rises 58.0 70.8 
30 Pay according to national pay scales  47.9 67.1 
29 Pay more if skills in short supply 43.2 39.5 
 
 On the whole, the views expressed by staff in the two trusts are similar, except that those in 
the group-scheme trust are significantly cooler towards performance pay, more strongly opposed to 
paying solely on the basis of individual performance, and more strongly attached to paying for 
experience, cost of living rises, and much more strongly attached to national pay scales. Some of 
these differences, and particularly the latter, may be related to the slacker local labour market for 
the group-scheme trust. National pay scales even out differences in bargaining power arising from 
differences in local unemployment rates. 
 In view of the diversity of occupational groups employed at the two hospital trusts, it is 
interesting to see how attitudes to the principle of performance pay differ between them (Table 
5.11). In both trusts there is a marked difference of enthusiasm between the managerial and white 
collar staff groups and the professional and nursing ones. The medical professional associations have 
taken a strong position nationally against performance pay, although it is not clear whether they are 
reflecting or forming their members’ views in doing so. The nature of nursing work, with its heavy 
emphasis on cooperation among colleagues in patient care, may be a factor in their greater coolness 
towards performance pay, but that would explain better opposition to individual rather than group 
performance schemes. 
 Across most groups, support for the principle of performance pay is stronger in the individual 
scheme trust. The two exceptions are maintenance, where numbers are very small and so may just 
reflect statistical error, and ancillary grades. The Director of Personnel at the group scheme trust 
pointed out that this group had gained considerably from the general reorganisation of pay scales. 
 
Table 5.11 
Performance pay good in principle (Q32) by staff group (% agree) 
 
Staff group Individual Trust-wide 
Senior managers 95.9 83.7 
Admin & clerical 74.8 67.6 
Professional 65.6 41.1 
Nursing 56.5 42.6 
Maintenance 54.5 64.7 
Ancillary 52.6 67.7 
All groups 62.5 52.3 
 
 Finally, attitudes to performance pay differ strongly between those on Trust and those who 
have remained on Whitley contracts (Table 5.12). In both hospitals, staff on trust contracts were 
much more favourable to the principle, and less likely to believe it fundamentally unfair. They were 
also far more likely to report negative judgements of its effects in practice, and to be cynical about 
management’s motives for the scheme. As argued earlier, we do not believe these differences can 
be explained by ‘self selection’, that is, those opposed to the principle performance pay chose to 
remain on Whitley contracts. 
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 To facilitate comparison between the two hospitals given their different percentages of staff on 
trust and Whitley contracts, we calculated an adjusted figure for the group scheme trust. The final 
column shows what the overall figure would be for that hospital had the mix of staff on the two types 
of contract been the same as in the individual scheme hospital. 
 
Table 5.12 
Comparison of staff views by Trust and Whitley contracts (% ‘agree’) 
 
No. Question Contract type Individual Trust wide Trust wide 
adjusted 
32 PP good principle Trust 68.7 62.4  
  Whitley 44.3 38.6  
  All 62.2 52.0 57.1 
33 PP unfair Trust 22.9 21.3  
  Whitley 39.6 43.0  
  All 27.3 30.9 26.2 
39 PP causes jealousies Trust 58.7 41.2  
  Whitley 68.1 62.3  
  All 61.2 50.5 46.0 
37 PP made staff more aware of  Trust 50.1 48.6  
 Trust goals  Whitley 41.2 21.9  
  All 47.7 36.9 42.7 
44 PP has undermined morale Trust 47.3 35.3  
  Whitley 63.4 61.2  
  All 51.5 46.6 41.0 
43 Managers use PP to reward  Trust 36.9 19.0  
 Their favourites Whitley 52.7 36.1  
  All 41.1 26.5 22.9 
55 Current level of PP set in Trust 47.1 64.2  
 Order to induce switch to Whitley 72.5 86.7  
 Trust contracts  All 53.9 74.1 69.2 
46 PP a device to cut paybill Trust 33.7 34.4  
  Whitley 46.0 65.6  
  All 36.9 48.1 41.3 
36 No PP if jobs being cut Trust 35.8 50.0  
  Whitley 47.0 51.3  
  All 38.8 50.6 50.6 
30 Pay on national scales Trust 40.8 59.7  
  Whitley 66.2 77.7  
  All 47.7 66.3 63.7 
 
 
5.7  Awareness of Trust Objectives 
 
One of the goals of the performance pay schemes in both trust hospitals has been to raise staff 
awareness of their trust’s objectives. Naturally, the mechanism by which this is achieved differs: by 
individual communication through the appraisal process in one case, and by linking the bonus to how 
well the trust achieves its objectives in the other. Taking all staff together, both on trust and Whitley 
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contracts, a much stronger percentage agree performance pay has raised awareness in the individual 
scheme trust. 
 
Table 5.13 
Awareness of trust objectives 
 
No. Question % ‘agree’ Individual scheme Trust-wide 
scheme 
37 Raises awareness of Trust objectives 46.8 37.0 
61 Made me more aware of Trust targets* 43.0 33.8 
62 Already aware of Trust targets* 49.3 36.7 
48 Scheme aims clearly communicated before 
implementation 
37.4 20.0 
41 Managers set work targets more clearly 53.1 30.5 
 
* asked only of those on trust contracts. 
 
 Comparing the two schemes, people in the individual scheme were more likely to reply not 
only that staff awareness in general had increased (Q37), but also that their own personal awareness 
of trust objectives had been raised (Q61). 
 Thinking that staff would be less likely to report that PRP had raised their awareness if they 
were already aware of trust objectives, we enquired about this (Q62). We ask this question for two 
reasons: the different effects in raising awareness between the two types of scheme might be due to 
differences in the initial level of awareness; and from the point of view of PRP’s effectiveness, it is 
presumably more valuable to the organisation if it boosts awareness among those previously not 
aware of its objectives. There is little point in preaching to the converted. 
 In fact, differences in initial awareness do not explain the different effects of PRP between the 
two trusts. It is lowest in the trust in which least staff reported it raising their awareness. In addition, 
the schemes’ ability to raise awareness among the unaware appears to be least for the group-based 
one. Focusing on those initially unaware, in the individual scheme, 40% reported increased 
awareness against 32% reporting no increase. In the group scheme, only 24% reported an increase, 
against 69% reporting no effect. So clearly, the individual scheme was more effective in raising 
awareness of trust objectives among those not previously aware. 
 The most important reason appears to be that management communication was more 
effective under the individual scheme. The aims were judged more clearly communicated before 
implementation (Q48), and managers were believed to set targets more clearly (Q41). 
 Turning to the effects by staff group, the stronger impact of the individual scheme on staff 
awareness of trust objectives is also visible within most staff groups (Table 5.14), where the analysis 
is confined to those on trust contracts). Ancillary staff are the notable exception. In the latter case, 
the personnel director of the group-scheme trust explained that they had benefited considerably 
from the job evaluation exercise associated with the switch to performance pay. 
 The impact of the schemes on staff awareness also differed between staff groups. Those with 
a strong external, professional, orientation were less convinced that either scheme had raised general 
awareness of trust objectives than were the other groups. The difference between the professional 
and the other groups was less sharp over the effect on their own personal awareness, and in the 
individual scheme trust, nurses were close to the average. 
 The clear implication, overall, is that the direct communication of objectives through the 
appraisal process is more effective than the somewhat diffuse link between the size of the bonus and 
achieving objectives. The effect is particular noticeable among nurses in the individual scheme trust 
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where the quite large difference between nurses and the non-professional groups on awareness in 
general disappears when we turn to the effects on their own personal awareness of trust objectives. 
 
Table 5.14 
Effects of PRP on staff awareness of trust objectives (% ‘agree’) 
 
Staff on TRUST 
contracts only  
PP has made STAFF more aware 
(Q37) 
 
PP has made ME more aware  
(Q61) 
 
 Individual Group Individual Group 
Senior Management 72.7 66.7 43.1 38.1 
Professional & 
technical 
44.5 31.6 33.8 28.0 
Nursing 47.1 40.5 44.0 29.0 
Admin & clerical 54.6 52.2 48.2 38.4 
Ancillary 54.2 64.7 45.9 50.0 
     
All staff 49.9 48.3 43.3 36.1 
N 470 465 458 449 
 
*Works and maintenance staff not shown because of very small sample numbers. 
 
 There is however another side to the story: how people feel towards the organisation they 
work in. Here, the trust-wide scheme scores more favourably with staff. There they are much more 
likely to respond that the bonus has made them feel part of a successful organisation (Q65), and that 
it has made them feel more positive about working for the trust (Q64) (see Table 5.15). 
 
Table 5.15 
Feeling part of a successful organisation 
 
No. Question % ‘agree’ Individual scheme Trust-wide 
scheme 
65 PP made me feel part of a successful organisation* 27.7 44.1 
64 PP made me feel more positive about working for the 
Trust* 
29.9 38.6 
63 PP made me identify with Trust  goals* 34.0 29.0 
 
* asked only of those on trust contracts. 
 
 Finally, increasing awareness of trust goals, and feeling part of a successful organisation stop 
short of inducing staff to identify with trust goals. Neither scheme was very successful on this score 
(Q63). 
 
 
5.8  Cost Flexibility 
 
One of the major employer criticisms of the service-based incremental pay scales of the old Whitley 
system was the general inertia this gave to staff costs which represent about 70% of the total costs 
of the trusts. The individual performance pay scheme introduces an element of local flexibility by 
making the size of performance related increases negotiable each year. Likewise, the trust-wide 
bonus introduces an element of cost flexibility depending on what the trust thinks it can afford to set 
aside annually for the bonus, and on how far its objectives are achieved in any year. 
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 Although both schemes allow for a degree of cost flexibility through their performance pay 
schemes, it is arguably more transparent under the group scheme. Under the individual scheme, cost 
flexibility can come about by negotiation of smaller performance pay increases (and a smaller bonus 
when that is paid) for each appraisal grade. However, this has the effect of reducing the reward that 
staff gain for their individual performance during the year and can be seen as an attempt by 
management to claw back what has been given during the year in terms of performance. In other 
words, there is a conflict between the logic of rewarding staff for their personal efforts during the 
year, which is what they see as themselves as contributing to their organisation, and linking this to 
the overall success of the organisation which is of course influenced by many other factors. In 
contrast, the trust-wide bonus is unambiguously linked to trust performance, and there is no direct 
link with individual performance. 
 In both trusts, there was general acceptance of the idea that staff should share in the success 
of their organisation, and also that troubles should be shared in times of adversity. Better to restrict 
pay increases than to have job cuts. Where the two trusts diverge strongly is over the continuation 
of performance increments when jobs are having to be cut. In the group-scheme trust, 50% of staff 
thought avoiding job cuts more important than performance increments. 
 
Table 5.16 
Staff views on cost flexibility and performance pay (% ‘agree’) 
 
No. Question Individual scheme Trust-wide 
scheme 
34 It is appropriate for staff to be financially rewarded when 
the Trust does well in achieving its goals  
84.4 80.4 
35 If Trust in financial difficulty, reasonable to restrict pay 
increases if alternative were job losses 
61.1 59.1 
36 Staff should not receive performance increments when 
jobs are having to be cut 
38.9 50.0 
46 The Trust’s scheme is simply a device to cut the pay bill 37.0 48.3 
55 Current level of PP to attract staff onto Trust contracts 54.0 73.8 
 
 In view of the group-performance group-adversity emphasis of the trust-wide scheme, it is 
interesting to look further at the ‘pay or jobs’ question (Q36) (Table 5.17). In all staff groups, for 
those on trust contracts, jobs weigh more heavily for the group-scheme trust, although the 
differences are smallest for the least qualified groups. 
 
Table 5.17 
‘Pay or jobs’: views by staff group 
 
Staff on TRUST contracts only  
(% ‘agree’) (Q36) 
Individual scheme trust Group scheme trust 
   
Senior Management 20.4 47.6 
Professional & technical 23.5 38.6 
Nursing 33.0 42.0 
Admin & clerical 42.2 48.3 
Ancillary 64.0 69.3 
   
All staff 35.9 49.5 
N 468 466 
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 With observations for one point in time only, we cannot say definitely whether these results 
are caused by the differences between the two schemes, or whether senior management in the less 
buoyant of the two local labour markets were in tune with staff views when choosing their scheme. 
However, two sets of factors suggest these differences may be related to the type of scheme 
adopted. 
 If the slacker local labour market of the group scheme trust had caused the greater stress on 
jobs over pay, then one would expect to see staff in the group scheme trust also placing a 
correspondingly higher value on job security, both as a valued feature in their current jobs and as a 
reason for joining the NHS (Table 5.7, Q4; and Table 5.8, Q9). In fact, in both trusts, job security 
is highly valued, and the difference between the two is rather small, around five percentage points, 
only one third the size of the difference on the ‘pay or jobs’ question. Moreover, when we look at 
the results by staff grade, the difference between the trusts on ‘pay or jobs’ is greatest among the 
staff groups with the most transferable skills and so the least to gain from job security: the 
professional and senior management groups. It would seem therefore that the greater acceptance of 
a trade-off between performance pay increases and jobs when times are bad is favoured by the 
scheme itself rather than the state of the local labour market. 
 There is however, a degree of ambiguity in the replies by the staff at the group-scheme trust. 
The variability of the bonus seems to be accepted as a means of sharing adversity and preserving 
jobs, yet there also appears to be a degree of suspicion over management’s true intentions. Staff 
there were more likely overall to believe performance pay was simply a device to cut the paybill, 
and that its current levels were designed to induce staff to switch to Whitley contracts. Much of the 
reason for this lies in the feelings of those still on Whitley contracts (Table 5.12), and here the 
consolidation of bonuses into base pay for those on trust contracts seems to be the problem. 
 So the trust-wide scheme appears to have enjoyed greater success in fostering acceptance for 
sharing adversity through a variable bonus, and hence for a degree of cost variability, than has the 
individual scheme. 
 
 
5.9   Evaluating and Dealing with Poor Performance 
 
One of the goals of performance pay schemes is to help control poor performance. Under individual 
schemes, if the great majority of staff expect some performance reward, it may prove demotivating 
if they see the same rewards going to those who are not pulling their weight. Thus, sanctioning poor 
performance may be as important for motivation as rewarding exceptionally good performance. 
Indeed, in a recent survey of police officers’ views of their appraisal scheme, one of the most 
damaging aspects seemed to be the perception that management could not be trusted to appraise 
fairly and honestly because it did not sanction known cases of poor performance (Sheehy, 1993, 
evidence). In group schemes, dealing with poor performance can also be extremely important for 
maintaining motivation. Such schemes are especially vulnerable to ‘free-rider’ behaviour if 
individuals know that they can share in the rewards without contributing their share of effort. As 
critical as the number of actual free-riders is staff perception. If it is believed to be widespread, then 
their own motivation for working hard is likely to decline. Therefore, a critical problem for the 
success of both individual and group performance schemes is their ability to deal with poor 
performance, and to be seen to do so effectively. 
 Judging by staff replies, the individual scheme is seen as more successful in dealing with poor 
performance, which is perhaps not surprising given the close link between individual appraisal and 
individual pay. Under the group scheme, management decided to penalise only poor performers, but 
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there remains a problem as to how they should be identified without recourse to the results of an 
individual appraisal scheme, which, it will be remembered, was kept separate. The most readily 
available indicators that can be used are relatively objective ones, such as persistent absence or 
disciplinary offences. These may well capture the most obvious cases of poor performance, but 
there can be an element of ‘double punishment’ if the person has already been sanctioned for the 
absence, and things are not always clear cut. Absenteeism may be a gripe among staff with a good 
attendance record, but how should one treat cases where repeated absence is due to family 
problems or ill-health of family members? The rule clearly needs to be applied with discretion, but at 
that point it loses its objectivity. The grievance procedure provides a path to procedural justice, but 
as it is an all-purpose procedure, it is probably not equipped to deal with finely balanced cases. This 
is likely to make management rather cautious in its use of the ‘unsatisfactory’ ratings. This may be to 
the advantage of individual employees whose performance falls short of the mark, but it also means 
that staff will see many of the less obvious poor performers receiving the same rewards as 
themselves. One union representative commented that linking poor performance to absence made 
the performance bonus function rather like an attendance bonus. 
 
Table 5.18 
Dealing with poor performance (% agree) 
 
No. Question Individual scheme Trust-wide scheme 
51 Trust’s scheme a good way to identify poor 
performance 
53.1 23.0 
74 My managers can be trusted to identify poor 
performance 
42.8 30.5 
75 Managers know enough about the jobs of their staff to 
identify poor performance 
44.6 36.9 
52 The Trust’s scheme makes managers more willing to 
deal with poor performance 
38.4 31.3 
 
 These problems are reflected in the replies shown in (Table 5.18). Under the group scheme, 
staff were much less confident that management could identify poor performance, or that they knew 
enough about the jobs of their staff to do so. The gap narrows when it comes to managers’ 
willingness to deal with poor performance: not an easy job under any scheme. 
 
 
 
5.10 Team Working 
 
As suggested earlier, the theory of incentives would predict that team working and cooperation 
would be more strongly encouraged by the trust-wide than the individual scheme (Table 5.19). In 
fact, neither scheme is thought by the staff to do much to encourage team working (Q49). Staff on 
trust contracts in both hospitals were about twice as likely as those on Whitley to respond 
positively, but even among these, only one in five agreed their scheme encouraged team working. 
 There is a school of thought among personnel specialists that argues that pay systems are too 
blunt to help motivate staff to do specific things. The idea is that management have to adopt other, 
non-pay, policies to encourage their staff to achieve certain goals, and the important thing is to avoid 
ruining motivation with inappropriate pay incentives. One might therefore ask whether one scheme is 
seen as posing less of an obstacle to team working and cooperation than the other. Here a clear gap 
emerges between the two types of scheme. 
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 The trust-wide scheme is seen by fewer staff as causing jealousies among staff (Q39), 
undermining staff morale (Q44), and making staff less willing to help colleagues in difficulty (Q38). 
The gap becomes quite large if we take the adjusted figures for the trust-wide scheme which treat 
that hospital as though it had the same mix of staff on trust and Whitley contracts as the individual 
one. A gap of between ten and fifteen points emerges between the two trusts. Likewise, the impact 
on staff’s personal willingness to cooperate with management is also less affected under the trust-
wide scheme (Q50). 
 Apart from potential jealousies arising between staff who get different performance ratings, 
they may also fear that individual line managers may use the scheme to reward favourites. Again, the 
trust-wide scheme appears to be far less vulnerable to such fears among staff than the individual 
scheme (Q43). 
 
Table 5.19 
Team working under the two schemes (% agree) 
 
No. Question Individual 
scheme 
Trust-wide 
scheme 
Trust-wide scheme, 
adjusted figures 
 The Trust’s scheme:    
49 Encourages team working 18.4 16.4 18.6 
39 Causes jealousies between staff 61.3 50.9 46.0 
44 Helped undermine staff morale 51.6 47.2 41.0 
38 Makes staff less willing to assist colleagues 
with work difficulties 
25.6 18.9 15.1 
50 Reduced my willingness to co-operate with 
management 
18.9 14.1 11.4 
43 Managers use the scheme to reward their 
favourites 
41.3 26.9 22.9 
 
Finally, we asked whether staff wished to be rewarded on a group basis (Q53). About one 
third of staff under the individual scheme agreed, whereas about two-thirds of those under the trust-
wide scheme thought it did not properly reward groups or departments that performed better than 
the rest. 
The general conclusion then on team working and cooperation is that the trust-wide scheme, 
as might have been expected, gains a more positive response, particularly in avoiding some of the 
jealousies and fears of favouritism associated with the individual scheme. On the other hand, it is 
clear from the replies that even group performance schemes will not generate team working ‘by 
remote control’. 
5.11 General Motivation 
 
Motivation had not been one of the central goals of the trust-wide bonus, as the Personnel Director 
explained to us, so it might seem inappropriate to evaluate it on such grounds. However, the 
question itself is of considerable interest, particularly in view of the opportunity for comparison with 
the individual performance scheme. 
 In order for performance pay to motivate, staff need to believe they can vary their effort and 
performance, that the expected rewards will flow if they succeed, and they must think the reward 
worth striving for. In both trusts, most staff knew what they had to do to get a good rating and 
believed they were capable of so doing (Table 5.20, Q86, Q87), and only a minority believed their 
jobs gave them little scope for performing well (Q90). In the individual-scheme trust most staff 
understood the reason for their latest performance rating, whereas only around a third did so in the 
group-scheme trust. Likewise, there was a big gap between the percentages of staff believing their 
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most recent appraisal to be a fair reflection of their performance (Q85). The immediate reason for 
this lies in the much smaller percentage of staff in the group scheme trust who had had a formal 
performance review (36% compared with 92%), and hence a very large percentage of ‘no views’. 
If we take instead the ratio of ‘agrees’ to ‘disagrees’, then the two trusts are much more alike: 1:2 
for the group scheme compared with 1:1.7 for the individual scheme.  
 Finally, to return to the question of staff perceptions of management’s behaviour evoked in the 
previous section, it is notable that staff under the individual scheme are more likely to report they 
expected to be denied ratings they deserved (Q89). We could not ask about quotas under the 
group scheme because the question would not have made sense, but under the individual one, it is 
notable that a majority believed that staff are frequently denied the ratings they deserve because 
there is a quota system. 
 
Table 5.20 
Staff views of their performance targets and ratings (% agree) 
 
No. Question Individual scheme Trust-wide scheme 
86 I know what I have to do to get a good rating in 
the future 
54.9 *64.4 
87 I am personally capable of doing what is 
necessary to get a good rating in the future 
84.5 84.1 
90 The nature of my present job makes it very hard 
for me to get a good rating 
35.4 29.6 
84 I understand why I was awarded my most recent 
performance rating 
65.9 31.5 
85 My most recent performance rating was a fair 
reflection  of my performance 
55.3 38.5 
88 The personal satisfaction I derive from my work is 
sufficient incentive for me to do what is needed 
to get a good rating 
74.9 61.1 
89 Even if my performance is good enough to merit a 
good rating, I doubt that I will be given one 
46.3 36.1 
91 Staff are frequently denied the performance rating 
they deserve because there is a quota system of 
performance ratings 
56.5 na 
 
* I am clear about my current objectives and targets 
 
 The much smaller percentage of staff that had undergone their performance reviews at the 
group scheme trust compared with the individual scheme trust may be thought to vindicate the views 
of the latter’s managers that performance pay was needed to drive the appraisal system. Without 
the pay element, busy line managers and busy staff are tempted to put off what for many is an 
awkward process, especially if the outcome might be criticism. The date for the performance pay 
increase imposes a deadline for completion of the appraisal process. Generally, this discipline 
appears to have worked. Many more staff at the individual trust replied that they had had sufficient 
opportunity during the year to discuss their performance with their line managers. A much greater 
percentage replied positively in the individual-scheme trust than in the group-scheme one (Table 
5.21). 
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Table 5.21 
Opportunity to discuss performance with line managers (% agree) 
 
No. Question Individual scheme Trust-wide scheme 
 Sufficient opportunity to discuss with  
My manager the following: 
  
77 Clarify job role 61.8 46.3 
78 Identify objectives 65.6 43.5 
79 Training requirements 59.6 41.2 
80 Performance 58.6 41.9 
 
 Turning to the motivational questions, one cannot ask sensible questions about motivation in 
general. It is better to focus on particular aspects of work behaviour and to ask whether 
performance pay has given staff a greater incentive to undertake them. On the whole, the effects of 
performance pay under both schemes are judged to be modest in relation to the kinds of activity 
shown in Table 5.22, and the ‘disagrees’ far outnumber the ‘agrees’. Probably many staff were 
already sensitive to the needs of patients and their colleagues given the nature of their work (Q68, 
Q69). More interesting are the replies concerning work priorities and to work beyond the 
requirements of one’s job (Q70, Q66), and to show more initiative (Q71). It seems that the 
discussions with line managers over performance and target setting has had a beneficial effect. The 
stronger link between these discussions and pay may explain the stronger effect under the individual 
scheme. 
 
Table 5.22 
Impact of performance on work behaviour (% agree, staff on trust contracts only) 
 
No. Question Individual scheme Trust-wide scheme 
 PP has given me an incentive to be more:   
68 Sensitive to the needs of patients  11.5 9.3 
69 Sensitive to my colleagues 16.1 12.9 
72 Effective in my dealings with other colleagues 18.6 11.9 
70 Get my work priorities right 30.5 18.5 
66 To work beyond the requirements of the job 32.0 22.2 
71 Show more initiative in my job 37.6 19.0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.12 Line Manager Views on the Effects of Performance Pay 
 
In the absence of objective data on organisational performance, line manager views about the 
effects of the schemes on their staff’s performance provide an external check on the reports by 
individual employees, and an assessment of the first step beyond staff’s subjective views about 
motivation towards organisational performance (Table 5.23). 
  99 
 
Table 5.23 
Line manager views on the effects of performance pay (% agree) 
 
No. Question Individual 
scheme 
Trust-wide 
scheme 
 Performance pay has:   
112 Made staff more aware of the goals of the Trust 45.7 33.5 
117 Led to an increase in the quantity of work many of the staff 
do 
51.8 34.1 
113 Caused many of the staff to work beyond the requirements 
of their job 
48.8 20.5 
116 Helped to increase the quality of the work of many of the 
staff 
38.9 22.0 
115 Led to many of the staff giving sustained high performance 
at work 
30.0 18.9 
118 Made many of the staff more committed to their work 23.4 13.0 
114 Reduced the willingness of many of the staff  to  co-operate 
with management 
30.2 27.0 
119 It has made it easier for me to deal with poor performance 41.2 23.1 
121 Performance Pay is a bad idea because not enough staff 
have sufficient control over their work to change their ways 
41.3 43.7 
122 PP has caused jealousies between staff on Trust and 
Whitley contracts  
54.5 na 
 
 Four main conclusions emerge from the responses.  First, in both trusts many managers 
believed that their schemes had made staff more aware of trust goals (Q112) although they were 
nevertheless a minority in the group scheme hospital. 
 Secondly, under both schemes, more line managers believe both schemes to have increased 
the quantity than the quality of work. This does raise a general question about performance pay, 
whether it has an inherent bias, at least in terms of the way people respond, towards quantity rather 
than quality. This can be seen in the wording of the appraisal ratings, of exceeding or falling short of 
targets. It is often easier to think of these in terms of doing more or less work rather than in terms of 
greater or lesser quality, especially in view of the greater difficulties of measuring quality. 
 Thirdly, the majority of line managers in both trusts believe that performance pay has not 
reduced staff willingness to cooperate with management, but there remains a sizeable minority that 
believes it has harmed cooperation. 
 Fourthly, comparing reactions to the two schemes, it is clear that line managers working with 
the individual scheme believe it to have had a stronger effect on work quantity and quality, working 
beyond job requirements and commitment than those with the trust-wide scheme. The former also 
believed their scheme more effective helping to deal with poor performance. An important caveat 
also emerges in the large numbers of managers in both trusts who identify the lack 
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5.13 Conclusions 
 
A striking result of our survey has been that the staff of both trust hospitals appear highly motivated 
in their work, find it intrinsically interesting and worthwhile and are attached to the idea of public 
service, views which cut across all staff groups. In both trusts, performance pay has been an 
important part of the move to local pay and conditions, and to reorientate staff goals towards the 
objectives of the trust rather than the health service as a whole. Although neither scheme can be said 
to have worked miracles, and the prevailing views of staff are mostly somewhat sceptical, the 
comparison between the individual and group schemes shows that each scheme does some things 
better than the other, and these correspond broadly with the theoretical expectations set out in the 
introduction. 
 First, the individual scheme has a number of advantages over the group one. It scores more 
highly on raising staff awareness of trust objectives, dealing with poor performance, and fares better 
on overall staff motivation, although as stressed earlier, for both schemes, most staff claim there was 
no effect on their motivation. 
 Secondly, the trust-wide bonus has a number of advantages over the individual scheme. It 
makes more staff feel they are part of a successful organisation, it fares better on encouraging team 
working and cooperation. Most important, it is much less likely to lead to jealousies, damage 
morale, and it seems to inspire less suspicion of management in the minds of the staff. It is also 
associated with a greater willingness to entertain variability in the bonus in order to save jobs, and so 
could be argued to be more effective at promoting a group spirit among the workforce. 
 In pursuing the group scheme, however, management pays a price in foregoing the 
opportunity to use performance pay to drive the appraisal system. Generally, the individual scheme 
appears to have been very successful in getting managers and staff to undertake appraisals, and it is 
no doubt by its capacity to promote such discussions between line managers and their staff that the 
individual scheme scored more highly on generating staff awareness of trust objectives. The cost has 
been one of a certain contamination of the appraisal process, visible in the numbers of staff who 
thought that good performance might not receive the appraisal rating it deserved, and that 
management operated a quota on good appraisals irrespective of actual performance. 
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Chapter 6 
Performance Pay for School Head Teachers 
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
Although performance related pay has been widely used in the private sector in Britain and the 
United States for many years, it has only recently been extended greatly in the public services. In the 
United States, the first major use of performance pay for federal civil servants dates back to the 
early 1980s, and in the UK, to the late 1980s. In both Britain and the US, the push for teacher 
performance pay has come primarily from central government rather than from education managers. 
 In Britain, or more specifically, England and Wales1, the initial impetus for performance pay 
for teachers has come from central government. In its White Paper ‘Choice and Diversity’ and in its 
‘Parents’ Charter’, the then Conservative government stressed the need for an effective and 
accountable education service, and stated its belief that this could best be achieved by, among other 
things, the introduction of performance related pay for teachers. Set up in 1992 after the abolition of 
the previous pay bargaining system, the first pay review body was given the remit by the Secretary 
of State to develop proposals for linking teachers’ pay more closely to performance (STRB, 1992). 
In the United States, performance pay for teachers was one of the recommendations of President 
Reagan’s task force on education, ‘A Nation at Risk’ (National Commission on Excellence in 
Education, 1983), a call taken up by the President himself. Before then it had been practised on a 
piecemeal basis, affecting only about 4% of the nation’s schools in the late 1970s (Ballou and 
Podgursky, 1993).  
 In contrast, managers and the professional associations within the educational sector in both 
countries have generally been less convinced of its merits. In the Wyatt (1989) survey of 
organisations across the US economy, personnel managers in education were those most likely to 
reply that the ‘culture does not support pay for performance’.2 In Britain, the National Association 
of Governors and Managers (NAGM) has publicly expressed its doubts about the appropriateness 
of linking teachers’ pay to performance3. Professional organisations in both countries have generally 
been opposed to pay for performance. The most common reasons put forward being perceived 
lack of fairness of assessments, difficulties of measuring performance, and a potentially negative 
effect on relationships with other teachers.4 
                                                 
1. Scotland has a separate educational system from that of England and Wales, not covered in this paper. 
  
2 . In all, 43% of education personnel managers were of this view, compared with 35% in government, and 31% in 
non-profit organisations. In most other activities, ‘culture’ was not cited among the top five impediments to the 
success of pay for performance (Wyatt, 1989). 
 
3. In their evidence to the 1997 Pay Review Body, the National Association of Governors and Managers stated 
‘NAGM doubts the value of this régime, because it represents a systematic attempt by the Government to push 
reluctant governing bodies into PRP for heads and deputies, and does so in a way which may in due course 
oblige them, also against their better judgement to make greater use of excellence points for classroom teachers’. 
(para 14, Written evidence to the School Teachers’ Review Body for its 1997 report, September 1996). 
    
4. For example, in their evidence to the School Teachers’ Review Body in 1992, the NUT and NASUWT stated 
‘the two teachers’ unions oppose performance related pay as the term is generally understood; that is, as a 
specific individual or group bonus scheme — or a combination of the two — that operates in addition to the 
normal pattern of career progression and promotion’. Performance related pay: submission to the School 
Teachers’ Review Body by the NASUWT and the NUT, para 1.5. 
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 As for the views of teachers themselves, the evidence has been mixed. In the US, some, but 
not all, surveys of teacher views have found majorities in favour of the principle (Ballou and 
Podgursky, 1993), although it should be said that many of those replying had not had personal 
experience of performance pay. In Britain, the 1991 IMS survey of British head teachers found 
widespread scepticism as to how well a performance pay system would work in their schools 
(Bevan and Stock, 1991). 
 As these views generally reflected scepticism prior to the application of performance pay 
schemes, it is of considerable interest and importance to discover the views and experiences of 
teachers who have had direct experience of having their pay linked to performance. Moreover, 
there has been little serious evaluation of the effects of performance pay schemes on employee 
motivation that is in the public domain, and there has been none in education. Since the introduction 
of a form of performance pay for head teachers and deputy head teachers in England and Wales, 
we now have the opportunity to do this. For this reason, the CEP decided to carry out a survey of 
the views and experiences of heads and deputies with the support of their two professional 
associations, the NAHT and SHA. 
 This chapter evaluates some of the effects of performance pay for heads and deputies in 
England and Wales. It starts with an outline of pay arrangements for heads and deputies and the 
procedures for awarding performance pay. It then briefly describes the survey before presenting 
some of its main findings. We enquired into the general work orientations of heads and deputies and 
their general views on pay before looking at how the scheme had been implemented in their schools. 
We then explored their views on the principle of performance pay, and then its impact on target 
setting, relations with other staff and governors, and on their own motivation. 
 
 
6.2  The Performance Pay Scheme for Heads and Deputies 
 
The new pay structure for heads and deputies in England and Wales, which took effect from 
January 1 1991, comprises a 51 point spine, which at the time of our survey in February-March 
1997, ran from £24,564 to £55,566 a year, with the size of individual steps varying from £402 to 
£939. Ranges of points were assigned to schools of different sizes, size being determined by pupil 
numbers and their age, older pupils attracting a higher weight5. Heads and deputies may not be 
appointed below the minimum point for the size of school they run, but they may be appointed 
above that level. Progression from one point on the spine to another is decided annually by the 
                                                                                                                                                       
In its Salary Guidelines of August 1996, the NAHT stated, on PRP, ‘The NAHT has consistently made 
clear its concerns about individual performance related pay (PRP) in schools. Those concerns in summary are: 
1) that there is no new money to pay for PRP so any such payments would be from existing funding; 
2) that there is little evidence of individual PRP operating successfully. On the contrary, there is much evidence 
of demotivation and division especially where PRP is seen to operate unfairly.’ 
NAHT Salary Guidelines, August 1996 (PM 002) para 54. 
More recently, the SHA expressed its ‘established position’ as follows: ‘The Association has always 
held the view that the health of the profession requires a system of differentials providing adequate recognition 
of effective work linked to the discharge of responsibilities beyond those carried by all teachers. It has 
nevertheless agreed with the other teacher associations that excellence points have no useful part to play in the 
pay structure because no clear criteria for their award have been defined, because resources for any widespread 
use have been lacking and because their use would necessarily be divisive and therefore counterproductive in 
terms of overall school performance’ (SHA, 1997, p. 2). SHA Pay and Conditions of Employment for Heads, 
Deputies and Classroom Teachers: Scosoff’s guidance on the 1997 settlement, August 1997. 
 
5. There are six such ranges in all, corresponding to the size groups shown in Table A11 (Appendix 1). 
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school’s governing body, and there is no automatic annual increment6. Governing bodies may pay 
above the normal maximum for their school size if they consider appropriate on grounds of duties, 
responsibilities or performance. They are required to review the salaries of their heads and deputies 
annually, and to notify them in writing of their decision and the reasons, and informing them of the 
grounds of future reviews. In reaching their decisions, governing bodies are required to follow the 
statutory guidelines laid down in the School Teachers’ Pay and Conditions Document (The 
Document 1996, §4). 
 The system of school governance and of heads’ and deputies’ pay has been evolving rapidly 
over the past decade. The current system dates back to the then government’s Local Management 
of Schools’ initiative (LMS) which was introduced gradually from 1988 with the passing of the 
1988 Education Reform Act. Local management required schools to take over responsibilities from 
local education authorities, transferring many powers to the schools’ governing bodies. 
 To assist Local Management, from 1991, the government developed a national framework 
for schools. This included the establishment of a national curriculum, a system for assessing school 
performance, with, publication of performance tables, and external evaluation by inspectors from the 
Office for Standards in Education, Ofsted. Development planning for schools has been encouraged 
as a mechanism for involving all those with a stake in the process. Monitoring the achievement of the 
targets set has become one of the major responsibilities of governing bodies (Ofsted, 1996). 
 From the beginning, as a part of the Citizens’ Charter, the government was also keen on the 
introduction of performance pay for all teachers, both in the classroom and for heads and deputies7. 
However, because of the many difficulties involved, the government moved cautiously, and at 
present, the only scheme effectively in operation is that for heads and deputies, building on their 
1991 pay structure. For classroom teachers, a new pay structure was introduced in September 
1993 which included provision for the award of ‘excellence points’ taking account of all aspects of 
a teacher’s performance, but with special regard to classroom teaching. However, a survey by the 
Review Body carried out in the first year of operation reported that initial use of these points had 
been very limited (STRB 1994, p. 29), a point confirmed in its 1997 report. The Review Body 
findings stressed in particular the perceived financial constraints on schools, and considerable 
uncertainty about the principle and practicality of rewarding teachers in this way on a fair and 
objective basis. But most important, the new system of appraisal for classroom teachers was not 
expected to be ready before 1995.8 
 The criteria for setting heads’ and deputies’ pay have evolved considerably since the new 
pay structure came into effect. Governing bodies are instructed by Document to pay special, but not 
exclusive, regard to four criteria: 
 
                                                 
6. Strictly speaking these powers belong to the ‘relevant body’ which may be the governing body or the LEA 
(DfEE 1996b). For simplicity of exposition we have chosen to avoid this rather cumbersome term. Throughout the 
text, we use ‘governing body’ to refer to both types of arrangement. 
  
7. In fact, there had been a system of accelerated increments and special payments for those at the top of their 
scale since 1987. The 1992 Review Body reported that there was virtually no information on the use of the first, 
but that the second had not been widely used, affecting fewer than 2,000 teachers nationally in 1991 (STRB 1992 
§101-108).  However, according to the 1992 Review Body report, these had not been widely used. STRB 1992. 
 
8. In July 1991, the government set up a four-year programme of teacher appraisal, to complete the first round of 
appraising all teachers by August 1995, and thereafter, to appraise them on a two-yearly basis (STRB 1992, §64). 
The 1996 STRB reported that many schools had been reluctant to use ‘excellence points’ for classroom teachers 
in the absence of suitable criteria. The Review Body reported that the Teacher Training Agency planned to have 
national standards for expert classroom teachers in place by early 1997 (STRB 1996 §115). 
  
 
  
 104 
· the responsibilities of the post 
· the social, economic and cultural background of the pupils attending the school 
· whether the post is difficult to fill 
· the head’s and deputy’s performance9 
 
 The first three criteria have remained unchanged since the new pay structure was 
implemented, but the last one, that on performance, has undergone considerable revision. At the 
time of our survey, heads and deputies had recently experienced the application of the criteria in 
force for 1995/96 setting their pay in September 1996, and were currently working towards their 
1997 review on a set of more carefully defined criteria. 
 The older criterion stressed relative performance to holders of comparable posts: 
 
‘Sustained overall performance by the headteacher or deputy headteacher which appreciably 
exceeds that normally expected from holders of such posts.’ (STRB 1994, p. 24) 
 
The new criterion, for 1996/97, asked: 
 
‘whether there has been a sustained high quality of performance by the head teacher or 
deputy head teacher.’ (The Document 1996, §4) 
 
 More important, governing bodies were given much more explicit guidelines as to how to 
determine performance, notably, they were to be guided by four essential performance indicators 
(STRB 1995 §70): 
 
· year-on-year improvement in a school’s examination or test results 
· year-on-year improvement in pupil attendance 
· evidence of sound financial management 
· if there had been a recent Ofsted inspection, progress in meeting the requirements of the 
resulting action plan 
 
 From September 1997, the performance criterion was further revised, adding to that for 
1996/97: 
 
‘...in the light of performance criteria previously agreed between the relevant body and’ the 
head teacher or deputy head teacher.’ (The Document 1996, §4.4.1) 
 
It was also made compulsory for governing bodies to hold annual performance reviews with their 
heads and deputies before any increase in pay can occur. 
 Thus, the rules governing performance pay for heads and deputies have evolved 
considerably since the new terms and conditions were introduced. In this process, the Review Body 
has played a special role in promoting the introduction and refinement of performance pay in the 
light of each additional year’s experience. 
 In particular, the Review Body has pressed for a design that: 
 
                                                 
9. The DfEE point out that ‘failure to award a point on performance grounds does not prevent awarding one on 
other grounds’ (DfEE 1996b, § 22). 
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· is simple, straightforward and easy to understand 
· aims for year-on-year improvement in outcomes 
· has a common national framework, but with sufficient flexibility to allow for individual school 
circumstances 
· encourages positive attitudes for both educational purposes and school outcomes 
· provides that any payments should be funded separately from the rest of the school’s budget 
      (STRB 1995 § 68) 
 
 The funding of additional spine points has remained the one major area where the 
government has consistently rejected the Review Body’s advice in the interests of wider budgetary 
considerations. In its 1993 report, the Review Body pointed out that the funding arrangements for 
the Local Management of Schools did not allow for extra funding to reward improvements in 
performance (STRB 1992 §73). It repeated its warning in 1993, pointing out that uncertainty over 
funding was one of the reasons why some of the available pay discretions were not being used more 
widely (STRB 1993, §16). In its survey of April 1993, the Review Body reported that the 
commonest reason for not using pay discretions for heads and deputies was because the school 
lacked sufficient funds (STRB 1993, §63-65). 
 Nevertheless, use of additional spine points for heads and deputies has become established 
over time. This can be seen in the information provided by the Review Body on the numbers of 
additional spine points (for all four criteria) awarded to heads and deputies since 1993 (Table 6.1). 
After some fluctuation in the first two years, the percentage of heads and deputies each year 
receiving awards appears to have stabilised at just under 30% for both groups. The distribution of 
awards over a longer period, January 1991 to September 1994, shows both that many heads and 
deputies have been awarded additional spine points on more than one occasion, and that many of 
those receiving no award in one year are likely to receive one in a subsequent year. Thus, by 
September 1994, just under 60% of heads and just over 50% of deputies had received additional 
spine points. The latter results are consistent with those of our own survey which referred to the 
three years 1993-1996 where just under 60% of heads and deputies replied that they had received 
additional spine points over the past three years (see Table 6.8). 
 
 
Table 6.1 
Additional spine points for school heads and deputies (all schools) 
Head Teachers 
 
Additional Spine Points March-Sept 93 Sept 93-94 Sept 94-95 Sept 95-96 Jan 91-Sept 94 
<0      1.0    0.0    0.1    0.3     0.4 
0    78.3  68.4  72.8  71.8   43.5 
1     7.3  10.7  12.4  13.1     5.2 
2     5.5    8.9    8.0    9.5   13.4 
3     2.9    5.4    3.2    2.8   10.7 
>3     5.0    6.6    3.5    2.6   26.8 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% in same post - 84 86 85 69 
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Deputy Head Teachers 
 
Additional 
Spine Points 
March-Sept 93 Sept 93-94 Sept 94-95 Sept 95-96 Jan 91-Sept 94 
<0     0.5     0.2     0.0    0.1     0.6 
0   79.4   70.4   74.3   72.9   48.2 
1     9.3   13.2   13.4   17.0     7.8 
2     5.5     9.0     7.1     6.8   16.1 
3     3.0     4.2     2.7     1.5   10.4 
>3     2.2     3.0     2.3     1.7   16.8 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% in same post  81 83 81 61 
 
Note: Distribution of head teachers who remained in the same post during the year and who received additional 
spine points.  Source: School Teachers’ Review Body, 1993-97, annually for individual years, and 1995 Table 7 
and 9. 
 
 
6.3  The Survey 
 
A survey of school head and deputy head teacher attitudes and experiences with performance 
related pay was carried out by the Centre for Economic Performance in February-March 1997. 
This chapter provides a first full analysis of the results with the results presented separately for each 
of the two main unions for head and deputy head teachers, the National Association of Head 
Teachers (NAHT) whose members include heads and deputies from secondary schools, but the 
great majority are drawn mainly from nursery and primary schools; and the Secondary Heads 
Association (SHA) the great majority of whose members are in secondary schools. 
 The questionnaire was sent out to 5,000 school heads and deputies: 3,000 to NAHT 
members and 2,000 to SHA members. 1,960 replies were received giving an overall response rate 
of just under 40%. The response has been well-distributed across schools and gender, age and 
qualifications of heads and deputies, and most important, the percentage replying that they had 
received additional spine points is close to that found by the STRB 1995 (see Appendix 1). 
 
 
6.4  The Conduct of the Performance Review 
 
Before one can judge the effects of performance pay for school heads and deputies it is essential to 
know whether the scheme has been applied as it was intended, or indeed, whether it has been 
applied at all. 
 Because of the changes in the procedures for setting objectives for heads and deputies and 
the refinement of the criteria to be used between 1995/96 and 1996/97, we asked about the 
conduct of annual reviews in both periods bearing in mind that the objectives would have been 
agreed for 1996/97, but evaluation of their achievement would not yet have taken place. 
 A minimal test of whether the most basic of the procedures are carried out is given by 
whether or not Heads and Deputies have had, or expect to have, an Annual Salary Statement 
(which informs them of their position on the pay spine, the reasons why, and the conditions for 
future salary reviews) and a Performance Review for the current year (1996/97). Among members 
of both associations, over 60% had received an Annual Salary Statement, the higher percentage 
among SHA members no doubt reflecting the generally larger size of secondary schools, and hence 
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the greater likelihood of more formalised relations with governing bodies (Table 6.2). On the other 
hand, use of the Performance Review has been more limited, affecting only about one third of heads 
and deputies. However, the reviews did not become compulsory until September 1997. 
 
Table 6.2 
Percentage receiving annual salary statements and performance reviews  
 
Have you received, or do you expect to receive any of the 
following during the year 1996/7 from your school’s Governing 
Body: 
NAHT SHA 
% replying ‘yes’ % % 
an Annual Salary Statement 61.6 67.8 
a Performance Review 33.7 33.2 
 
 In deciding salary enhancements, governing bodies rely heavily on the four criteria set out in 
their remit, and although allowed to do so, only a minority use other, additional, criteria (Table 6.3). 
By far the most commonly used criterion is the responsibility of post, but the second most 
commonly cited, in six cases out of ten, in both primary and secondary schools, is that of sustained 
high performance in the post. 
 
Table 6.3 
Criteria in the school’s pay policy for salary enhancements 
 
Which of the following criteria are in the School’s Pay Policy 
for awarding enhancements to pay : 
NAHT SHA 
% replying ‘yes’ % % 
The responsibility of the post 86.5 88.9 
Sustained high performance in the post  60.4 59.4 
The social, economic and cultural background of the pupils  38.7 32.8 
The difficulty of filling the post 40.1 37.2 
Other criteria 21.2 31.0 
 
 The criteria used to assess heads’ and deputies’ performance include both objective and 
subjective criteria. Top of the list comes the School Development Plan, followed by evidence of 
sound financial management, and progress in implementing an Ofsted action plan (Table 6.4). 
Interestingly, some of the more controversial indicators, such as exam results and absence rates 
figure much lower down the list. Subjective criteria continue to play an important part, notably, the 
governors’ personal judgement of their head’s and deputy’s, and the school’s performance. 
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Table 6.4 
The nature of performance criteria used for the 1996/97 performance review 
 
Objective criteria 
 
Objective criteria NAHT SHA 
% replying ‘yes’   
School Development Plan 79.1 74.7 
Evidence of sound financial management 73.7 64.8 
Progress in implementing an Ofsted action plan 63.8 60.7 
School examination/test results 31.3 50.3 
School absence rates  14.5 31.7 
Other objective criteria  28.3 44.4 
 
Subjective criteria 
 
Subjective  criteria NAHT SHA 
% replying ‘yes’     
Their personal judgement of my performance  75.2 74.2 
Their personal judgement of the school’s performance 71.3 65.0 
 
 Whether or not a head or deputy has had a Performance Review is a good predictor of the 
type of criteria used for deciding salary enhancements and especially performance-based 
enhancements (Table 6.5). Although there were many exceptions both ways, on the whole, those 
who had a Performance Review were more likely to be rated on their ‘sustained high performance’. 
Those with a review were also more likely to reply that the formal criteria in Table 6.4 had been 
used. 
 
Table 6.5 
Effect of having a performance review on performance criteria used 
% reporting the following criteria were used 
 
Criterion used With review No review Sig 
 % using criterion % using criterion  
Sustained high performance 75.5 48.7 ** 
School development plan 89.0 68.5 ** 
Sound financial management 78.9 66.2 ** 
Implement Ofsted plan 66.9 59.9 * 
Exam results 42.9 28.5 ** 
No formal criteria 17.4 35.6 ** 
 
Note:  Significance (probability difference due to chance): ** <1%, * < 2% 
 
 Turning to the way in which targets have been set, the great majority of heads and 
deputies replied that they either agreed their targets with their school’s governing body, or advised 
or were consulted over the targets (Table 6.6). About a third of heads and deputies reported a 
direct link between pay and performance targets, and of these, roughly 85% said they agreed their 
criteria with governing body. Although primary schools were more likely to follow LEA guidelines, 
this does not seem to have affected whether or not pay was linked to performance. 
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Table 6.6 
Procedures for setting targets in the 1996/97 performance review 
 
 NAHT SHA 
I agreed the targets with my school’s Governing Body 75.8 76.6 
I advised the Governing Body on the appropriate criteria 74.9 72.4 
I was consulted over the choice of targets by the Governing Body 68.9 70.9 
My school’s Governing Body  used its own school-related criteria 35.5 43.3 
My school’s Governing Body  consulted other teachers on appropriate criteria  6.8 10.7 
The Governing Body follows recommendations from the LEA  56.4 35.2 
Does the Performance Review link targets directly to pay 33.7 28.7 
No explicit criteria were used 22.9 20.0 
 
Note: views of those who had a performance review in 1996/97 
 
 Compared with the position for the 1995/96 review, there appears to have been a 
considerable tightening up of procedures (Table 6.7). In that review, significantly fewer heads and 
deputies had been informed in writing of their position on their pay scale, or had been informed of 
the basis on which their pay was to be determined.10 In view of the small percentages reporting 
formal reviews of performance and use of appraisal, the 1996/97 replies show a substantial 
improvement on the procedural side. 
 
Table 6.7 
Conduct of the 1995/96 review 
 
% replying ‘yes’ NAHT SHA 
In the previous review of your pay (for 1995/6) were you informed of the following in 
accordance with Para 3 of the Document :  
  
Did the Governing Body inform you, in writing, of your position on the pay scale? 54.2 62.6 
Were you informed by the Governing Body of the basis on which your pay had 
been determined? 
45.5 41.4 
Did the Governing Body inform you of the grounds for future reviews? 23.4 21.5 
Was your performance formally reviewed? 23.5 21.5 
Was this linked to performance appraisal?  4.5 5.9 
 
 
6.5   Awarding of Salary Enhancements 
 
Turning to salary enhancements, the majority of respondents from both associations have received 
at least one salary enhancement over the past three years, but there remain about two out of five 
heads and deputies who have not (Table 6.8). These figures are in line with the estimates for the 
earlier period of 1991-1994 by the 1995 Review Body. A much smaller proportion received 
performance-based enhancements: at about a quarter of heads and deputies, but there was no 
marked difference between primary and secondary schools.11 
                                                 
10. Our results are close to those reported by the 1995 Review Body. In their survey of mid-1995, 55% of heads 
had been informed in writing of their position on the scale, and 41% had been informed of the basis on which 
their pay had been set. 30%, a bit higher than our figure, had been informed of the grounds for future reviews 
(STRB 1996 §65). 
 
11. Strictly speaking the question asked was ‘how many of these were performance related’. However, it is clear 
from the numbers responding, practically the same for both questions about the number of enhancements and 
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Table 6.8 
Number of enhancements received over the last 3 years 
 
 Enhancements overall  Performance related 
 NAHT SHA  NAHT SHA 
0     40.3     42.7      76.0     78.6 
1-2     43.9     43.2      18.0     16.8 
=>3     15.8     14.1        6.0       4.6 
 100 100  100 100 
 
 About 40% of those who received enhancements received at least one performance-based 
enhancement, and the more enhancements received, the more likely it was that they would receive 
at least one for performance. Of those receiving only one enhancement, 31% did so for 
performance; of those receiving two, 42% did so for performance, but of those receiving three or 
more, 52% received at least some for performance. 
 A preliminary analysis of the cross-tabulations shows that some categories of heads and 
deputies are more likely to get performance enhancements than others. Notably, of those having a 
Performance Review, 47% got performance enhancements against 13% of those who had not. 
Likewise, if they agreed performance criteria with their governing bodies they were more likely to 
receive performance enhancements (47% against 32%). If the school was in a deprived 
neighbourhood, as identified by the percentage of pupils receiving free school meals, heads and 
deputies were less likely to get performance enhancements. This could reflect a number of factors: in 
deprived neighbourhoods the school’s head teacher may already appear ‘well-off’; governors 
themselves may not be sympathetic to a ‘performance culture’; and the schools themselves may 
have more limited resources.12 Grant Maintained and Voluntary Controlled schools were more 
likely to award performance enhancements: about one third of heads and deputies there had 
received them, compared with a quarter in LEA Maintained and Voluntary Aided schools. 
 In contrast, simple cross-tabulations showed no particular effect of age, gender, school type 
(primary/secondary), location in London, or whether the school followed LEA guidelines. 
 To conclude, by 1997, it is clear that the procedures for awarding performance pay to 
heads and deputies were fairly well established. Although there remained a substantial minority of 
schools which did not appear to follow the guidelines, there had been a marked improvement 
following the much more specific guidelines for 1996/97. In addition, performance criteria and 
performance related enhancements are being used in a considerable number of schools. It would 
appear too that a large number of governing bodies are taking the performance criteria seriously 
both for schools, and for heads and deputies. In strong contrast to the position for classroom 
teachers, it is clear that performance enhancements are being used quite widely for heads and 
deputies. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
the number that were performance related, that respondents gave the number of performance-related increments 
received overall. 
  
12. Public funding compensates for many differences in neighbourhood wealth, but there remain greater 
possibilities to raise additional money in better off neighbourhoods. Although money raised by Parent Teacher 
Associations is practically never used for salaries, it is likely to ease the general financial pressure on the 
schools concerned. 
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6.6   General Orientations to Work in Schools and Education 
 
A basic pre-condition for incentive schemes to influence employee performance is that they should 
value the rewards on offer. To gauge this, it is useful to look across the range of benefits, material 
and non-material, they derive from their work. It is clear from the responses to our survey that 
heads and deputies derive a large number of non-monetary rewards from their jobs, particularly, the 
intrinsic challenges, interest, and public service of their job (Table 6.9). However, material rewards 
are also important, as is shown by the importance attached to pay, pension, and job security. 
 
Table 6.9 
Value of current job 
 
No. The following issues are important to me in my  current job: % Agree % Agree 
  NAHT SHA 
1 Job security 90.1 91.9 
2 My level of income 87.0 91.5 
3 Contributing to an important public service  94.4 92.5 
4 My pension  89.0 90.1 
5 Opportunities to exercise responsibility 90.7 97.0 
6 Varied and interesting work 96.3 98.2 
7 The opportunity to take early retirement 51.1 48.8 
8 Status 48.5 58.4 
9 Self-esteem 80.9 85.5 
 
Note: question numbers based on NAHT questionnaire. 
 
 Heads and deputies also derive a lot of satisfaction from the nature of their activity, and the 
great majority show little sign of wishing to leave for other jobs (Table 6.10). They also consider 
themselves good ‘organisational citizens’: always showing goodwill to complete urgent tasks, and 
keeping well-informed for the benefit of their schools. Our results echo those of Vaarlem et al. 
(1992) on factors head teachers considered important for their own morale.13 
 
Table 6.10  
General attitudes to work in education 
 
No. % replying ‘Agree’ NAHT SHA 
90 Working in education means a great deal to me 89.8 91.6 
86 I would be happy to spend the rest of my career in education 72.6 85.5 
87 I always show goodwill to complete an urgent task 93.5 95.3 
88 I keep myself well-informed and undertake training when I think this may 
benefit the school 
98.1 97.3 
 
 They also feel a strong sense of attachment and commitment to their schools, feeling ‘part of 
the family’ and having confidence and trust in their colleagues (Table 6.11). 
 The further one moves from the work place, the less happy heads and deputies seem to be. 
Confidence and trust in the school’s governors, even though lower than with colleagues, is 
nevertheless high. Most striking, however, are the numbers who feel that teachers lose out whenever 
                                                 
13. Precise comparison with their results is not possible, but where their questions were similar, for example, for 
job security, service, and responsibility, they were given a similar degree of importance. The main differences 
were that pay was less highly, and status in the community more highly, rated (Vaarlam et al. 1992, Table A4). 
 
 
  
 112 
there are changes in education: three out of five primary heads and deputies, and one in three 
secondary heads and deputies (Table 6.12). 
 
Table 6.11 
Atmosphere in schools 
 
No. % Agree NAHT SHA 
81 I feel ‘part of the family’ in my current school 92.0 89.1 
82 I feel a strong sense of commitment to my school 98.7 98.3 
83 I am very happy working here 89.3 90.3 
84 I do not feel ‘emotionally attached’ to the school 15.1 15.3 
85 I think that I could easily become as attached to another organisation as 
This school 
50.1 59.9 
92 I have confidence and trust in my colleagues in the school  92.0 91.4 
93 I have confidence and trust in the school’s governors  73.2 72.5 
 
Table 6.12  
Atmosphere in education 
 
No.   % Disagree % Agree 
89 NAHT  Whenever changes are made in education teachers usually 
lose out in the end 
24.7 59.5 
 SHA  45.4 35.1 
91 NAHT My performance is always well above that of other 
Heads/Deputies in similar schools.  
14.3 20.2 
 SHA  13.2 22.8 
 
 
6.7   General Views on the Job and the Principle of Relating Pay to         
       Performance 
 
In assessing the reactions of heads and deputies to performance related pay, it is important to 
remember that only a quarter have actually received performance enhancements to their salaries, 
although about 60% of schools use performance as one of their criteria for deciding heads’ and 
deputies’ pay. 
 On balance, heads and deputies are not favourable to the principle of performance related 
pay, but NAHT members are considerably more sceptical than their SHA counterparts (Table 
6.13)14. This may reflect stronger opposition among primary than among secondary school heads, 
feeling that teachers are victims rather than agents in change (Table 6.12). Primary schools, being 
generally smaller than secondary schools, will have less capacity to deal with frequent changes in the 
educational system. 
 Disapproval of the principle stands in marked contrast to the results of the same survey 
carried out by the authors in two civil service departments and in two NHS trust hospitals where 
between a half and two thirds of staff thought performance pay good in principle. 
 
Table 6.13 
Views on the principle of performance pay 
                                                 
14 . This point is recognised in the SHA guidance notes for the 1997 settlement in which it recognises that some 
of its members ‘may wish to argue that it would be quixotic to oppose any pay advance for heads or deputies on 
performance grounds, if their governors judge it to be affordable and merited’, (SHA,1997). 
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No.   Disagree Agree 
10 NAHT The principle of performance pay is a good one 63.1 28.9 
 SHA  50.2 41.9 
11 NAHT The idea of Performance Pay for Heads and Deputies is 
fundamentally unfair 
35.0 53.0 
 SHA  47.5 42.3 
 
 Heads and deputies stressed the importance of a number of other principles for determining 
their pay (Table 6.14). In particular, they thought that experience, the difference in duties between 
heads and deputies in different schools, and the demands of the post should be given more 
recognition in pay. The stronger support for experience being more fully recognised among NAHT 
members may again reflect a desire for simpler and more predictable pay systems given the smaller 
scale of many primary schools. 
 
Table 6.14 
Views on alternative principles of pay 
 
No.   Disagree Agree 
12 NAHT Experience should count more 31.0 52.5 
 SHA  48.5 33.4 
13 NAHT Take more account of different duties in different 
schools  
  9.6 79.6 
 SHA  15.0 74.3 
17 NAHT Demands of the post and not performance of 
individuals  
14.6 74.8 
 SHA  25.6 62.8 
16 NAHT Pay according to nationally determined pay scales   8.9 83.3 
 SHA  12.1 78.4 
14 NAHT Pay solely for individual performance  81.8   9.2 
 SHA  84.1   8.0 
15 NAHT Pay more when posts are difficult to recruit 25.2 54.6 
 SHA  29.8 51.0 
 
 A number of factors influence heads’ and deputies views of whether performance pay is 
good in principle (Table 6.15). First, the nature of their experience with the system. As noted 
earlier, whether or not there had been a Performance Review was a good predictor of the 
sophistication of the procedures used, and this is related to heads’ and deputies’ views of the 
principle. Of those with a performance review, 43% believe the principle good, compared with 
27% of those without one. Whether or not they have received a performance enhancement also has 
a strong effect. Although only a minority of heads thought their work consistently better than that of 
their peers, 47% of those who did approved the principle, against 23% among those who did not. 
Similarly, those in schools in better off neighbourhoods were more likely to approve of the principle. 
Heads and deputies were more likely to approve if they were male, and if they were in secondary 
rather than primary schools. Closer examination of the relationship between gender and type of 
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school shows that the different views of women and men on the principle of performance pay are 
almost entirely due to women being more often heads in primary schools.15 
 
Table 6.15 
Effect of different factors on support for the principle of performance pay 
% agreeing with principle of linking pay to performance 
 
 %  % 
Performance Review:  Yes 42.6 Pupils on free meals =<10% 36.3 
No 27.0 >25% 28.2 
    
No performance enhancement 27.7 Male 33.3 
3 or more perf. enhancements 60.0 Female 28.7 
    
Perform better than peers:  Yes 46.7 Secondary 42.8 
No 22.9 Primary 27.0 
 
Note:  All significant at 1% level except free meals at 5% (Chi square test). 
 
 
6.8   Target Setting 
 
An important part of any incentive scheme is that the targets should be clearly set and done in such a 
way that employees can adjust and improve their performance, or at least, align it more closely to 
management’s objectives. The Review Body has consistently argued that clear, objective targets 
that are mutually agreed are essential. 
 
Table 6.16 
Impact on target setting for heads, deputies and governors 
 
No.  Salary enhancements based on performance for Heads and 
Deputies have: 
Disagree 
% 
Agree 
% 
48 NAHT made the Governing Body think more clearly about the 
School Development Plan  
34.4 35.7 
 SHA  38.6 28.7 
58 NAHT made me more aware of the comparative performance of my 
school.  
49.9 23.9 
 SHA  53.8 20.6 
61 NAHT helped me clarify my work priorities  56.5 19.1 
 SHA  56.5 19.4 
 
 Overall, heads and deputies do not see performance pay as having improved target setting 
either by governors or for themselves, although there is an important minority who disagree, and one 
factor in this is the quality of review procedures and whether or not performance enhancements 
have been given (Table 6.16). 
 Comparing those with a Performance Review with those without, we find that 52% with, 
against 26% without, believe performance pay has made the governing body think more clearly 
about objectives. Likewise, those with a review compared to those without, are more likely to have 
                                                 
15 .  The percentage approving of the principle of performance pay in secondary schools are: women 40.1%, men, 
42.4%; and in primary schools: women 24.0% and men 28.3%. Overall, these differences were not statistically 
significant. 
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been made more aware of comparative performance and to have clarified priorities. The ratios are 
30% to 20%, and 27% to 15% respectively.  
 Comparing replies of those who have received performance enhancements to those who 
have not, the differences are even more pronounced. In schools where three or more performance 
enhancements had been awarded, 62% of heads and deputies judged performance pay to have 
improved governors’ target setting, against 29% where no enhancements had been given. There 
were also strong effects on awareness of comparative performance and priorities: 39% against 20% 
and 32% against 17%. 
 Thus, although the overall effects of the system on target setting across all schools are not 
impressive, there is a fair-sized minority of schools, about a quarter, which have used the full scope 
of the new provisions and have done so to good effect. 
 
 
6.9   Relations with Governing Body 
 
On the whole, relations with governors over performance enhancements appear favourable, except 
that a large number felt that they had not had sufficient opportunity to discuss their performance with 
governors, and a substantial minority did not believe their decision represented a fair reflection of 
their performance (Table 6.17). By comparison, the much more widely held view that they are not 
paid enough for their responsibilities shows that general discontent on teachers’ pay has not 
seriously coloured views on performance pay. 
 Finally, only a few felt pressured into accepting performance targets, most understood their 
governors’ decisions, and most felt that appeal procedures were available. 
 
Table 6.17  
Fairness of the Governors’ decisions on performance enhancements 
 
No.   Disagree % Agree % 
72 NAHT Throughout the last year, I had sufficient opportunity to 
discuss my performance with my Governing Body 
51.4 38.0 
 SHA  51.9 36.3 
80 NAHT I feel pressurised into accepting performance targets set  
by the Governors without discussion. 
63.8 11.9 
 SHA  67.6 12.8 
73 NAHT I understand the Governing Body’s decision regarding  
my pay 
17.6 65.5 
 SHA  20.4 66.2 
75 NAHT If I were dissatisfied with the Governors’ decision,  
procedures exist to allow me to appeal 
24.0 57.4 
 SHA  25.1 57.2 
74 NAHT The decision represents a fair reflection of my performance 33.3 41.0 
 SHA  28.7 42.2 
67 NAHT I am paid enough for my current responsibilities 66.6 22.8 
 SHA  51.4 36.7 
 
 If we take again whether or not there was a Performance Review as the indicator of 
established procedures, then the view becomes much more positive. Instead of 28% believing they 
had sufficient opportunity to discuss their performance, we find 57% replying positively. Likewise, 
82% of those with a review understood their governors’ decision, and 59% believed it a fair 
reflection of their performance. For those without reviews, the equivalent figures were 57% and 
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32%. The presence of reviews affected responses to the other questions in a similar fashion, except 
that very few felt pressurised whether or not they had a review. Similar cross-tabulations were done 
for those with performance enhancements, and the effect was somewhat stronger. However, if one 
is assessing the impact of performance incentives, it is more appropriate to consider those covered 
by the system rather than concentrate only on those who won prizes. 
 One of the big problems with Local Management of Schools, and of performance pay in 
education more generally, is the widespread belief that good performance is a complex and subtle 
phenomenon, and therefore hard to measure objectively and fairly. This has been a recurring 
concern in the Review Body reports, and considerable effort has been devoted to identifying and 
refining suitable indicators. 
 Most heads and deputies in our sample agreed that performance pay is problematic 
because it is hard to gauge individual performance, and most felt that their governing body did not 
know enough about their jobs (Table 6.18). But equally, most felt their governors to be supportive 
and that they understood how they determined enhancements in their school. In contrast, most felt 
their LEAs had not been of great assistance. 
 
Table 6.18  
Clarity, transparency and equity of awards  
 
No.   Disagree % Agree 
% 
47 NAHT PRP is problematic because hard to link work schools to 
individual performance  
11.9 82.0 
 SHA  15.1 81.4 
68 NAHT The Governing Body know enough about my job to identify 
good performance  
55.7 37.0 
 SHA  52.9 39.1 
66 NAHT My Governing Body provide me with the support I need to 
perform well in the post 
22.9 66.6 
 SHA  19.4 67.3 
65 NAHT I do not understand how the Governors in my school 
determine the award of enhancements   
56.0 22.8 
 SHA  58.6 23.0 
70 NAHT LEA advice has helped the Governors set fair salary levels  54.9 24.0 
 SHA  50.6 18.9 
69 NAHT The LEA has provided information on pay trends in the local 
area. 
45.3 41.9 
 SHA  44.4 34.1 
 
 As with the previous answers, for the one third of schools with a performance review, 
heads’ and deputies’ judgements are noticeably more positive. Among those with a review, 76% 
found their governors supportive, compared with 63% for those who had not, and many more 
believed their governors adequately informed, 50% against 31%. Similarly, fewer heads and 
deputies were likely to reply that they did not understand how enhancements were determined in 
their school, and the presence of a review also increased the scope for help and information from 
the LEA. 
 On the other hand, the presence of a review had no effect on whether heads and deputies 
considered themselves paid well enough for their responsibilities. This is an interesting result because 
it confirms that while the reviews clearly assist performance enhancements, there is no general ‘halo 
effect’ from these onto other aspects of pay. 
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6.10 Impact on Personal Motivation 
 
The general tenor of replies on personal motivation is that performance enhancements have not had 
much effect on incentives, but equally, they have not caused heads and deputies to wish to 
cooperate less with their school’s governors (Table 6.19). Many believed it has not raised the 
quality of their work because it was already at the appropriate standard. 
 
Table 6.19 
Performance pay and personal motivation 
 
No.  Linking my performance to my pay has: Disagree % Agree % 
49 NAHT meant that good work is recognised and rewarded at last 33.9 37.9 
 SHA  36.9 40.0 
59 NAHT given me an added incentive to work beyond the 
requirements of the job 
73.8 8.1 
 SHA  75.1 9.8 
62 NAHT given me an incentive me to show more initiative in my job  68.4 8.7 
 SHA  67.9 11.3 
63 NAHT has caused me greater stress in my job  35.9 36.2 
 SHA  49.5 22.3 
60 NAHT reduced my wish to co-operate with the Governing Body 66.9   6.7 
 SHA  71.8   4.2 
64 NAHT had no effect on the quality of my work because it was 
already at the appropriate standard 
  8.6 68.6 
 SHA  10.8 64.0 
 
 A striking feature of the replies is that judgements of ‘no effect’ are stronger among those 
who have had, or expect to have, a performance review than among the others. However, almost all 
of this is to be explained by a sharp drop in the ‘no view’ response. In other words, the better 
established the procedures in a particular school, the more likely its heads and deputies are to judge 
that there has been no effect, positive or negative. The one, and notable, exception is the belief that 
good work is recognised and rewarded at last: 51% of those with a review agreed, whereas among 
those without a review, ‘disagrees’ outnumbered ‘agrees’. 
 One possible explanation of these rather negative findings is that, on the whole, even where 
the procedures are established, heads and deputies are generally sceptical as to whether additional 
effort will be rewarded by performance enhancements. Lack of clarity may leave them uncertain as 
to how they should perform; they may not believe they are capable of achieving it (perhaps because 
of lack of resources, or training); they may believe their school cannot afford it; or that it is contrary 
to the governors’ policy. 
 The overall picture shows widespread scepticism, although roughly half of heads and 
deputies know what they have to do to gain an enhancement, and believe they are personally 
capable (Table 6.20). However, a very large majority believe their schools cannot afford 
performance enhancements, and about half believe their governors’ pay policy is against it, even if 
their personal performance is good enough. Given this picture, it is hardly surprising that 
performance enhancements seem to have had little overall incentive effect. 
 Finally, the large numbers who replied that performance enhancements had no effect on 
their performance because it was already at the ‘appropriate standard’ deserves comment. This was 
designed to capture whether heads and deputies felt there was some level of performance they 
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deemed appropriate for their profession. To fall beneath is not to do one’s job properly, but 
equally, there is a limit on what can reasonably be demanded of people in certain jobs. The great 
majority of both NAHT and SHA members replied positively to this question. One of the objectives 
of performance pay in the literature is to destabilise employees’ views on what is a fair standard of 
work so that a new norm can be established. Such views have commonly been associated with 
groups with a strong occupational identity either within the workplace, or, in the case of professional 
workers, more widely. 
 
Table 6.20  
Will rewards follow high performance? 
 
No.   Disagree Agree 
76 NAHT I know what I have to do to get an enhancement based on  
my performance in the future 
45.8 30.3 
 SHA  45.4 29.6 
77 NAHT I am personally capable of getting an enhancement based  
on my performance in the future 
23.1 47.7 
 SHA  20.2 51.0 
78 NAHT Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt if the  
school can afford to reward me with an enhancement 
14.3 77.4 
 SHA  18.2 67.9 
79 NAHT Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt if the 
Governors’ pay policy will permit performance related pay 
30.2 48.4 
 SHA  33.7 45.0 
 
 However, if we turn to those who have had performance reviews, a more complex picture 
emerges. Those who have had reviews are more than twice a likely to say they know what they 
have to do, and to believe they are personally capable of doing it (52.7% to 18.7%; and 65.3% to 
39.6% respectively). In contrast, those without a review are much more likely to believe their school 
cannot afford enhancements, and that their governors’ policy is against it (81.5% to 63.7%, and 
57.8% to 28.3% respectively). 
 This does raise a difficult question of causation: do underfunded schools, with little to hand 
out by way of enhancements, avoid having reviews because they might create false expectations; or 
is it the review process together with better developed procedures which explains the more positive 
views among heads? One test of this is to see whether schools in deprived neighbourhoods are less 
likely to have performance reviews, and to see whether heads in schools in such neighbourhoods 
are more likely to believe enhancements are constrained by lack of resources. In both cases, the 
relationship is weak and not statistically significant, so it would appear that the critical factor is how 
well schools have developed their performance appraisal procedures. These provide opportunities 
for two-way information between heads and deputies and their governors. 
 
 
 
6.11 Impact on Relations with Other Staff in the School 
 
One of the most widely discussed problems of performance related pay is whether such schemes 
motivate the few at the expense of the motivation of the many. This is of special concern in schools 
where heads and classroom teachers work closely together, especially in small schools where the 
head will usually be a ‘player-manager’ with a heavy classroom load, and where is it often hard to 
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identify the contribution of individuals to the overall performance of the school. The lack of any 
operational performance pay scheme for classroom teachers could also be felt divisive. 
 Overall, it was widely felt that performance enhancements for heads and deputies cause 
resentment among teaching staff, and undermine morale (Table 6.21). One factor in this is 
undoubtedly the belief that it is hard to link the work of schools to individual performance: around 
95% of heads and deputies who thought performance pay for themselves caused resentment or 
undermined team working also believed it hard to link school performance to individuals. 
 
 
Table 6.21 
Impact on relations with other staff in the school 
 
No  Salary enhancements based on performance for Heads and 
Deputies: 
Disagree Agree 
46 NAHT cause resentment among teaching staff 18.2 58.0 
 SHA  13.4 70.2 
51 NAHT undermine team working in the school.  26.8 50.6 
 SHA  29.6 54.0 
50 NAHT simply a device to get more work done.  39.1 26.0 
 SHA  46.5 17.3 
 
 
 Two factors seem to account for the negative reports on resentment and team working: a 
widespread belief that it is better to reward the whole school rather than leading individuals because 
it is believed hard to identify individual contributions, and that it is unfair that classroom teachers are 
denied the opportunities open to heads and deputies, whether it is because of lack of procedures or 
want of resources (Table 6.22). 
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Table 6.22 
Fairness of awarding salary enhancements to Heads and Deputies for good performance 
 
No.   Disagree Agree 
52 NAHT Individual performance objectives are a suitable basis for 
awarding enhancements. 
52.6 30.4 
 SHA  53.9 34.9 
53 NAHT Better to reward the whole school for its performance rather than 
H&Ds 
22.2 65.3 
 SHA  21.9 65.7 
54 NAHT Wrong to award to H&Ds enhancements for high performance 
when there are not appropriate criteria to award classroom 
teachers through excellent points 
14.9 76.4 
 SHA  19.2 75.0 
71 NAHT It is hard to justify an enhancement for myself, when there are no 
resources available to determine excellence points for classroom 
teachers. 
16.8 74.7 
 SHA  17.2 72.9 
57 NAHT If school’s budget tight, right for H&Ds to go without even if 
performance merits them 
50.0 39.7 
 SHA  33.0 54.6 
56 NAHT Money available for salary enhancements should be 
substantially increased 
21.0 52.8 
 SHA  33.2 42.4 
55 NAHT Fair for Governors to award just to retain a Head or Deputy 40.0 40.9 
 SHA  50.1 37.4 
 
 To some extent, the presence of a performance review promotes acceptance of 
performance pay. It appears to increase heads’ and deputies’ confidence in the applicability of 
individual performance criteria. Once again, comparing those in schools with a review to those 
without, we find that 45% believe individual criteria a suitable basis, against 25% where there is no 
review. 
 Nevertheless, even among schools with a review, a large number of heads and deputies 
reject individual criteria. One reason why this might be so is that the quality of Performance Reviews 
varies a good deal between schools, as is indicated by the range of criteria used. Nevertheless, even 
in schools where reviews are well-conducted, it is likely that some heads and deputies remain 
sceptical, and this leads to the second reason. Some other more general reasons are discussed in 
the conclusion. 
 
 
6.12  Conclusions 
  
Performance pay has become an established feature of heads’ and deputies’ pay in England and 
Wales even though it remains unpopular. About 60% of schools use performance as one of their 
criteria for deciding the pay of their heads and deputies, and about 25% have paid performance 
enhancements over the past three years. So, there is no doubt that the system is in place, and in a 
substantial minority of schools, it is being used to reward heads and deputies. 
 The procedures set up to reward heads and deputies appear very uneven as to their quality 
and degree of formalisation. One third of heads and deputies, by early 1997, had, or expected to 
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have, a formal performance review, and about two thirds had received an annual salary statement 
which informs them of their position on the pay spine and the reasons why. 
 Whether or not there is a performance review makes a difference. Where they exist, it is 
much more likely that formal, objective, criteria will be used for appraising heads and deputies, that 
performance enhancements will be awarded, and that heads and deputies will report positively 
about the scheme. It is more likely, but the general tenor of replies remains negative overall. 
 The most widely held view among heads and deputies, who have now had pay linked to 
performance for six years, is negative. They do not agree with the principle; its impact on target 
setting has been small, and that on personal motivation small or irrelevant; and it is believed to 
damage morale in schools and weaken team working. 
 However, if one concentrates on the replies of those who have received performance 
enhancements, the judgements are markedly less negative and often positive. The more performance 
enhancements received, the more likely heads and deputies will agree with the principle and believe 
the measurement and other difficulties can be overcome. They are more positive about the target 
setting functions, and are less likely to believe that performance pay for heads and deputies damages 
morale. 
 We might therefore consider two possible interpretations of the results: one which is 
optimistic for further use of performance pay in schools; and one which is pessimistic. 
 On the optimistic side, first, performance pay motivates the ‘winners’ but demotivates the 
‘losers’. This is supported by the distribution of judgements according to whether or not people 
have benefited personally from performance pay. Secondly, where the procedures are clear and 
well-established, heads and deputies are more likely to accept that it can be beneficial, so as 
procedures, such as the annual performance reviews, are generalised to cover heads and deputies in 
all schools, one might expect acceptance of the scheme to spread. There appears to be a ‘learning’ 
effect with the development of performance reviews and performance enhancements, so that the 
spread of performance reviews for heads and deputies and more widespread and systematic 
evaluation of their schools is leading to a change of  management culture. This concerns in part the 
acceptance that a much greater range of activities within schools are susceptible to objective 
measurement. Here it would seem that the widespread use of Osfted reports and school 
development plans illustrates that objective measurement does not simply mean ‘league tables’ 
which reduce schools’ performance to a small number of dubious statistical indicators. It may be too 
that the improved target setting by heads and deputies will prove to be the most important part of 
that culture change, and that the value of performance pay itself is not to motivate, but to make the 
other things happen. 
 On the pessimistic side, however, a number of other issues have to be raised. First, even 
among the beneficiaries of performance enhancements, it has been common to find that a large 
minority, and sometimes even a majority expressed negative judgements of performance pay: it is 
just that they were significantly less negative than those of heads and deputies in other schools. It is 
possible that this shows simply that the ‘learning effect’ is rather slow, but as the scheme had 
already been around for six years, this seems too sanguine an interpretation. 
 Secondly, and also less optimistically for the scheme, it may be that performance pay has 
been successfully implemented in those schools where there were sufficient financial resources to 
make it worthwhile, and where governors saw it as a good opportunity to reward good heads and 
deputies. There was a weak tendency for the frequency of enhancements to decrease as the 
percentage of pupils with free school meals increased, but this needs to be explored in more depth 
before any firm conclusions may be drawn. The funding formulae for schools take account of some 
problems of local neighbourhoods, but not of the ability of schools to raise additional funds through 
local fundraising activities. Although these are not destined for salaries, presumably, they can ease 
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the general financial pressures on schools. A more powerful reason is that schools in better off 
neighbourhoods are more likely to be able to attract governors with management expertise as they 
are more likely to have pupils whose parents who run businesses or professional activities. So there 
may have been some ‘self selection’ among schools using performance enhancements. 
 Thirdly, there may be deeper, more philosophical, reasons for the discontent with 
performance pay which would not be removed by more widespread and better conducted reviews. 
In the literature on performance evaluation, it is common to distinguish two questions: the extent to 
which the criteria for evaluation or appraisal can be applied effectively and accurately; and that to 
which they are actually measuring the right things. In the jargon, these are referred to as ‘reliability’ 
and ‘validity’16. Properly conducted reviews may allay heads’ and deputies’ scepticism about the 
practicality of measuring some aspects of performance: whether certain aspects of their work can be 
measured reliably. Here the careful compilation of performance indicators, and the use of the 
assessments by Ofsted inspectors is critical. But, many heads and deputies may still believe these 
are not reflecting those aspects of a school’s performance which they believe to be the most 
appropriate: they are not valid measures of performance because they are, or are felt to be, 
measuring the wrong things. There is less reason to believe that carefully planned performance 
reviews will resolve this second, and more fundamental, question. Hence the continued scepticism 
among many heads and deputies. As education in a pluralist democracy is about values it may be 
that our responses reflect a deeper disagreement about the goals of education. If this is so, then it is 
vitally important that schools retain the freedom they have at the moment to decide their own criteria 
for awarding enhancements. 
 A fourth question concerns the perceived inequity between performance rewards for heads 
and deputies when similar opportunities are not available for classroom teachers. Two issues are 
inter-twined here: the inequity of opportunities for rewarding good performance of one group of 
teachers and not others; and the widespread belief that performance in schools is dependent on the 
cooperation of many individual teachers, so that it is not feasible to identify the contribution of 
particular individuals. If the opportunities were open to all categories of teachers, then the second 
question might be less poignant, but given that they are not, the system is felt to be unfair, and 
damaging to relations within schools. Although we did not ask specifically about this, it may be that 
the slow take-up of performance enhancements in schools is connected with the concern by heads 
and governors that it would generate feelings of inequity within their schools. The extent to which 
this is true may also mean that extending the performance review procedures will not necessarily 
bring a proportionate increase in the acceptance of performance pay principles because those 
schools which have adopted them were those in which concerns about their effects on relations 
within schools were least strongly held. While more money might alleviate the inequity, it would 
reduce the attractiveness of selective incentives, like performance pay, to employers. 
                                                 
16. See for example Cascio 1991. 
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Appendix 1 
Sample Information 
 
This appendix contains details of our sample response compared with such data on the sampled 
population as we could obtain. 
 
1.  Employment Service and Inland Revenue 
 
To check the reliability of our sample, we compared response rates by Management pay band and 
by region. In the tables below, we estimated the number of questionnaires sent to each pay band 
and region assuming that as the sample had been selected randomly, the number of questionnaires 
sent out should have been proportional to number of staff in each pay band and region. Response 
rates are not shown for individual cells where the numbers were too small to be meaningful, 
indicated by ‘**’. 
 There was some tendency for those in the higher Management Pay Bands to respond more 
readily, as has been common in other of our public service PRP surveys, but there was generally a 
good response across all pay bands. The tables also show a good response across regions. 
 
Table A1 
Employment Service: sample information 
 
Band  Population Estimated no. of q'aires 
sent 
Usable q’aires received back Estimated response rate % 
MPB1 117 10 8 81.1 
MPB2 138 12 5 43.0 
MPB3 590 50 30 60.3 
MPB4 552 47 24 51.6 
MPB5 721 61 19 31.3 
MPB6 6,199 523 134 25.6 
APB SEO 23 2 5 ** 
APB HEO 102 9 10 ** 
APB EO 2,231 188 35 18.6 
     
Totals  10,673 900 270 30.0 
Others 24326 900 16  
 
Region  Population 
(all grades) 
Estimated q’aires sent 
out to MPB grades 
Q’aires received back Estimated response rate % 
for MPB grades 
LASER 9,750 251 47 19 
North West 4,193 108 45 42 
Northern 1,970 51 14 28 
Yorks and Humber 3,034 78 23 29 
East Mids & Eastern 3,262 84 19 23 
South West 2,633 68 16 24 
West Midlands 2,997 77 31 40 
Wales 1,918 49 19 39 
Head Office 1,744 45 36 80 
Scotland  3,498 90 40 44 
     
Total  34,999 900 290 32 
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 Similar methodological checks were carried out on the Inland Revenue survey and are given 
in our paper ‘Performance management and performance pay at the Inland Revenue: 1996’. A 
summary is shown below, for the whole sample. 
 
Table A2 
Inland Revenue survey: sample information 
 
 Population Sample 
Pay Band % % 
B 5.2 1.9 
C1 3.0 5.4 
C2 9.7 17.7 
D 22.8 29.9 
E1 34.1 26.7 
E2 25.2 18.3 
Executive office   
London 9.7 8.5 
North 6.8 7.2 
South Yorkshire 8.1 9.2 
East 8.4 9.6 
South East 8.9 10.0 
South West 5.2 5.8 
North West 14.0 14.2 
Wales & Midlands 13.6 14.3 
Scotland 8.9 7.8 
Northern Ireland  2.1 1.6 
AO Cumbernauld 1.9 1.5 
AO Shipley 1.9 1.4 
Other EO or Divisions 10.7 8.9 
Gender   
Female 62.2 56.2 
Male 37.8 43.8 
Ethnicity   
‘White’ 94.1 95.7 
‘Non-white’ 5.9 4.3 
Status   
Full-time 83.5 85.1 
Part-time 16.5 14.9 
 
Sources: Inland Revenue figures for 1.10.96, except for ethnicity which relates to 1.1.97; sample. 
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Table A3  
Comparison of the survey sample with Employment Service figures 
 
Pay Band  ES figures % Sample No.s Estimated response % 
MPB 1 1.1 8 81.1 
MPB 2 1.3 5 43.0 
MPB 3 5.5 30 60.3 
MPB 4 5.2 24 51.6 
MPB 5 6.8 19 31.3 
MPB 6 58.1 134 25.6 
APB SEO, HEO & EO 22.1 50 25.2 
All MPB grades 100.0  30.0 
Totals  10,673 270  
Other Pay Bands 24,326 16 - 
    
Region  ES figures % Sample No.s Estimated response rate % 
London & SE 27.9 47 18.7 
North West 12.0 45 41.7 
Northern 5.6 14 27.6 
Yorks. And Humber 8.7 23 29.5 
East Mids. & Eastern 9.3 19 22.7 
South West 7.5 16 23.6 
West Midlands 8.6 31 40.2 
Wales 5.5 19 38.5 
Head Office 5.0 36 80.3 
Scotland  10.0 40 44.5 
Totals  34,999 290 32.2 
    
Gender  ES figures % Sample  Estimated response rate % 
Male  28.3 123 48.2 
Female 71.7 160 24.8 
Totals  34,999 283 31.4 
 
Source: Sample data (1.1.97) and Employment Service-wide figures (1.6.97). 
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Table A4  
Comparison of Inland Revenue staff and the CEP 1996 sample 
 
 Population Sample 
Pay Band % % 
B 5.2 1.9 
C1 3.0 5.4 
C2 9.7 17.7 
D 22.8 29.9 
E1 34.1 26.7 
E2 25.2 18.3 
Executive office   
London 9.7 8.5 
North 6.8 7.2 
South Yorkshire 8.1 9.2 
East 8.4 9.6 
South East 8.9 10.0 
South West 5.2 5.8 
North West 14.0 14.2 
Wales & Midlands 13.6 14.3 
Scotland 8.9 7.8 
Northern Ireland  2.1 1.6 
AO Cumbernauld 1.9 1.5 
AO Shipley 1.9 1.4 
Other EO or Divisions 10.7 8.9 
Gender   
Female 62.2 56.2 
Male 37.8 43.8 
Ethnicity   
‘White’ 94.1 95.7 
‘Non-white’ 5.9 4.3 
Status   
Full-time 83.5 85.1 
Part-time 16.5 14.9 
 
Sources: Inland Revenue figures for 1.10.96, except for ethnicity which relates to 1.1.97; sample. 
 
Details of the 1991 Inland Revenue sample can be found in Marsden and Richardson 1992. 
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2.  NHS Trust Hospitals 
 
For the NHS trust hospitals we gained the following response rates by staff group, gender, contract, 
and employment status. 
 
Table A5 
NHS trust response rate by staff group 
 
 Individual scheme 
trust 
 Group scheme 
trust 
 
Staff Group  Employment Response rate % Employment Response rate % 
Ancillary 217 19 686 10 
Admin & Clerical 495 27 768 23 
Maintenance 43 53 51 35 
Nursing & Midwifery 1,195 25 2,043 20 
Professional & Technical 292 35 492 25 
Senior Managers  82 60 82 60 
Totals  2,324 28 4,122 21 
 
Table A6 
NHS trust response rate by gender, contract and employment status 
 
 Individual scheme trust Group scheme trust 
 Response rate % % 
Female 25 20 
Male 20 21 
Trust 30-32 22 
Whitley 22-26 19 
Part-time 21 16 
Full-time 32 25 
Total 28 21 
 
NHS: Definitions of Appraisal Gradings 
 
Individual scheme: 
 
· Excellent: this category is reserved for a small number of truly exceptional performers who have 
consistently and significantly excelled 
· Superior: appropriate for members of staff who have consistently exceeded the requirements of 
the objectives and the job contribution profile 
· Good: where a member of staff achieves all, or nearly all of the objectives, and contributes at 
least to the level required by the job contribution profile 
· Average: for staff who achieve the majority of objectives and are close to matching the job 
contribution profile 
· Poor: only be used if a member of staff consistently falls below the contribution required in the 
profile and has fallen short in the majority of objectives 
 
Group scheme: 
 
· Satisfactory to very good performance 
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· Unsatisfactory but having sufficient potential and making sufficient effort to become satisfactory 
· Unsatisfactory and unacceptable performance. Continued performance at this level will result in 
dismissal 
 
 
3.  Head Teachers 
 
A stratified sample was used for NAHT members, over-sampling members in London and in 
secondary schools. In addition, the NAHT sample was confined to heads. For SHA, a single stage 
random sample was selected of 2,000 members. The NAHT results in this paper have been 
weighted to adjust for the different sampling fractions used for different categories of members. The 
tables below give details of the response. 
Although the response rate was 40%, and so might be considered to be on the low side, the 
sample has achieved a good cross-section of the membership. Most important, there does not 
appear to be any correlation between response and the receipt of salary enhancements. There is 
therefore no ground for believing that our sample has been biased either towards those who feel 
aggrieved because they have not benefited from the scheme, nor towards those who are enthusiastic 
because they have gained from it. The most likely reasons for the low response are the workloads 
of heads and deputies, and the fact that we were unable to send out reminders to those who had not 
returned questionnaires by the appropriate date. 
In designing the questionnaire, we received considerable help from officials of both NAHT 
and SHA, and it was tested on groups of lay officials of both associations. It was sent out with an 
accompanying letter from the General Secretaries of the NAHT and SHA encouraging members to 
respond to the questionnaire, and pointing out that it was a piece of academic research carried out 
at the London School of Economics. It was sent out in February 1997, with a return date in March. 
 
Table A7  
Population and sample by gender 
 
 NAHT  SHA  
 Membership Sample Membership Sample 
Female 50 46.7 32.6 31.5 
Male 50 53.3 67.4 68.5 
Total 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Table A8  
Population and sample by School status: SHA 
 
SHA Membership Sample 
LEA Maintained 59.9 60.9 
Grant Maintained 15.2 17.8 
Independent 13.5 9.2 
Voluntary Aided/Controlled 11.4 10.3 
Other 0.0 1.7 
Total 100 100 
 
Source: SHA 
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Table A9  
Salary enhancements for population and sample 
Spine movements 1995/6 for heads and deputies remaining in post over the last three years. (All schools) 
 
Number of 
enhancements 
Sept 95-96 Jan 91-Sept 94 NAHT 1994-97 SHA 
1994-97 
<0 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0 
0 72.3 45.8 40.3 42.7 
1 15.0 6.5 27.4 26.9 
2 8.2 14.7 16.5 16.3 
3 2.2 10.6 9.2 10.5 
>3 2.2 22.0 6.6 3.6 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
% in same post 83 65 na na 
Source: STRB (1994, and 1997) and survey results 
 
Table A10  
Head teachers and Deputies by age: population and sample 
 
Age group Primary heads NAHT 
heads 
Secondary heads & 
deputies  
SHA 
heads & deputies 
 % % % % 
<20 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
20-29 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
30-39 8.3 7.4 8.3 10.7 
40-49 56.1 58.9 55.1 55.4 
50-59 32.9 32.6 34.0 33.4 
>60 2.9 1.1 2.4 0.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: DfEE Statistics of Education: Teachers, England and Wales 1996, Tab. 11, and survey results. DfEE data 
for March 1994. 
 
Table A11 
School Size Group: Population and Sample 
 
Group size Primary & Nursery 
heads 
NAHT heads in 
(sample %) 
Secondary (heads & 
deps) 
SHA heads & 
deputies (sample %) 
1 32.2 18.5 1.6 0.4 
2 51.9 54.3 6.4 0.9 
3 14.9 20.2 8.1 4.5 
4 0.5 2.0 19.4 22.6 
5 0.0 3.8 48.4 53.0 
6 0.0 1.1 16.1 18.6 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: DfEE, Data base of Teacher Records, derived from salary data, including ‘safeguarding’ where 
appropriate. Provisional estimates for March 1995, and sample, Feb/March 1997. Excludes special schools (1S to 
4S). 1 
 
                                                 
1. School size groups are defined primarily in order to calculate a school’s teaching establishment. They are 
based on the numb er of pupils and their age. For example, each pupil under 14 years old counts as two ‘units’ 
whereas each one aged 17 and over counts as nine units. Schools that score up to 300 points are classified in 
Group 1, those with 301-700, to Group 2, and so on up to those with 4,601 or more units which are assigned to 
Group 6. Allowance is also made for pupils with special needs. (DfEE a) 1996). 
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Appendix 2 
Summary of Questionnaire Replies 
 
1. Inland Revenue 1996 
 
Section 1 - We should like to ask your views about the principle of linking pay to performance 
Please would you indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statements below : 
 
  Strongly 
disagree 
% 
Disagree 
% 
No View 
% 
Agree 
% 
Strongly 
agree 
% 
Total 
replies 
1 The principle of relating pay to performance is a 
good one 
13.0 24.3 4.6 52.2 5.9 1180 
2 The idea of performance pay is fundamentally unfair 6.0 45.5 9.2 26.6 12.6 1172 
3 Experience (i.e. years in the job) should count more 
towards determining pay levels  
6.9 30.1 10.3 38.4 14.3 1181 
4 Pay should take into account different duties carried 
out by staff in the same band/span 
4.0 19.5 13.3 49.9 13.3 1179 
5 Staff should be paid solely on the basis of individual 
performance 
18.6 46.1 6.0 22.1 7.3 1183 
6 Staff should be paid more if their skills are in short 
supply 
5.6 34.4 15.7 37.6 6.8 1179 
7 People should be paid according to national 
negotiated pay scales  
1.8 11.6 10.1 49.6 26.8 1178 
8 Pay should reflect the demands of the jobs and not 
the performance of individual job holders 
3.3 25.5 13.5 41.9 15.9 1178 
9 Annual pay rises should be used primarily to 
compensate for rises in the cost of living 
3.3 20.7 9.2 48.3 18.6 1177 
 
Section 2  - We would now like to ask your views of the Inland Revenues Performance Management  (PM) 
scheme. 
How,  in your experience,  has the Revenues Performance Management (PM) Scheme been working: 
 
  Strongly 
disagree 
% 
Disagree 
% 
No View 
% 
Agree 
% 
Strongly 
agree 
% 
Total 
replies 
10 Performance Pay raises staff awareness of the 
objectives of PM 
11.5 40.9 9.4 36.6 1.5 1176 
11 PM makes staff less willing to assist colleagues 
experiencing work difficulties 
2.3 27.3 7.3 43.2 19.9 1184 
12 PM causes jealousies between staff 0.8 7.8 6.0 48.5 37.0 1183 
13 PM is difficult to operate because the type of work 
done in the Inland Revenue is hard to measure 
1.1 15.1 8.1 46.0 29.7 1186 
14 PM has made managers set work targets more clearly 11.0 42.7 14.7 29.6 1.9 1181 
15 PM has meant good work is recognised and 
rewarded  at last 
25.5 47.2 8.6 15.4 3.2 1180 
16 Managers use the scheme to reward their favourites 4.0 17.3 21.3 36.8 20.6 1176 
17 Women lose out under PM 14.1 38.8 32.9 11.3 2.9 1175 
18 Staff are frequently denied the performance 
assessments they deserve because in practice there 
is a quota on exceeds and extra-loaded jobs 
3.0 10.6 8.9 36.7 40.8 1186 
19 PM has helped to undermine staff morale 0.3 10.1 8.5 44.2 36.9 1183 
20 Members of ethnic minorities lose out under PM 13.1 27.8 48.5 8.3 2.3 1175 
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21 For all that is said about quality, PM is simply a 
device to get more work done 
0.6 12.6 10.0 49.6 27.2 1185 
22 PM  is simply a device to cut the pay bill 0.5 12.2 12.7 43.7 30.9 1164 
        
23 The individual performance targets are a suitable 
basis for determining performance pay 
11.9 45.5 15.9 25.4 1.2 1168 
24 Extra-loaded posts are used as a substitute for 
progression and promotion 
1.1 10.0 11.6 50.6 26.6 1177 
25 Performance Management discourages team working 2.1 20.8 10.2 42.8 24.1 1181 
26 The link with pay makes staff question the fairness of 
PM 
0.1 5.8 7.8 56.8 29.6 1177 
27 PM is a good way to identify poor performance 13.6 46.7 11.9 25.4 2.4 1177 
28 Staff in lower pay bands/spans do better now under 
PM 
13.2 37.6 32.0 14.3 2.8 1178 
29 Staff are aware of the Conciliation and Appeals 
procedure 
8.5 31.6 17.1 41.0 1.9 1182 
30 The appeal system ensures unfair assessments are 
corrected  
12.6 36.7 38.4 11.6 0.8 1176 
31 Staff suffering illness or personal distress lose out 
under PM 
1.4 18.5 21.8 43.3 15.0 1183 
32 It would be better to base PM on the performance of  
groups of staff  than of individuals  
13.4 36.9 21.8 21.8 6.0 1177 
33 Non-pensionable one-off annual payments are an 
acceptable method for distributing pay beyond the 
band/span maximum 
26.5 36.6 16.2 15.9 4.8 1182 
34 It would be fair for management to award 
Performance Pay to someone who has been loyal and 
hardworking but has not performed well in their job. 
9.8 45.3 19.3 23.1 2.5 1176 
35 It would be fair for manangement to award an exceed 
just to prevent a competent officer from leaving 
32.1 54.6 6.5 4.5 2.3 1179 
36 Employees working part-time lose out under PM 6.7 29.3 37.4 20.3 6.3 1180 
37 The amount of money an individual receives for an 
exceed or an extra-loaded should be substantially 
increased 
9.2 25.0 20.0 29.7 16.0 1180 
 
 
Section 3  We would like you to answer the following questions about your personal experiences with the 
Performance Management Scheme. 
 
  Strongly 
disagree 
% 
Disagree 
% 
No View 
% 
Agree 
% 
Strongly 
agree 
% 
 
Total 
replies 
38 I do not understand how PM operates in the 
Revenue 
15.5 62.8 7.9 11.4 2.5 1178 
39 PM has made me more aware of the targets of the 
Revenue 
8.4 39.6 12.6 37.4 2.0 1178 
40 PM has given me an incentive to work beyond the 
requirements of the job  
27.1 50.3 5.3 15.4 2.1 1179 
41 PM has reduced my wish to co-operate with 
management 
7.3 43.9 18.6 23.4 6.9 1179 
42 PM has made me more aware of the importance of  
being sensitive to my colleagues 
9.2 52.0 21.1 16.8 0.9 1178 
43 PM has caused me to work longer hours 10.5 56.0 8.4 20.2 5.0 1181 
44 PM has given me the incentive to be more effective 
in my dealings with the public 
15.8 53.3 16.3 13.5 1.1 1181 
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  Strongly 
disagree 
% 
Disagree 
% 
No View 
% 
Agree 
% 
Strongly 
agree 
% 
 
Total 
replies 
45 PM has given me greater incentive to get my work 
priorities right 
14.3 49.4 12.7 22.2 1.4 1184 
46 PM has made me want to show more initiative in my 
job 
16.1 54.0 10.4 17.7 1.9 1176 
47 PM has caused greater stress in my job 3.9 21.9 10.5 39.9 23.7 1176 
48 PM has had no effect on the quality of my work 
because it was already at the appropriate level 
1.7 6.9 7.7 54.5 29.3 1178 
49 Managers know enough about the jobs of their staff 
to identify poor performance 
17.1 26.8 7.3 37.9 10.9 1184 
 
Section 4. We should like to ask you some questions about the Performance Agreement relating to your most 
recent annual pay award 
 
  Strongly 
disagree 
% 
Disagree 
% 
No View 
% 
Agree 
% 
Strongly 
agree 
% 
 
Total 
replies 
50 I was satisfied with the 1996 pay award 17.8 35.3 6.2 38.1 2.5 1177 
51 Throughout the last year, I had sufficient 
opportunity  to discuss my performance with my line 
manager 
11.3 26.9 5.3 52.1 4.5 1187 
52 I have been able to change my objectives when my  
work allocation has altered 
8.0 21.3 21.4 46.6 2.8 1184 
53 I understand why I was awarded my most recent 
performance assessment 
4.5 9.5 6.9 71.3 7.8 1183 
54 My most recent performance assessment was a fair 
reflection of my performance 
7.2 21.2 7.8 53.5 10.3 1184 
55 I know what I have to do to get an Exceed in the 
future 
14.5 34.9 8.4 35.6 6.6 1185 
56 I am personally capable of doing what is necessary 
to get an Exceed in the future 
6.0 15.4 16.3 44.2 18.1 1185 
57 The personal satisfaction I derive from my work is 
sufficient incentive for me to do what is needed to 
get an Exceed 
19.4 35.6 12.9 25.6 6.5 1183 
58 Even if my performance is good enough , I doubt I 
will receive an Exceed 
4.5 23.1 9.0 34.9 28.4 1185 
59 The nature of my present job makes it very hard for 
me to exceed the objective in my Performance 
Agreement 
1.6 24.7 9.3 43.3 21.1 1184 
60 It was difficult to achieve an Exceed because my  
Performance Agreement was altered during the year. 
5.1 50.9 30.1 10.4 3.5 1183 
61 Staff feel pressured into accepting performance 
objectivesset by management without discussion. 
2.0 23.0 11.7 44.9 18.4 1186 
62 For all that is said about individual performance 
objectives, in reality everyone is given the same 
targets. 
3.8 21.9 11.0 44.1 19.1 1186 
63 In agreeing objectives, I am more concerned to avoid 
a Not Met than to aim for an Exceed 
5.0 28.9 10.2 39.7 16.1 1183 
64 The staff who gain Exceeds are those who are 
cleverest at negotiating their Performance 
Agreements 
7.0 33.5 16.1 26.9 16.4 1185 
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Section 5  If there are any further points you would like to make about the Performance Management scheme 
please do so in the space provided. 
 
Section 6 -  We should like to ask what you value in your job, and working for the Inland Revenue 
 
The following issues are important to me in my  current job : 
 
  Strongly 
disagree 
% 
Disagree 
% 
No View 
% 
Agree 
% 
Strongly 
agree 
% 
 
Total 
replies 
65 Job Security  1.4 5.8 3.3 49.4 40.1 1182 
66 My level of income 2.1 8.7 4.2 53.8 31.2 1184 
67 Flexible working time 1.3 4.6 5.5 50.3 38.2 1177 
68 Contributing to an important public sevice 2.6 16.6 24.7 45.5 10.7 1178 
69 Opportunity to exercise responsibility 1.6 12.7 20.7 52.8 12.1 1177 
70 Varied and interesting work 5.0 19.8 11.2 48.3 15.6 1179 
71 Career opportunities 21.0 30.7 14.1 22.1 12.2 1168 
72 Leave entitlement 1.0 7.2 12.6 60.6 18.6 1172 
 
 
Section 7. Now we should like to know something about your general attitudes, first to the office in which you 
work and then to the Inland Revenue as a whole. 
 
  Strongly 
disagree 
% 
Disagree 
% 
No View 
% 
Agree 
% 
Strongly 
agree 
% 
 
Total 
replies 
73 Working as a member of a team 6.4 19.2 22.5 43.0 8.8 1149 
74 I feel 'part of the family' in my current office 7.3 25.0 11.7 49.0 6.9 1176 
75 I feel a strong sense of commitment to my current 
office  
6.1 24.2 16.4 43.9 9.4 1180 
76 I feel 'part of the family' in the Inland Revenue 18.8 46.4 18.6 14.7 1.4 1176 
77 I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career 
in the Inland Revenue 
10.9 18.4 21.4 41.1 8.3 1174 
78 I do not feel emotionally attached to the Inland 
Revenue 
3.8 21.2 16.7 42.6 15.6 1171 
79 I think that I could easily become as attached to 
another organisation as the Inland Revenue 
1.8 12.9 20.9 52.3 12.2 1175 
80 I feel a strong sense of commitment to the Inland 
Revenue 
10.8 31.7 22.5 30.3 4.8 1175 
81 I always show goodwill to complete an urgent task 0.8 2.9 3.4 64.3 28.6 1180 
82 I keep myself well-informed and undertake training 
when I think this may benefit the Revenue 
1.0 10.9 16.0 59.1 13.1 1179 
83 Whenever changes are made in this organisation 
employees usually lose out in the end 
1.2 11.9 13.9 47.3 25.6 1180 
84 Working in the Inland Revenue means a great deal to 
me 
10.3 28.4 32.0 25.4 3.8 1174 
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  Strongly 
disagree 
% 
Disagree 
% 
No View 
% 
Agree 
% 
Strongly 
agree 
% 
Total 
replies 
85 My performance is always well above that of other 
colleagues doing similar work 
1.2 24.4 38.2 28.9 7.4 1174 
86 I have confidence and trust in my fellow staff 3.8 20.4 22.5 48.5 4.8 1174 
 
Section 8  Finally we would like some personal information. We would stress here again that this is purely for 
research purposes. All replies will remain confidential  and anonymous  
NOTE: Biographical data are unweighted 
87 Are you Male 43.8 Female 56.2   1170 
88 Do you work Full Time 85.1 Part 
Time 
14.9   1171 
89 What is your age <21 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60   
  0.2 12.4 35.7 38.3 13.6  1104 
90 Do you consider yourself a 
member of an ethnic minority ? 
No 95.7 Yes 4.3   1161 
91 To which staff group do you 
belong? 
E2 E1 D C2 C1 B  
  18.3 26.7 29.9 17.1 5.4 1.9 1134 
92 How long have you worked in 
the Inland Revenue ?  
<1 1-2 3-5 6-10 >10   
  0.2 0.3 6.3 19.4 78.3  1170 
 
93 Which Executive Office do 
you work in ?  
Northern Ireland  1.6 Scotland 7.8 
  AO Cumbernauld 1.5 North 7.2 
  AO Shipley 1.4 South Yorkshire 9.2 
  North West 14.2 Wales & Midlands 14.3 
  East 9.6 South West 5.8 
  South East 10.0 London 8.5 
  Other EO or 
Divisions 
8.9   
    Total replies 1167 
 
94 How long have you worked in 
your current office ?  
<1 1-2 3-5 6-10 >10   
  10.2 10.9 23.6 29.4 26.0  1163 
         
95 What was your latest 
Performance Assessment  ?  
exceed 31.7      
  succeed 67.3      
  not met  1.1     1140 
96 Were you in an extra-loaded 
job for your last Assessment ?  
No 77.8 Yes 22.2   1173 
97 Were you  able to agree your 
last Performance Agreement 
with your manager ?  
No 7.8 Yes 92.2   1176 
98 Did you appeal against your 
last Performance Agreement ?  
No 96.1 Yes 3.9   1168 
99 If yes, where was the appeal 
settled ?  
Conciliat
ion 
59.5 Appeal 
Board 
40.5   37 
100 Are you at the top of your pay 
scale ?  
No 48.0 Yes 52.0   1160 
101 Was your last job with a 
private sector employer ?  
No 58.4 Yes 41.6   1088 
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Additional Section for Managers assessing staff performance. 
 
Section 9 - If you have had to assess staff we should like to ask you some additional questions. Please circle the 
number that best reflects your opinion. 
 
 
 
  Strongly 
disagree 
% 
Disagree 
% 
No View 
% 
Agree 
% 
Strongly 
agree 
% 
 
Total 
replies 
102 PM has made staff more aware of the Inland 
Revenues targets  
4.8 41.8 8.2 42.5 3.1 292 
103 The existence of PM has caused many of the staff to 
work beyond the requirements of their job 
4.8 50.7 7.8 33.7 3.4 294 
104 PM has reduced the willingness of many of the staff  
to  co-operate with management 
1.0 35.7 18.6 37.8 7.2 291 
105 PM  has led to many of the staff giving sustained 
high performance at work 
8.9 58.9 15.1 16.1 1.4 292 
106 PM has helped to increase the quality of the work of 
many of the staff 
14.0 58.2 11.0 16.4 0.3 292 
107 PM has led to an increase in the quantity of work 
many of the staff do 
5.1 46.1 7.2 37.5 4.1 293 
108 PM has made many of the staff more committed to 
their work 
14.6 58.2 13.9 12.9 0.0 294 
109 PM has made it easier for me to deal with poor 
performance 
15.8 44.9 14.4 23.6 1.4 292 
110 The system of Performance Management has led me 
to take more work home 
13.4 39.5 13.7 25.8 7.9 291 
111 PM is a bad idea because not enough staff have 
sufficient control over their work to change their 
ways 
1.7 24.5 17.3 39.8 16.7 294 
 
Thank you for your co-operation. We would now like you to seal the completed Questionnaire in the envelope 
provided and return it to us. 
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2. Employment Service 
Section 1 - We should like to ask your views about the principle of linking pay to performance (for 
each of the following statements, please circle the number that best reflects your opinion). 
Please would you indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statements below:  
  Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
1 The principle of relating pay to performance is a 
good one 
7.70 18.67 1.40 64.27 7.96 292 
2 The idea of performance pay is fundamentally unfair 9.79 60.85 6.21 16.30 6.85 291 
3 Experience (i.e. years in the job) should count more 
towards determining pay levels  
8.44 42.04 13.27 28.53 7.72 292 
4 Pay should take into account different duties carried 
out by staff in the same band 
2.35 21.94 7.83 51.78 16.11 291 
5 Individuals should be paid solely on the basis of 
individual performance 
22.45 53.55 7.02 13.09 3.89 291 
6 Staff should be paid more if their skills are in short 
supply 
4.93 38.02 18.25 34.39 4.41 292 
7 Staff should be paid according to national negotiated 
pay scales 
0.83 11.62 9.02 46.04 32.48 290 
8 Pay should reflect the demands of the jobs and not 
the performance of individual job holders 
1.21 24.98 12.04 42.93 18.84 291 
9 Annual pay rises should be used primarily to 
compensate for rises in the cost of living 
1.72 16.09 9.29 44.08 28.82 292 
10 It is appropriate for staff to be financially rewarded 
when the Agency does well in achieving its goals  
0.92 7.95 4.18 57.13 29.82 291 
 
Section 2 - We would now like to ask your views of the Employment Service Agencys Performance Pay 
scheme. Please circle the number that best reflects your opinion. 
How,  in your experience,  has the Agency's Performance Pay Scheme been working: 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
11 Performance Pay raises staff awareness of Agency 
objectives (APA Targets) 
9.33 37.25 3.85 45.02 4.55 292 
12 It makes staff less willing to assist colleagues 
experiencing work difficulties 
2.64 31.98 12.98 41.11 11.29 292 
13 Performance Pay causes jealousies between staff 0.50 13.84 7.75 50.34 27.58 288 
14 It is difficult to operate because the type of work 
done in the Employment Service is hard to measure 
1.67 17.47 8.50 45.78 26.57 291 
15 It has made managers set work targets more clearly 6.14 38.61 5.40 47.13 2.71 292 
16 It has meant good work is recognised and rewarded  
at last 
19.43 49.62 6.99 20.97 2.98 291 
17 Managers use the scheme to reward their favourites 4.56 27.33 26.71 29.40 12.00 291 
18 Women lose out under Performance Pay  18.45 46.04 27.40 4.58 3.53 292 
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  Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
19 Staff are frequently denied the Box Marking they 
deserve because  there is a quota system of Box 
Markings 
1.36 14.15 10.00 41.82 32.66 290 
20 Performance Pay has helped to undermine staff 
morale 
0.89 12.85 8.63 50.14 27.49 290 
21 Members of ethnic minorities lose out under 
Performance Pay 
12.68 34.08 48.85 2.20 2.18 291 
22 For all that is said about quality, the Agency's PRP 
scheme is simply a device to get more work done 
1.06 20.10 14.09 46.20 18.55 291 
23 It  is simply a device to cut the pay bill 0.29 11.77 13.94 45.50 28.60 291 
24 It makes progression of one's salary hard to predict 0.61 6.63 5.24 51.17 36.35 289 
25 The individual performance targets are a suitable 
basis for determining performance pay 
18.02 48.81 9.80 20.81 2.56 291 
26 The Agency's PRP Scheme encourages team working 23.80 52.85 9.94 10.76 2.65 290 
27 Performance Pay has made staff less willing to 
tolerate absence by colleagues in their section 
3.12 28.20 23.90 36.43 8.35 291 
28 The Agency's PRP scheme is a good way to identify 
poor performance 
11.63 52.11 10.73 22.35 3.18 291 
29 The link with pay makes staff question the fairness of 
performance appraisals  
0.55 9.90 11.66 60.70 17.19 291 
30 Members in lower pay bands do better now under 
Performance Pay 
11.70 33.69 48.50 5.30 0.81 290 
31 The appeal system ensures unfair appraisals are 
corrected  
11.92 33.70 41.38 11.86 1.13 291 
32 It would be better to base PM on the performance of  
groups of staff  than of individuals  
5.68 42.73 15.97 25.59 10.03 291 
33 Group-based PRP is a bad idea because there are 
always some colleagues who will not pull their 
weight 
1.27 22.32 15.33 47.15 13.94 291 
34 Non-consolidated pay an acceptable method for 
distributing performance pay  
32.56 34.43 23.60 6.12 3.29 289 
35 It would be fair for management to award 
Performance Pay to someone who has been loyal and 
hardworking but has not performed well in their job. 
8.15 40.09 19.98 28.07 3.70 290 
36 It would be fair for management to award a Box A 
just to prevent a competent officer from leaving 
40.17 50.91 4.71 3.41 0.81 290 
37 Part-time employees lose out under PM 10.86 34.53 36.48 12.77 5.36 291 
38 The amount of money an individual receives for a 
Box A should be substantially increased 
7.55 37.16 20.57 21.53 13.20 291 
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Section 3  We would like you to answer the following questions about your personal experiences with 
the Performance Pay Scheme. Please circle the number that best reflects your opinion 
  
  Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
39 I do not understand how the Agency's PRP scheme 
operates 
10.75 57.28 9.14 19.81 3.02 289 
40 Performance Pay has made me more aware of the 
targets of the Agency 
8.65 47.72 4.61 35.24 3.78 290 
41 Performance Pay has given me an incentive to work 
beyond the requirements of the job  
24.45 60.43 2.93 10.72 1.46 291 
42 It has reduced my wish to co-operate with 
management 
8.24 50.26 15.26 18.37 7.87 291 
43 Performance Pay has made me more aware of the 
importance of  being sensitive to my colleagues 
10.91 55.34 22.43 10.75 0.57 291 
44 Performance Pay has caused me to work longer hours 11.62 60.36 9.33 13.01 5.69 290 
45 It has given me the incentive to be more effective in 
my dealings with the public 
20.40 59.51 11.51 7.61 0.97 289 
46 It has given me an incentive to get my work priorities 
right 
14.26 53.72 10.73 19.12 2.18 291 
47 It has made me want to show more initiative in my job 16.97 55.98 7.05 19.10 0.89 290 
48 Performance Pay has caused greater stress in my job 3.36 28.48 11.16 38.91 18.08 291 
49 It has led fellow staff to pressure me to work harder 9.89 49.84 14.25 18.36 7.65 291 
50 Performance Pay has had no effect on the quality of 
my work because it was already at the appropriate 
standard 
0.98 7.45 8.87 48.87 33.84 291 
51 Managers know enough about the jobs of their staff 
to identify poor performance 
13.25 31.67 7.26 37.23 10.59 291 
   
Section 4. Now we would like some reactions to your latest Performance Assessment and Box 
Marking (as before, please circle the number that best reflects your opinion). 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
52 Throughout the last year, I had sufficient 
opportunity  to discuss my performance with my line 
manager 
10.64 25.44 2.49 53.74 7.68 290 
53 I understand why I was awarded my most recent Box 
Marking 
6.62 14.72 6.02 66.27 6.37 290 
54 My most recent Box Marking was a fair reflection of 
my performance 
10.54 20.59 4.09 59.47 5.31 290 
55 I know what I have to do to get a Box A or B in the 
future 
15.52 31.14 5.16 43.45 4.73 289 
56 I am personally capable of doing what is necessary 
to get a Box A or B in the future 
2.66 10.66 9.73 54.47 22.48 290 
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  Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
57 The personal satisfaction I derive from my work is 
sufficient incentive for me to do what is needed to 
get a Box A or B 
11.49 27.08 11.87 35.77 13.79 289 
58 Even if my performance is good enough , I doubt I 
will receive the Box Marking I deserve 
3.64 28.83 13.10 32.86 21.56 290 
59 The nature of my present job makes it very hard for 
me to meet or exceed  objectives 
1.97 31.64 7.74 40.63 18.02 289 
60 It is difficult for me to get a higher Box Marking due 
to the many other organisational changes in the 
Agency 
1.02 18.61 13.48 47.34 19.56 287 
61 Staff feel pressured into accepting performance 
objectives set by management without discussion. 
1.46 25.43 9.72 42.54 20.85 289 
62 My current pay banding has prevented me from 
being awarded a higher Box Marking  
1.70 41.24 33.39 15.23 8.44 288 
   
Section 5  If there are any further points you would like to make about the Performance Pay scheme 
please do so in the space provided.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 6 -  We should like to ask what you value in your job, and working for the Employment Service 
(ES) (for each of the following statements, please circle the number that best reflects your opinion). 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree  
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No View 
 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
The following issues are important to me in my  current job : 
63 Job Security  2.34 6.87 3.27 48.32 39.20 290 
64 My level of income 1.33 3.99 0.87 54.53 39.28 291 
65 Flexible working time 1.19 9.64 8.20 58.88 22.09 291 
66 Contributing to an important public service 2.25 13.41 20.55 47.99 15.80 289 
67 Opportunity to exercise responsibility 1.76 10.94 11.81 58.73 16.76 291 
68 Varied and interesting work 4.09 12.74 8.94 54.97 19.26 290 
69 Career opportunities 13.51 32.53 6.59 32.30 15.07 289 
70 Working as a member of a team 1.77 13.31 16.97 56.42 11.53 289 
71 A safe working environment 8.87 14.85 12.16 42.40 21.72 277 
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Section 7. Now we should like to know something about your general attitudes, first to the office in 
which you work and then to the Agency as a whole. Please circle the number that best reflects 
your opinion. 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree  
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No View 
 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
72 I feel 'part of the family' in my current office 6.98 22.25 12.24 49.19 9.35 290 
73 I feel a strong sense of commitment to my current 
office  
7.70 22.15 10.65 46.69 12.81 290 
74 I feel 'part of the family' in the Employment Service  23.01 50.43 13.71 11.64 1.22 288 
75 I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career 
in the ES 
19.17 21.61 18.27 32.97 7.98 288 
76 I do not feel emotionally attached to the ES 2.30 24.52 14.30 39.20 19.68 287 
77 I think that I could easily become as attached to 
another organisation as this Agency 
1.20 8.68 17.65 53.59 18.87 289 
78 I feel a strong sense of commitment to the ES 18.28 30.58 15.64 31.25 4.25 286 
79 I always show goodwill to complete an urgent task 0.40 4.78 2.87 64.11 27.84 290 
80 I keep myself well-informed and undertake training 
when I think this may benefit the ES 
1.56 9.79 10.62 64.77 13.26 290 
81 If the opportunity arose, I would take a job elsewhere 
or take early retirement/severance terms  
1.59 14.56 13.04 32.67 38.13 288 
82 Whenever changes are made in this Agency 
employees usually lose out in the end 
0.40 9.11 10.77 45.70 34.01 289 
83 Working in the Agency  means a great deal to me 16.48 36.81 26.80 17.81 2.09 289 
84 My performance is always well above that of other 
colleagues doing similar work 
0.81 27.64 34.93 29.77 6.86 289 
85 I have confidence and trust in my colleagues 3.16 22.18 18.48 51.78 4.40 290 
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Section 8  Finally we would like some personal information We would stress here again that this is 
purely for research purposes. All replies will remain confidential  and anonymous.  
 
This Section unweighted  
 
      Total 
Replies 
86 Are you Male 43.46 Female 56.54 283 
87 Do you work Full Time 90.66 Part Time 9.34 289 
88 What is your age <21 21-30 31-40 41-50 > 51  
  0.00 5.17 46.49 34.32 14.02 271 
89 Do you consider yourself 
a member of an ethnic 
minority ? 
No 96.53 Yes 3.47 288 
       
90 To which  pay band do 
you belong ? (Please 
circle) 
MPB1 2.80 MPB7 1.40  
  MPB2 1.75 PB8 0.35  
  MPB3 10.49 PB9 0.35  
  MPB4 8.39 APB SEO 1.75 286 
  MPB5 6.64 APB HEO 3.50  
  MPB6 46.85 APB EO 12.24  
  Other 3.50    
 
91 How long have you worked in 
the Civil Service 
<1 1-2 3-5 6-10 > 10  
  0.00 0.35 1.40 6.29 91.96 286 
92 How long have you worked in 
your current office 
<1 1-2 3-5 6-10 > 10  
  17.77 17.77 38.68 18.82 6.97 287 
93 In which  region do you work  ? 
(Please circle) 
East Midlands & 
Eastern Counties 
6.55 North West  15.52  
  West Midlands 10.69 Northern 4.83  
  LASER 16.21 Yorks. & 
Humberside  
7.93 290 
  South West 5.52 Scotland  13.79  
  Wales  6.55 Head office  12.41  
       
94 What was your last Box Marking 
? (Please circle) 
Box A 11.15 Box C 9.41 287 
  Box B 79.44 Box D 0.00  
       
95 Are you at the top of your pay 
scale ?  
No 43.21 Yes 56.79 287 
96 Was your last job with a private 
sector employer ?  
No 65.83 Yes 34.17 278 
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Additional Section for Managers assessing staff performance. 
Section 9 - If you have had to assess staff we should like to ask you some additional questions. 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree  
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No View 
 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
97 Performance pay has made staff more 
aware of the Agencys targets  
6.42 41.40 4.25 43.29 4.65 211 
98 The existence of Performance Pay has 
caused many staff to work beyond the 
requirements of their job 
11.09 61.20 8.98 17.34 1.39 211 
99 It has reduced the willingness of many of 
the staff  to  co-operate with management 
2.07 38.44 20.99 35.31 3.18 211 
100 It  has led to many of the staff giving 
sustained high performance at work 
10.20 67.65 12.53 9.26 0.36 211 
101 It has helped to increase the quality of 
the work of many of the staff 
10.34 61.56 10.05 17.55 0.49 211 
102 It has led to an increase in the quantity of 
work many of the staff do 
5.89 52.60 13.58 24.67 3.25 209 
103 It has made many of the staff more 
committed to their work 
11.40 65.24 13.18 10.19 0.00 210 
104 It has made it easier for me to deal with 
poor performance 
10.57 53.78 10.67 23.65 1.33 211 
105 The system of Performance Pay has led 
me to take more work home 
5.64 52.21 8.33 25.19 8.64 210 
106 Performance Pay is a bad idea because 
not enough staff have sufficient control 
over their work to change their ways 
2.40 20.64 13.20 34.42 29.34 211 
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3. NHS Trust Hospital A: Individual PRP scheme 
 
Section 1 -  We should like to ask what you like about your job, and working in your hospital  
(for each of the following statements, please circle the number that best reflects your opinion). 
I originally chose a career in the health service because: 
  Strong
ly 
Disagr
ee % 
Disagr
ee 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strong
ly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replie
s 
1 it gave me the opportunity to help people  0.57 2.16 9.86 56.27 31.14 663 
2 I am interested in health care  0.65 1.69 9.99 57.81 29.86 660 
3 it offered good pay opportunities  26.45 48.15 16.37 9.03 0 650 
4 it offered job security 3.13 16.59 19.76 51.63 8.88 656 
5 it offered me the chance to work part time  16.32 13.99 34.55 26.77 8.37 647 
6 it offered me the chance to work shifts  18.87 16.53 40.97 18.46 5.17 637 
7 the NHS provides an important public service 1.67 2.05 11.87 48.50 35.92 645 
8 I needed a job at the time  19.16 18.08 18.47 28.13 16.16 625 
 
Section 2 - We should like to ask you about the aspects of your current work that you value most. 
 Again, for each of the following statements please circle the number that best reflects your opinion. 
 
The following issues are important to me in my job: 
  Strongl
y 
Disagre
e % 
Disagre
e 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongl
y Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
9 Job Security 2.22 7.52 8.39 51.43 30.44 672 
10 My level of income 3.87 10.67 7.89 48.15 29.42 668 
11 Interest in health care  1.12 1.38 8.96 62.74 25.80 669 
12 Flexible working time 3.36 12.31 26.06 40.84 17.42 657 
13 Opportunity to exercise responsibility 0.94 3.72 13.82 55.94 25.58 671 
14 Opportunity to work on my own initiative 0.62 3.20 6.77 55.02 34.39 673 
15 Varied and interesting work 0.93 3.80 4.84 51.12 39.31 677 
16 Opportunities for further training 3.53 10.33 12.87 49.75 23.52 668 
17 Relationship with colleagues and manager(s) 2.15 2.94 8.72 59.38 26.80 675 
18 Team work and co-operation 1.63 4.03 8.19 51.86 34.30 657 
19 Staff Benefits (e.g. childcare provision) 10.02 14.59 48.71 19.83 6.85 613 
 
NHS Hopital Trust A:  INDIVIDUAL PRP SCHEME 
 144 
Section 3 - Please evaluate your income and performance in comparison to other employees  
(for each of the following statements, please circle the number that best reflects your opinion). 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
20 In comparison with other groups of employees in 
the Trust my pay is fair 
13.73 31.00 17.21 35.82 2.24 676 
21 I am suitably paid in relation to my  
qualifications within the Trust 
14.82 41.73 9.62 31.35 2.48 675 
22 My performance is always well above that  
of other colleagues doing similar work. 
1.36 16.79 42.49 28.87 10.49 672 
23 The 1996 pay award was fair to your staff group 15.19 30.24 18.72 32.53 3.31 676 
 
Section 4 - We should now like to ask your views about the principle of linking pay to performance  
(for each of the following statements, please circle the number that best reflects your opinion). 
 
Please would you indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statements below: 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
24 Experience (i.e. years in the job) should count more 
towards determining pay levels  
2.52 24.39 5.86 46.85 20.38 681 
25 Pay should take into account different duties 
carried out by staff in the same grade 
1.13 9.91 8.38 62.09 18.48 685 
26 Employees with additional work-related 
qualifications should receive additional pay 
1.38 13.38 11.77 54.16 19.31 683 
27 Individuals should be  paid solely on the basis of 
individual performance 
8.43 37.70 13.28 31.50 9.09 679 
28 Excellent performance should be rewarded by 
additional bonuses in pay 
3.13 7.85 8.32 48.14 32.56 683 
29 Irrespective of work-related qualifications and  
experience, staff should be paid more if their  skills 
are in short supply  
3.16 32.61 21.08 34.52 8.63 676 
30 People should be paid according to national pay 
scales  
4.12 26.98 21.03 37.02 10.84 666 
31 Annual pay rises should be used primarily to  
compensate for rises in the cost of living 
3.58 26.59 11.81 45.17 12.85 677 
32 The principle of relating pay to performance 
is a good one 
9.57 16.57 11.86 50.67 11.32 674 
33 The idea of performance pay is fundamentally  
unfair 
10.74 47.14 14.66 17.54 9.92 671 
34 It is appropriate for staff to be financially rewarded 
when the Trust does well in achieving its goals  
1.43 5.37 8.80 58.28 26.12 684 
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  Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
35 If the Trust were in financial difficulty, it would be 
reasonable for pay increases to be restricted if the 
alternative were job losses  
7.05 21.43 10.47 52.51 8.54 677 
36 Staff should not receive performance increments  
when jobs are having to be cut 
9.23 37.27 14.56 33.08 5.86 676 
 
Section 5 - Whether or not you are covered by the Trust's Performance Pay Scheme , we would now like to ask your 
view of its effects. Please circle the number that best reflects your opinion. 
 
How,  in your experience,  has the Trust's Performance Pay Scheme been working: 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
37 It raises staff awareness of Trust objectives  5.41 30.89 16.87 43.90 2.94 677 
38 It makes staff less willing to assist colleagues  
experiencing work difficulties 
7.33 49.62 17.42 20.16 5.47 670 
39 It causes jealousies between staff 2.91 22.07 13.77 41.49 19.77 678 
40 It is problematic because the type of work done in 
the NHS is hard to measure  
1.20 13.18 9.91 47.92 27.78 673 
41 It has made managers set work targets more clearly  6.65 23.24 17.03 47.94 5.14 671 
42 It has meant good work is recognised and rewarded 
at last 
11.59 29.53 12.03 37.71 9.14 668 
43 Managers use the scheme to reward their 
favourites  
3.67 27.38 27.61 26.00 15.34 675 
44 It has helped to undermine staff morale  4.10 21.94 22.40 31.65 19.91 673 
45 For all that is said about quality, the Trust's scheme 
is simply a device to get more work done. 
2.29 23.34 19.28 36.23 18.85 676 
46 The Trust's scheme is simply a device to cut the  
pay bill 
3.70 28.14 31.17 23.78 13.21 672 
47 The individual performance targets are a suitable  
basis for  determining performance pay 
7.99 30.63 21.84 36.79 2.76 673 
48 The aims of Trust's scheme were clearly  
communicated prior to implementation 
9.57 25.15 27.85 34.74 2.69 670 
49 The Trust's Performance Pay scheme encourages  
team working 
14.81 49.04 17.71 16.20 2.23 674 
50 The Trust's Performance pay scheme has reduced  
my willingness to co-operate with management 
10.86 45.09 25.14 12.73 6.18 675 
51 The Trust's scheme is a good way to identify  
poor performance 
9.13 26.16 11.57 47.11 6.03 672 
52 The Trust's scheme makes managers more  
willing to deal with poor performance 
9.53 31.73 20.34 35.24 3.15 677 
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  Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
53 It would be better to base Performance Pay on the  
performance of groups of staff than of individuals  
10.47 42.98 15.67 23.89 6.98 674 
54 Performance Pay does not sufficiently reward 
individuals who perform better than others in the 
Trust 
1.56 21.92 21.65 41.89 12.98 678 
55 The current level of the Performance Pay is simply 
a means to encourage staff onto Trust contracts  
1.59 20.41 24.00 37.14 16.85 675 
56 It would be fair for management to award 
Performance Pay to someone who has been loyal 
and hardworking but has not performed well in 
their job. 
7.14 47.12 23.24 19.39 3.11 666 
57 Part-time staff lose out under Performance Pay 4.09 33.55 41.90 15.22 5.25 673 
58 The amount of money an individual gets from  
Performance Pay should be substantially increased 
1.77 21.46 31.91 33.29 11.56 674 
59 It is right to award some performance pay as an  
unconsolidated  lump sum bonus 
4.69 16.40 26.39 44.97 7.54 673 
60 Employees from ethnic minorities lose out  
under Performance Pay 
21.28 37.66 34.12 4.83 2.12 681 
 
Section 6  If you are currently on a TRUST contract we would like you to answer the following questions about your 
personal experiences with the Performance Pay Scheme. Please circle the number that best reflects your opinion. If you 
are on a WHITLEY contract please go directly to Section 7 below.  
  
  Strongly 
Disagree % 
Disagree 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
61 The Trust's Performance Pay Scheme has made  
me more aware of the targets of the Trust. 
5.98 35.48 15.54 39.20 3.80 481 
62 I was already aware of the targets of the Trust 2.20 28.80 19.71 43.38 5.91 478 
63 Performance Pay has made me identify with 
the goals of the Trust 
5.36 36.50 24.14 31.51 2.49 480 
64 Performance Pay has made me feel more positive 
about working for the Trust 
10.48 39.45 20.18 26.81 3.08 483 
65 Performance Pay has made me feel that I am part 
of a successful organisation 
11.26 40.39 20.62 25.42 2.31 479 
66 Performance Pay has given me an incentive 
to  work beyond the requirements of the job 
11.34 45.41 11.28 27.67 4.31 483 
67 Performance Pay now gives proper recognition 
to occupational skills  
9.87 35.65 18.80 32.53 3.16 482 
68 Performance Pay has given me an incentive  
to be more sensitive to the needs of patients  
20.91 44.20 23.37 10.87 0.65 481 
69 Performance Pay has made me more aware  
of the importance of being sensitive to my 
colleagues  
18.23 47.78 17.84 15.04 1.10 483 
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  Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
70 Performance Pay has given me the incentive 
to get my work priorities right 
14.81 41.95 12.77 29.01 1.46 483 
71 Performance Pay has made me want to show  
more initiative in my job 
13.91 38.66 9.83 34.89 2.70 483 
72 Performance Pay has made me more effective  
in my dealings with other colleagues  
14.58 48.76 18.02 17.36 1.28 483 
73 My performance award under the scheme has been 
a fair reflection of my performance 
14.10 24.22 17.84 39.74 4.09 482 
74 My managers can be trusted to identify poor 
performance 
10.36 28.40 18.43 39.79 3.02 480 
75 Managers know enough about the jobs of their 
staff to identify poor performance 
14.37 26.67 14.39 41.48 3.09 480 
 
Section 7. Whether you are on a Trust or a Whitley contract, we should like some reactions to your latest Individual 
Performance and Development Review (IPDR)  (as before, please circle the number that best reflects your opinion). 
 
    Yes No  Total  
76 Have you had an IPDR in the last year?    91.55 8.45  607 
        
  Strong
ly 
Disagr
ee % 
Disagr
ee 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strong
ly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replie
s 
77 In the last year, I had sufficient opportunity to 
discuss and clarify my job contribution profile with 
my manager 
9.51 22.03 6.62 55.30 6.54 652 
78 In the last year, I had sufficient opportunity to 
identify objectives with my manager 
7.36 19.29 7.80 58.82 6.73 650 
79 In the last year, I have had sufficient opportunity 
to discuss my training and personal development 
requirements with my manager 
9.43 22.75 8.20 53.74 5.88 650 
80 In the last year, I have had sufficient opportunity 
to  discuss my performance with my manager 
9.11 23.03 9.21 53.05 5.59 644 
81 I  had sufficient time to prepare for my IPDR 
meetings 
9.23 18.38 9.56 56.84 6.00 648 
82 My manager was well prepared in my IPDR 
meetings 
10.23 21.38 13.32 48.55 6.52 646 
83 My IPDR meetings were useful 12.11 23.95 14.25 44.49 5.19 646 
84 I understand why I was awarded my most recent 
IPDR performance rating 
8.87 12.32 12.88 58.23 7.71 647 
85 My most recent performance rating was a fair 
reflection  of my performance 
12.56 20.33 11.83 49.30 5.98 645 
86 I know what I have to do to get a good / superior/ 
excellent performance rating in the future  
11.46 20.39 13.28 47.34 7.53 649 
NHS Hopital Trust A:  INDIVIDUAL PRP SCHEME 
 148 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
87 I am personally capable of doing what is necessary 
to get a good/superior/excellent performance rating 
in the future  
1.97 5.12 8.44 59.19 25.29 654 
88 The personal satisfaction I derive from my work  
is sufficient incentive for me to do what is needed  
to get a good/superior/excellent performance rating 
3.51 12.04 9.58 54.48 20.39 657 
89 Even if my performance is good enough to merit a 
good/superior/excellent/ performance rating, I 
doubt that I will be given one 
6.39 33.60 13.73 22.96 23.32 652 
90 The nature of my present job makes it very hard  
for me to get a good/superior/excellent  
performance rating 
7.00 42.90 14.66 22.67 12.76 651 
91 Staff are frequently denied the performance rating 
they deserve because there is a quota system of 
performance ratings 
4.72 16.04 22.73 29.76 26.74 651 
92 The grandparent system ensures a fair means to 
appeal against a poor performance rating 
12.90 21.34 28.94 32.74 4.08 653 
  
Section 8  If there are any further points you would like to make please do so in the space provided. We would be 
particularly interested to hear your views on the following issues: 
 
why you decided to move to a Trust contract or remain on Whitley terms and conditions; 
what you find good about or difficult with the IPDR Process; 
The contribution the IPDR makes in achieving the objectives of your department. 
 
Section 9. Now we should like to know something about your general attitudes to your Trust Hospital.  
Please circle the number that best reflects your opinion. 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
93 I feel 'part of the family' in this Trust 11.07 33.83 24.66 27.62 2.82 671 
94 I would be very happy to spend the rest of my 
career in this hospital 
10.93 24.30 21.54 36.80 6.42 668 
95 I do not feel 'emotionally attached' to the hospital 5.86 32.64 18.57 34.65 8.28 667 
96 I think that I could easily become as attached to  
another organisation as this hospital 
3.04 14.30 25.74 48.95 7.98 668 
97 I feel a strong sense of commitment to the hospital 5.05 20.74 20.10 46.11 8.00 672 
98 Whenever changes are made in this hospital  
employees usually lose out in the end 
2.64 20.39 29.19 32.55 15.23 672 
99 Working in the Trust means a great deal to me  8.53 25.08 37.41 24.47 4.51 665 
100 I have confidence and trust in my fellow staff 4.48 12.36 17.35 54.36 11.45 673 
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Section 10.  Finally we would like some personal information. We would stress here again that this is purely for 
research purposes. All replies will remain confidential  and anonymous.  
 
      Total  
Replies 
101 Are you Male 13.99 Female 86.01 678 
102 Do you work Full Time 67.91 Part Time 32.09 678 
103 What is your age <21 0.31  
  21-30 21.38  
  31-40 30.03  
  41-50 31.29 636 
  51-60 14.94  
  >60 2.04  
     
104 To which staff group do you belong? Ancillary 6.24  
  Admin. and Clerical 20.24  
  Maintenance 3.50  
  Nursing & Midwifery 46.42 657 
  Professional, Tech. & Scientific 16.13  
  Senior Managers 7.46  
     
105 How long have you worked this group  (years) <1 11.72  
  1-2 9.74  
  3-5 21.46 657 
  6-10 26.18  
  > 10 30.90  
     
106 How long have you worked in the NHS <1 6.54  
  1-2 6.24  
  3-5 15.01 673 
  6-10 23.18  
  > 10 49.03  
     
107 How long have you worked at Trust B <5 11.30  
 (years - including prior to Trust status) 5-9 9.94  
  10-14 23.49 664 
  15-19 31.33  
  20-24 23.95  
     
108 On which type of contract are you currently 
employed ?  
Trust 73.32 Whitley 26.68 674 
 
 
What was your latest Performance Review rating ?  excellent   3.50  
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109 
  superior   21.48  
  good   65.47 614 
  acceptable   9.54  
  poor   0.00  
110 Are you a member of a trade union or professional 
association ? 
Yes 68.24 No 31.76 678 
111 Was your last job with a private sector employer ?  Yes 33.07 No 66.93 649 
   
     
  Additional Section for Managers rating staff for the Performance Pay. 
 
Section 11 - If you have had to rate the performance of staff for the purposes of the Trust's Performance Pay Scheme 
we should like to ask you some additional questions. Please circle the number that best reflects your opinion. 
 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree No 
View 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Total  
Replies 
112 Performance Pay has made staff more aware of  
the goals of the Trust 
7.30 32.94 14.01 41.13 4.61 332 
113 The existence of the Performance Pay has caused  
many of the staff to work beyond the 
requirements of their job 
4.64 33.30 13.30 39.89 8.86 331 
114 It has reduced the willingness of many of the staff  
to  co-operate with management 
4.06 45.35 20.44 24.05 6.11 329 
115 It has led to many of the staff giving sustained 
high performance at work 
7.92 43.85 18.24 27.78 2.21 327 
116 It has helped to increase the quality of the work  
of many of the staff 
8.00 39.43 13.66 35.37 3.55 329 
117 It has led to an increase in the quantity of work  
many of the staff do 
4.68 32.20 11.32 40.71 11.09 329 
118 It has made many of the staff more committed to  
their work 
9.02 51.23 16.39 20.88 2.47 329 
119 It has made it easier for me to deal with  
poor performance 
8.20 34.08 16.50 37.30 3.91 325 
120 The system of Performance Pay has led me to  
take more work home 
4.70 28.82 16.31 32.36 17.80 327 
121 Performance Pay is a bad idea because not 
enough staff have sufficient control over their 
work to change their ways 
6.14 29.93 22.65 27.78 13.51 327 
122 Performance Pay has caused jealousies between 
staff on Trust and Whitley contracts  
4.27 22.73 18.46 31.56 22.98 330 
 
 
Thank you for your co-operation. We would now like you to seal the completed Questionnaire in the envelope 
provided and return it to us. 
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4. NHS Trust Hospital B: Group PRP scheme. 
Section 1 -  We should like to ask what you like about your job, and working in your hospital  
(for each of the following statements, please circle the number that best reflects your opinion). 
I originally chose a career in the health service because: 
  Strongly 
Disagree 
% 
Disagree 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
1 it gave me the opportunity to help people  0.6 2.6 11.4 50.0 35.4 898 
2 I am interested in health care  0.6 2.2 11.7 48.4 37.1 890 
3 it offered good pay opportunities  15.7 36.3 21.0 24.7 2.3 877 
4 it offered job security 3.8 15.3 16.2 50.5 14.1 884 
5 it offered me the chance to work part time  18.2 14.0 37.7 20.8 9.2 865 
6 it offered me the chance to work shifts  18.2 18.6 39.9 18.6 4.8 858 
7 the NHS provides an important public service 1.1 1.8 8.2 50.2 38.6 879 
8 I needed a job at the time  24.5 17.7 16.1 27.9 14.0 853 
 
Section 2 - We should like to ask you about the aspects of your current work that you value most. 
 Again, for each of the following statements please circle the number that best reflects your opinion. 
 
The following issues are important to me in my job : 
  Strongl
y 
Disagre
e % 
Disagre
e 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongl
y Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
9 Job Security 2.2 4.8 5.1 42.9 45.2 910 
10 My level of income 3.1 6.9 5.8 51.3 32.9 901 
11 Interest in health care  0.1 2.0 11.3 55.4 31.2 897 
12 Flexible working time 7.0 14.0 24.7 39.8 14.5 887 
13 Opportunity to exercise responsibility 1.1 5.5 12.3 59.1 22.0 897 
14 Opportunity to work on my own initiative 1.3 3.7 5.7 58.4 30.9 900 
15 Varied and interesting work 0.6 3.0 6.7 55.2 34.4 897 
16 Opportunities for further training 3.3 11.8 13.4 49.2 22.3 889 
17 Relationship with colleagues and manager(s) 1.0 4.6 11.8 58.9 23.7 893 
18 Team work and co-operation 1.9 5.2 8.9 52.3 31.8 888 
19 Staff Benefits (e.g. childcare provision) 8.0 12.5 41.6 26.7 11.1 835 
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Section 3 - Please evaluate your income and performance in comparison to other employees  
(for each of the following statements, please circle the number that best reflects your opinion). 
 
  Strongl
y 
Disagre
e % 
Disagre
e 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongl
y Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
20 In comparison with other groups of employees in 
the Trust my pay is fair 
14.0 33.4 13.7 35.2 3.6 897 
21 I am suitably paid in relation to my  
qualifications within the Trust 
16.1 37.1 11.7 32.1 3.1 896 
22 My performance is always well above that  
of other colleagues doing similar work. 
2.5 17.6 43.1 27.0 9.9 893 
 
Section 4 - We should now like to ask your views about the principle of linking pay to performance  
(for each of the following statements, please circle the number that best reflects your opinion). 
 
Please would you indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statements below: 
  Strongl
y 
Disagre
e % 
Disagre
e 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongl
y Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
23 Experience (i.e. years in the job) should count more 
towards determining pay levels  
2.5 18.0 5.5 51.5 22.5 911 
24 Pay should take into account different duties 
carried out by staff in the same grade 
2.0 14.3 7.4 52.8 23.6 905 
25 Employees with additional work-related 
qualifications should receive additional pay 
2.0 16.4 14.3 47.6 19.9 905 
26 Individuals should be  paid solely on the basis of 
individual performance 
10.2 45.3 18.1 20.7 5.8 902 
27 Excellent performance should be rewarded by 
additional bonuses in pay 
4.6 15.4 9.4 47.4 23.2 905 
28 Irrespective of work-related qualifications and  
experience, staff should be paid more if their  skills 
are in short supply  
5.1 34.2 21.2 30.1 9.5 898 
29 People should be paid according to national pay 
scales  
1.9 14.4 16.6 43.2 23.9 898 
30 Annual pay rises should be used primarily to  
compensate for rises in the cost of living 
3.3 17.7 8.1 50.0 20.8 898 
31 The principle of relating pay to performance 
is a good one 
8.9 21.6 17.6 43.8 8.2 900 
32 The idea of performance pay is fundamentally  
unfair 
7.8 38.8 23.0 21.0 9.5 895 
33 It is appropriate for staff to be financially rewarded 
when the Trust does well in achieving its goals  
2.9 7.4 9.4 48.8 31.6 896 
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  Strongl
y 
Disagre
e % 
Disagre
e 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongl
y Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
34 If the Trust were in financial difficulty, it would be 
reasonable for pay increases to be restricted if the 
alternative were job losses  
9.4 21.8 9.7 52.3 6.8 907 
35 Staff should not receive performance increments  
when jobs are having to be cut 
7.0 27.3 15.7 40.5 9.5 902 
 
Section 5 - Whether or not you are covered by the Trust's Performance Bonus Scheme , we would now 
like to ask your view of its effects. Please circle the number that best reflects your opinion. 
 
How,  in your experience,  has the Trust's Performance Bonus Scheme been working: 
  Strongl
y 
Disagre
e % 
Disagre
e 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongl
y Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
36 It raises staff awareness of Trust objectives  8.4 32.5 22.2 34.9 2.1 898 
37 It makes staff less willing to assist colleagues  
experiencing work difficulties 
7.9 47.8 25.4 15.2 3.7 900 
38 It causes jealousies between staff 3.9 28.0 17.2 36.5 14.5 897 
49 It is problematic because the type of work done in 
the NHS is hard to measure  
0.9 9.9 16.4 51.2 21.8 899 
40 It has made managers set work targets mo re clearly 8.1 30.1 31.4 28.0 2.6 901 
41 It has meant good work is recognised and rewarded 
at last 
12.8 34.6 18.1 27.4 7.0 900 
42 Managers use the scheme to reward their 
favourites  
8.7 30.1 34.4 17.9 9.0 900 
43 It has helped to undermine staff morale  4.8 21.6 26.4 29.5 17.7 898 
44 For all that is said about quality, the Trust's scheme 
is simply a device to get more work done. 
3.2 20.8 25.7 33.7 16.4 901 
45 The Trust's scheme is simply a device to cut the  
pay bill 
2.3 17.2 32.3 30.8 17.5 903 
46 The performance targets of the Trust are a suitable 
basis for determining performance pay 
8.2 26.6 39.8 23.4 2.0 899 
47 The aims of Trust's scheme were clearly  
communicated prior to implementation 
13.5 36.7 29.8 18.2 1.8 897 
48 The Trust's Performance Pay scheme encourages  
team working 
14.6 46.2 22.7 14.1 2.3 902 
49 The Performance Bonus has reduced my 
willingness to co-operate with management 
9.8 41.8 34.3 9.9 4.2 900 
50 The Trust's scheme is a good way to identify  
poor performance 
10.8 36.1 30.1 20.1 2.9 904 
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  Strongl
y 
Disagre
e % 
Disagre
e 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongl
y Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
51 The Trust's scheme makes managers more  
willing to deal with poor performance 
6.2 32.8 29.8 29.3 2.0 894 
52 The Performance Bonus does not properly reward 
groups/departments which perform better than the 
Trust overall. 
0.4 7.0 30.1 48.8 13.5 896 
53 The Performance Bonus does not sufficiently 
reward individuals who perform better than others 
in the Trust 
0.5 9.6 32.7 45.5 11.8 888 
54 The current level of the Performance Bonus is 
simply a means to encourage staff onto Trust 
contracts  
0.7 8.8 16.6 42.5 31.3 897 
55 Staff with frequent short-term absence due to 
sickness should not receive the full bonus 
7.9 24.7 20.4 36.0 11.0 888 
56 Generally, staff who are dis ciplined should not 
receive the full bonus 
4.9 23.9 27.3 37.5 6.4 891 
57 Staff whose performance is unsatisfactory but have 
not been formally disciplined should not receive 
bonus 
6.2 27.8 29.9 31.3 4.9 891 
58 The amount of money an individual gets from  
Performance Pay should be substantially increased 
3.4 17.2 42.0 26.5 10.8 883 
 
Section 6  If you are currently on a TRUST contract we would like you to answer the following questions 
about your personal experiences with the Performance Bonus Scheme. Please circle the number that best 
reflects your opinion. If you are on a WHITLEY contract please go directly to Section 7 below.  
  
  Strongl
y 
Disagre
e % 
Disagre
e 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongl
y Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
59 The Trust's Performance  Bonus Scheme has made 
me more aware of the targets of the Trust. 
6.9 41.1 18.1 30.6 3.1 509 
60 I was already aware of the targets of the Trust 5.5 36.5 21.2 32.4 4.3 509 
61 The Performance Bonus has made me identify with 
the goals of the Trust 
5.9 39.6 25.2 26.8 2.2 507 
62 The Performance Bonus has made me feel more 
positive about working for the Trust 
8.6 30.7 22.1 34.1 4.5 511 
63 The Performance Bonus has made me feel that I am 
part of a successful organisation 
8.4 27.1 20.4 37.8 6.3 510 
64 I like to receive part of my pay as a lump sum 
bonus 
2.2 11.2 15.4 55.2 16.0 507 
65 The Performance Bonus has given me an incentive 
to work beyond the requirements of the job 
12.4 44.2 21.2 18.9 3.3 509 
66 The Performance Bonus now gives proper 
recognition to occupational skills  
12.1 33.6 31.4 20.4 2.6 506 
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  Strongl
y 
Disagre
e % 
Disagre
e 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongl
y Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
67 The Performance Bonus has given me an incentive 
to be more sensitive to the needs of patients  
20.8 44.3 25.7 7.5 1.8 506 
68 The Performance Bonus has made me more aware  
of the importance of being sensitive to my 
colleagues  
19.2 51.0 17.1 11.1 1.8 504 
69 The Performance Bonus has given me the incentive 
to get my work priorities right 
18.3 46.6 16.7 16.3 2.2 504 
70 The Performance Bonus has made me want to show  
more initiative in my job 
16.9 45.6 18.5 16.7 2.4 504 
71 The Performance Bonus has made me more 
effective in my dealings with other colleagues  
16.8 50.1 21.2 10.3 1.6 505 
72 My managers can be trusted to identify poor 
performance 
15.2 30.7 23.6 26.4 4.1 508 
73 Managers know enough about the jobs of their 
staff to identify poor performance 
19.8 26.6 16.7 32.1 4.8 504 
 
Section 7. Whether you are on a Trust or a Whitley contract, we should now like to ask your  
reactions to your latest Positive Performance Management Review (PPM)  (as before, please circle the 
number that best reflects your opinion). 
 
    Yes No  Total  
74 Have you already had a formal Review (PPM) ?   35.8 64.2  756 
        
  Strong
ly 
Disagr
ee % 
Disagr
ee 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strong
ly 
Agree 
% 
Total  
Replie
s 
75 In the last year, I have had sufficient opportunity 
to discuss and clarify my role with my line manager 
15.8 29.9 8.0 39.4 6.9 875 
76 In the last year, I have had sufficient opportunity 
to identify objectives and targets with my line 
manager 
15.1 30.4 10.9 37.4 6.2 875 
77 In the last year, I have had sufficient opportunity 
to discuss my performance with my line manager 
15.0 32.8 10.4 36.2 5.7 867 
78 In the last year, I have had sufficient opportunity 
to discuss my personal development needs with 
my line manager 
15.0 33.9 9.8 35.1 6.1 869 
79 I am clear about my current job role 6.1 12.4 5.0 62.2 14.2 872 
80 I am clear about my current objectives and targets 7.0 16.9 11.6 52.5 12.0 869 
81 I understand my manager's rating of my 
performance 
13.8 30.8 24.0 25.9 5.5 868 
82 I am clear about my personal development needs 4.1 15.6 12.2 57.1 11.0 871 
83 My most recent review was a fair reflection of my 
performance 
7.8 10.8 42.9 32.1 6.4 812 
84 I am personally capable of doing what is necessary 
to achieve my current objectives and targets  
0.8 2.7 12.6 58.3 25.8 866 
NHS Hopital Trust B:  Group PRP scheme 
 156 
 
  Strongl
y 
Disagre
e % 
Disagre
e 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongl
y Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
85 The personal satisfaction I derive from my work is 
sufficient incentive for me to fulfil my current 
objectives and targets  
6.4 19.6 12.8 47.2 13.9 873 
86 Even if I fulfil my objectives and targets, I doubt 
that I will be given the full bonus 
6.4 21.2 36.3 22.9 13.2 859 
87 The nature of my present job makes it very hard for 
me to meet my objectives and targets  
4.4 37.0 29.0 22.8 6.8 859 
 
  If you have had a discussion with your line manager in the last year about your personal 
performance, please answer the following questions: 
 
  Strongl
y 
Disagre
e % 
Disagre
e 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongl
y Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
88 I found the discussion useful 3.0 9.3 15.5 61.0 11.3 400 
89 I found the discussion threatening 16.1 52.6 18.9 8.4 3.9 380 
90 I found the discussion irrelevant 12.9 51.6 19.7 12.4 3.4 380 
91 I found the discussion superficial 10.7 39.5 20.4 23.8 5.8 382 
 
Þ If you have not had a formal discussion with your line manager in the last year, would you please 
answer the following question: 
 
92 I would have liked the opportunity to review my 
performance with my line manager 
3.6 6.9 20.9 42.8 26.1 449 
  
Section 8  If there are any further points you would like to make please do so in the space provided. 
We would be particularly interested to hear your views on the following issues : 
 
why you decided to move to a Trust contract or remain on Whitley terms and conditions; 
what you find good about or difficult with the PPM Process; 
The contribution the PPM makes in achieving the objectives of your department. 
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Section 9. Now we should like to know something about your general attitudes to your Trust Hospital.  
Please circle the number that best reflects your opinion. 
 
  Strongl
y 
Disagre
e % 
Disagre
e 
 
% 
No 
View 
% 
Agree 
 
% 
Strongl
y Agree 
% 
Total  
Replies 
93 I feel 'part of the family' in this Trust 20.7 38.4 21.1 16.4 3.4 880 
94 I would be very happy to spend the rest of my 
career in this hospital 
10.8 18.0 19.8 41.5 10.0 880 
95 I do not feel 'emotionally attached' to the hospital 6.4 30.6 17.1 37.2 8.7 873 
96 I think that I could easily become as attached to  
another organisation as this hospital 
3.7 16.8 25.6 45.9 7.9 863 
97 I feel a strong sense of commitment to the hospital 8.6 19.4 22.3 39.7 10.0 871 
98 Whenever changes are made in this hospital  
employees usually lose out in the end 
2.9 16.8 25.3 34.9 20.1 870 
99 Working in the Trust means a great deal to me  12.2 23.3 39.1 20.1 5.3 867 
100 I have confidence and trust in my fellow staff 3.9 14.3 17.6 49.5 14.5 873 
 
Section 10.  Finally we would like some personal information. We would stress here again that this is 
purely for research purposes. All replies will remain confidential  and anonymous.  
 
      Total  
Replies 
101 Are you Male 13.7 Female 86.3 877 
102 Do you work Full Time 66.6 Part Time 33.34 869 
103 What is your age <21 1.1  
  21-30 24.7  
  31-40 39.5  
  41-50 25.8 838 
  51-60 8.4  
  >60 0.6  
     
104 To which staff group do you belong? Ancillary 7.9  
  Admin. and Clerical 20.8  
  Maintenance 2.1  
  Nursing & Midwifery 49.1 862 
  Professional, Tech. & Scientific 14.5  
  Senior Managers 5.7  
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105 How long have you worked this group  (years) <1 8.9  
  1-2 4.9  
  3-5 19.6 857 
  6-10 25.4  
  > 10 41.2  
     
106 How long have you worked in the NHS <1 6.2  
  1-2 3.1  
  3-5 15.6 871 
  6-10 22.4  
  > 10 52.7  
     
107 How long have you worked at Trust A  <5 10.0  
 (years - including prior to Trust status) 5-9 5.0  
  10-14 19.5 862 
  15-19 28.4  
  20-24 37.1  
     
108 On which type of contract are you currently 
employed ?  
Trust 53.4 Whitley 46.6 869 
109 If your are on Trust pay, at the last bonus review did 
you receive the following 
Full bonus   87.0  
  Half Bonus due to unsatisfactory 
performance 
1.8  
  No Bonus due to unsatisfactory 
and unacceptable performance 
0.0 454 
  No bonus because of insufficient 
service with the Trust 
11.2  
110 Are you at the top of your pay scale  Yes 52.1 No 47.9 854 
111 Are you on either the Senior Managers' pay scales or 
Trust Grade 13 or above? 
Yes 6.2 No 93.8 794 
112 Are you a member of a trade union or professional 
association ? 
Yes 68.1 No 31.9 858 
113 Was your last job with a private sector employer ?  Yes 30.9 No 69.1 821 
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  Additional Section for Managers rating staff for the Performance Pay. 
 
Section 11 - If you have had to rate the performance of staff for the purposes of the Trust's 
Performance Bonus Scheme we should like to ask you some additional questions. Please circle the 
number that best reflects your opinion. 
 
  Strongl
y 
Disagre
e 
Disagre
e 
No 
View 
Agree Strongl
y Agree 
Total  
Replies 
114 The Performance Bonus has made staff more aware 
of  the goals of the Trust 
12.3 36.4 17.8 30.5 3.0 236 
115 The existence of the Performance Bonus has 
caused  many of the staff to work beyond the 
requirements of their job 
9.8 46.2 23.5 17.1 3.4 234 
116 It has reduced the willingness of many of the staff  
to  co-operate with management 
4.3 38.6 29.6 22.7 4.3 233 
117 It has led to many of the staff giving sustained 
high performance at work 
7.7 47.2 26.2 18.0 0.9 233 
118 It has helped to increase the quality of the work  
of many of the staff 
9.5 48.3 20.3 20.3 1.7 232 
119 It has led to an increase in the quantity of work  
many of the staff do 
6.0 43.1 17.2 25.4 8.6 232 
120 It has made many of the staff more committed to  
their work 
10.8 57.6 18.2 10.0 3.0 231 
121 It has helped me clarify staff roles and set goals  12.5 37.5 21.1 26.7 1.7 232 
122 It has made it easier for me to deal with  
poor performance 
10.9 35.8 30.1 20.5 2.6 229 
123 The system of The Performance Bonus has led me 
to take more work home 
10.5 51.5 26.2 9.6 1.7 229 
124 The Performance Bonus is a bad idea because not 
enough staff have sufficient control over their work 
to change their ways 
7.4 19.5 29.0 28.1 15.6 231 
 
 
Thank you for your co-operation. We would now like you to seal the completed Questionnaire in the 
envelope provided and return it to  
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5. Head Teachers: NAHT, mainly primary schools 
 
Section 1. First of all we should like to ask what you value in your job 
  Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree No view Agree Agree 
strongly 
Total 
replies 
§1. The following issues are important to me in my  current job : 
 
1 Job security 0.3 4.1 5.5 46.7 43.4 1069 
2 My level of income 0.7 5.4 6.8 56.9 30.1 1070 
3 Contributing to an important public 
service  
0.0 0.7 4.8 45.2 49.2 1068 
4 My pension  0.5 3.3 7.2 43.3 45.7 1067 
5 Opportunities to exercise 
responsibility 
0.1 1.7 7.5 49.2 41.5 1060 
6 Varied and interesting work 0.0 0.8 2.9 37.1 59.1 1067 
7 The opportunity to take early 
retirement 
10.0 17.0 21.8 26.8 24.3 1063 
8 Status 3.8 12.8 35.1 35.6 12.9 1058 
9 Self-esteem 0.8 4.3 13.9 51.5 29.4 1023 
 
Section 2. We should like to ask your views about the principle of linking pay to performance 
Please would you indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statements below :  
  Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree No view Agree Agree 
strongly 
Total 
replies 
10 The principle of relating Heads and 
Deputies’ pay to performance is a 
good one  
24.3 38.8 8.0 26.1 2.8 1059 
11 The idea of Performance Pay for 
Heads and Deputies is fundamentally 
unfair 
9.1 25.9 12.0 29.6 23.4 1061 
12 Experience (i.e. years in the job) 
should count more towards 
determining pay levels 
4.0 26.9 16.4 39.3 13.2 1066 
13 Pay should take more account of the 
different duties carried out by Heads 
and Deputies in different schools 
1.8 7.9 10.8 51.4 28.3 1069 
14 Heads and Deputies should be paid 
solely on the basis of their individual 
performance  
32.6 49.2 8.9 8.0 1.2 1062 
15 Heads and Deputies should be paid 
more when these posts are difficult to 
recruit 
3.9 21.3 20.2 46.5 8.1 1066 
16 Heads and Deputies should continue 
to be paid according to nationally 
determined pay scales 
0.6 8.3 7.9 44.1 39.2 1057 
17 Pay should reflect the demands of the 
post and not the performance of 
individual postholders  
1.6 13.0 10.5 42.8 32.0 1059 
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Section 3 - The criteria established by the School Teachers Review Body (STRB) for determining 
teachersí pay grant Governing Bodies a large degree of  discretion in awarding salary enhancements 
for Heads and Deputies. In this section we would like to establish how this process operates in your 
school and which criteria and indicators are used. 
 Have you received, or do you expect to receive any of the following 
during the year 1996/7 from your school’s Governing Body : 
Yes No Total 
replies 
18 an Annual Salary Statement   61.6 38.4 1057 
19 a Performance Review   31.2 68.8 1047 
 
If you have received a Performance Review for 1996/7, could you please answer the following questions :  
20 Does the Performance Review link targets directly to pay 33.7 66.6 356 
 How have the targets been set ?     
21 I agreed the targets with my school’s Governing Body 75.8 24.2 302 
22 I was consulted over the choice of targets by the Governing Body 68.9 31.1 286 
23 I advised the Governing Body on the appropriate criteria 74.9 25.1 299 
24 My school’s Governing Body  used its own school-related criteria 35.5 64.5 279 
25 My school’s Governing Body  consulted other teachers on appropriate 
criteria  
6.8 93.2 278 
26 The Governing Body follows recommendations from the LEA 56.4 43.6 291 
27 No explicit criteria were used   22.9 77.1 258 
 
Which of the following criteria are in the School’s Pay Policy for awarding enhancements to pay :  
28 The responsibility of the post   86.5 13.5 709 
29 The social, economic and cultural background of the pupils 38.7 61.3 654 
30 The difficulty of filling the post  40.1 59.9 651 
31 Sustained high performance in the post   60.4 39.6 676 
32 Does the Pay policy contain other criteria to determine Heads’ and Deputies’ 
pay 
21.2 79.0 647 
 
In assessing the performance of the Head and Deputy/Deputies for 1996/7, which of the following criteria 
will be used by the Governing Body : 
Objective criteria 
 
33 School Development Plan   79.1 20.9 659 
34 Progress in implementing an Ofsted action plan 63.8 36.2 632 
35 Evidence of sound financial management  73.7 26.3 636 
36 School examination/test results  31.3 68.7 607 
37 School absence rates    14.5 85.5 595 
38 Other objective criteria    28.3 71.7 441 
          
Subjective  criteria 
 
39 Their personal judgement of my performance   75.2 24.8 653 
40 Their personal judgement of the school’s performance 71.3 28.7 638 
 
In the previous review of your pay (for 1995/6) were you informed of the following in accordance with Para 3 
of the Document :  
41 Did the Governing Body inform you, in writing, of your position on the pay 
scale 
54.2 45.8 914 
42 Were you informed by the Governing Body of the basis on which your pay 
had been determined? 
45.5 54.5 907 
43 Did the Governing Body inform you of the grounds for future reviews ? 23.4 76.6 907 
44 Was your performance formally reviewed ?  23.5 76.5 910 
45 Was this linked to performance appraisal ?   4.5 95.5 888 
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Section 4  We would now like to ask your views of about the practice of enhancing salary at school level 
  Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree No view Agree Agree 
strongly 
Total 
replies 
Salary enhancements based on performance for Heads and 
Deputies: 
46 cause resentment among teaching staff 1.8 16.4 23.8 45.1 12.9 1042 
47 are problematic because it is hard to link the work 
done in schools to individual performance  
0.8 11.1 6.1 54.9 27.1 1045 
48 have made the Governing Body think more clearly 
about the School Development Plan  
7.1 27.3 29.9 30.8 4.9 1025 
49 mean that good work is recognised and rewarded at 
last 
8.0 25.9 28.2 32.8 5.2 1029 
50 are simply a device to get more work done.  7.0 32.1 34.8 20.2 5.9 1025 
51 undermine team working in the school.  3.4 23.4 22.6 34.8 15.9 1033 
52 Individual performance objectives for Heads and 
Deputies are a suitable basis for awarding 
enhancements. 
11.7 40.9 16.9 28.7 1.7 1029 
53 It would be better to reward the whole school for its 
performance rather than Heads and Deputies 
2.0 20.2 12.5 47.6 17.7 1043 
54 It is wrong to award Heads and Deputies 
enhancements for high performance when there aren’t 
appropriate criteria to award classroom teachers 
through excellence points 
1.9 13.0 8.6 51.8 24.6 1044 
55 It would be fair for the Governing Body to award a 
pay enhancement to a Head or Deputy just to retain 
her/him  
8.3 31.7 19.1 37.1 3.8 1041 
56 The money available for enhancements associated 
with sustained high performance should be 
substantially increased  
4.2 16.8 26.2 32.7 20.1 1034 
57 If a school’s budget is tight, it would be right for 
Heads and Deputies to go without enhancements even 
if their performance merited such an award  
18.4 31.6 10.4 30.1 9.5 1039 
Section 5  We would like you to answer the following questions about your personal experiences with your pay. 
Linking my performance to my pay  has :  
 
58 made me more aware of the comparative performance 
of my school.  
11.2 38.7 26.2 21.9 1.9 875 
59 given me an added incentive to work beyond the 
requirements of the job 
26.1 47.8 17.9 6.6 1.5 875 
60 reduced my wish to co-operate with the Governing 
Body 
21.5 45.4 26.4 4.7 2.0 864 
61 helped me clarify my work priorities  16.1 40.4 24.3 17.6 1.5 863 
62 given me an incentive me to show more initiative in 
my job  
22.1 46.3 22.8 7.4 1.3 867 
63 has caused me greater stress in my job  7.9 27.9 27.9 24.9 11.3 870 
64 had no effect on the quality of my work because it 
was already at the appropriate standard 
1.6 7.0 22.8 42.1 26.5 874 
65 I do not understand how the Governors in my school 
determine the award of enhancements   
16.7 39.4 21.2 16.5 6.3 930 
66 My Governing Body provide me with the support I 
need to perform well in the post 
5.8 17.1 10.5 46.8 19.8 983 
67 I am paid enough for my current responsibilities 24.4 42.2 10.6 19.4 3.3 988 
68 The Governing Body know enough about my job to 
identify good performance  
17.3 38.3 7.4 30.9 6.1 1017 
69 The LEA has provided information on pay trends in 
the local area. 
16.4 28.9 12.8 36.1 5.8 1002 
70 LEA advice has helped the Governors set fair salary 
levels 
18.9 36.0 21.2 21.8 2.2 997 
71 It is hard to justify an enhancement for myself, when 
there are no resources available to determine 
excellence points for classroom teachers. 
3.0 13.9 8.4 39.9 34.8 1015 
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Section 6. We should like to ask you some questions about your meetings with the Governing Body last year over  
pay enhancements 
  Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree No view Agree Agree 
strongly 
Total 
replies 
72 Throughout the last year, I had sufficient opportunity 
to discuss my performance with my Governing Body 
17.3 34.1 10.6 32.2 5.8 998 
73 I understand the Governing Body’s decision regarding 
my pay 
6.4 11.2 16.9 55.1 10.4 971 
74 The decision represents a fair reflection of my 
performance 
12.1 21.2 25.7 34.6 6.4 944 
75 If I were dissatisfied with the Governors’ decision, 
procedures exist to allow me to appeal  
7.5 16.5 18.8 48.9 8.4 959 
76 I know what I have to do to get an enhancement based 
on my performance in the future 
15.1 30.7 23.9 26.2 4.1 954 
77 I am personally capable of getting an enhancement 
based on my performance in the future 
7.3 15.8 29.2 37.2 10.5 945 
78 Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt if the 
school can afford to reward me with an enhancement 
2.6 11.7 8.3 33.3 44.1 986 
79 Even if my performance is good enough, I doubt if the 
Governors’ pay policy will permit performance 
related pay 
4.1 26.2 21.3 30.2 18.2 962 
80 I feel pressurised into accepting performance targets 
set by the Governors without discussion. 
23.9 39.9 24.3 6.6 5.3 955 
Section 7. Now we should like to know something about your general attitudes, first to the school in which you 
work and then to working in education as a whole.  
81 I feel 'part of the family' in my current school 0.7 4.0 3.2 41.1 51.0 1069 
82 I feel a strong sense of commitment to my school 0.3 0.3 0.7 26.9 71.8 1074 
83 I am very happy working here 0.9 5.0 4.8 42.6 46.7 1071 
84 I do not feel 'emotionally attached' to the school 36.0 42.9 6.0 9.9 5.3 1065 
85 I think that I could easily become as attached to 
another organisation as this school 
6.3 23.8 19.8 40.6 9.5 1066 
86 I would be happy to spend the rest of my career in 
education 
5.3 14.8 7.4 44.8 27.7 1042 
87 I always show goodwill to complete an urgent task 0.1 3.4 3.0 52.4 41.1 1045 
88 I keep myself well-informed and undertake training 
when I think this may benefit the school 
0.1 0.4 1.4 55.0 43.1 1050 
89  Whenever changes are made in education teachers 
usually lose out in the end 
2.4 22.3 15.9 36.4 23.1 1041 
90 Working in education means a great deal to me 1.1 3.6 5.6 49.6 40.2 1042 
91 My performance is always well above that of other 
Heads/Deputies in similar schools.  
1.6 12.8 65.5 15.1 5.1 1027 
92 I have confidence and trust in my colleagues in the 
school  
0.2 3.1 4.8 59.2 32.8 1048 
93 I have confidence and trust in the school's governors 3.2 11.8 11.9 55.5 17.7 1046 
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Section 8  Finally we would like some personal information 
94 Are you (Please circle) Male 53.3 Female 46.7 Total  966 
95 What is your age  <20 years 0.0     
  20-29 0.1     
  30-39 7.4     
  40-49 58.9     
  50-59 32.6     
  >60 1.1     
  Total 100.0 1044    
96 How long have you been a 
Head/Deputy  in this school ? 
<1yr 8.9     
  1-2yrs 6.7     
  3-5yrs 23.0     
  6-10yrs 31.7     
  11-15yrs 16.5     
  16-20yrs 9.1     
  >20 4.0     
  Total 100.0 1072    
97 Is this your first head/ deputy 
headship ? 
Yes 64.0 No 36.0 Total  1050 
98 What is your highest qualification? 
  Cert. Ed.T. Cert. 33.7     
  BA/BSc/BEd. 45.2     
  MA/MSc 20.3     
  PhD 0.8     
  Total 100.0 1053    
99 Is your current school :   
 1 Secondary 6.0     
 2 Middle 5.0     
 3 First 5.8     
 4 Junior 10.4     
 5 Primary 61.9     
 6 Infant 8.4     
 7 Special 0.3     
 8 Mixed school type 2.2     
 9 Sixth form college 0.0     
  Total 100.0 1055    
        
100 1 LEA-Maintained 74.8     
 2 Grant Maintained 4.0     
 3 Independent 0.3     
 4 Voluntary Aided 18.3     
 5 Other 0.3     
 7 Voluntary controlled 2.2     
  Total 100.0 941    
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101 In what kind of community is your school situated? 
 1 Urban 34.5  
 2 Suburban 22.3  
 3 Small town 18.5  
 4 Rural 23.1  
 5 Mixed community 1.6  
  Total 100.0 1031 
     
102 What is the group size of your school   
 1 1 18.2  
 2 2 53.4  
 3 3 19.9  
 4 4 2.0  
 5 5 3.7  
 6 6 1.1  
 7 1S 0.2  
 8 2S 0.3  
 9 3S 0.0  
 10 4S 1.1  
  Total 100.0 1049 
103 What proportion of these receive free school meals ?  
 1 =10% 38.6  
 2 11-20% 21.8  
 3 21-30% 13.1  
 4 31-40% 8.4  
 5 41-50% 7.0  
 6 51-60% 4.6  
 7 61-70% 4.1  
 8 71-80% 1.6  
 9 81-90% 0.6  
 10 91-100% 0.1  
  Total 100.0 981 
104 In which region in which your school is located  ?  
 1 North 5.9  
 2 North West 15.7  
 3 Yorks & Humberside 8.4  
 4 East Midlands 8.0  
 5 West Midlands 10.3  
 6 East Anglia 6.1  
 7 South West 10.2  
 8 Greater London 10.1  
 9 Other South East 14.1  
 10 Wales 4.2  
 11 Northern Ireland 0.0  
 12 Southern 6.7  
 13 Overseas 0.1  
  Total 100.0 1048 
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105 How many enhancements have you received over the last 3 years ?  
  0 40.3   
  1 27.4   
  2 16.5   
  3 9.2   
  4 3.0   
  5 1.6   
  6 1.0   
  7 0.3   
  8 0.1   
  9 0.3   
  10 0.0   
  11 0.0   
  12 0.0   
  13 0.2   
  Total 100.0 987  
106 How many of these were performance-related   
  0 76.0   
  1 12.4   
  2 5.6   
  3 3.4   
  4 1.3   
  5 0.6   
  6 0.3   
  7 0.1   
  8 0.1   
  9 0.1   
  10 0.0   
  11 0.0   
  12 0.0   
  13 0.1   
  Total 100.0 947  
Notes: replies weighted for sample stratification as at 17.9.97 based on Excel file ‘Teacher replies. 
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6. Head and Deputy Head Teachers: SHA, mainly secondary schools 
Section 1. First of all we should like to ask what you value in your job 
  Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree No view Agree Agree 
strongly 
Total 
replies 
The following issues are important to me in my  current job : 
 
1 Job security 0.3 2.3 5.5 44.3 47.6 860 
2 My level of income 0.5 2.7 5.3 61.4 30.1 861 
3 Contributing to an important public 
service  
0.0 0.8 6.7 35.8 56.6 862 
4 My pension  0.3 1.9 7.7 46.2 44.0 860 
5 Opportunities to exercise 
responsibility 
0.2 0.2 2.5 33.4 63.5 864 
6 Varied and interesting work 0.0 0.5 1.4 24.4 73.8 865 
7 The opportunity to take early 
retirement 
12.3 17.9 21.0 29.3 19.5 851 
8 Status 4.3 9.3 28.0 43.6 14.8 858 
9 Self-esteem 1.1 2.1 11.3 44.2 41.4 822 
 
Section 2. We should like to ask your views about the principle of linking pay to performance 
§2. Please would you indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statements below: 
10 The principle of relating Heads and 
Deputies’ pay to performance is a 
good one  
21.0 29.2 7.9 35.6 6.3 859 
11 The idea of Performance Pay for 
Heads and Deputies is fundamentally 
unfair 
14.0 33.5 10.2 24.1 18.2 855 
12 Experience (i.e. years in the job) 
should count more towards 
determining pay levels 
11.8 36.7 18.2 27.0 6.4 859 
13 Pay should take more account of the 
different duties carried out by Heads 
and Deputies in different schools 
2.2 12.8 10.7 52.4 21.9 860 
14 Heads and Deputies should be paid 
solely on the basis of their individual 
performance  
34.3 49.8 7.8 6.4 1.6 859 
15 Heads and Deputies should be paid 
more when these posts are difficult to 
recruit 
6.0 23.8 19.1 45.5 5.6 862 
16 Heads and Deputies should continue 
to be paid according to nationally 
determined pay scales 
1.9 10.2 9.5 43.4 35.0 860 
17 Pay should reflect the demands of the 
post and not the performance of 
individual postholders  
2.7 22.9 11.6 38.8 24.0 853 
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Section 3 - The criteria established by the School Teachers Review Body (STRB) for determining 
teachersí pay grant Governing Bodies a large degree of  discretion in awarding salary enhancements for 
Heads and Deputies. In this section we would like to establish how this process operates in your school 
and which criteria and indicators are used. 
 Have you received, or do you expect to receive any of the following 
during the year 1996/7 from your school’s Governing Body : 
Yes No Total 
replies 
18 an Annual Salary Statement   67.8 32.2 854 
19 a Performance Review   33.2 66.8 846 
If you have received a Performance Review for 1996/7, could you please answer the following questions :  
20 Does the Performance Review link targets directly to pay 28.7 71.3 300 
 How have the targets been set ?     
21 I agreed the targets with my school’s Governing Body 76.6 23.4 265 
22 I was consulted over the choice of targets by the Governing Body 70.9 29.1 254 
23 I advised the Governing Body on the appropriate criteria 72.4 27.6 261 
24 My school’s Governing Body  used its own school-related criteria 43.3 56.7 245 
25 My school’s Governing Body  consulted other teachers on appropriate 
criteria  
10.7 89.3 243 
26 The Governing Body follows recommendations from the LEA 35.2 64.8 250 
27 No explicit criteria were used   20.0 80.0 230 
Which of the following criteria are in the School’s Pay Policy for awarding enhancements to pay : 
28 The responsibility of the post   88.9 11.1 548 
29 The social, economic and cultural background of the pupils 32.8 67.2 506 
30 The difficulty of filling the post  37.2 62.8 505 
31 Sustained high performance in the post   59.4 40.6 520 
32 Does the Pay policy contain other criteria to determine Heads’ and 
Deputies’ pay 
31.0 69.0 504 
In assessing the performance of the Head and Deputy/Deputies for 1996/7, which of the following criteria 
will be used by the Governing Body : 
 Objective criteria      
33 School Development Plan   74.7 25.3 475 
34 Progress in implementing an Ofsted action plan 60.7 39.3 463 
35 Evidence of sound financial management  64.8 35.2 460 
36 School examination/test results  50.3 49.7 457 
37 School absence rates    31.7 68.3 441 
38 Other objective criteria    44.4 55.6 338 
          
 Subjective  criteria      
39 Their personal judgement of my performance   74.2 25.8 674 
40 Their personal judgement of the school’s performance 65.0 35.0 466 
In the previous review of your pay (for 1995/6) were you informed of the following in accordance with Para 3 
of the Document :  
41 Did the Governing Body inform you, in writing, of your position on the pay 
scale 
62.6 37.4 711 
42 Were you informed by the Governing Body of the basis on which your pay 
had been determined? 
41.4 58.6 701 
43 Did the Governing Body inform you of the grounds for future reviews ? 21.5 78.5 698 
44 Was your performance formally reviewed ?  21.5 78.5 697 
45 Was this linked to performance appraisal ?   5.9 94.1 679 
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Section 4  - We would now like to ask your views of about the practice of enhancing salary at school level 
  Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree No view Agree Agree 
strongly 
Total 
replies 
Salary enhancements based on performance for Heads and Deputies:  
46 cause resentment among teaching staff 1.6 11.7 16.4 48.2 21.9 852 
47 are problematic because it is hard to link the work 
done in schools to individual performance  
1.6 13.4 3.5 49.6 31.9 857 
48 have made the Governing Body think more clearly 
about the School Development Plan  
10.7 27.9 32.7 24.4 4.3 835 
49 mean that good work is recognised and rewarded at 
last 
7.8 29.1 23.0 34.9 5.1 842 
50 are simply a device to get more work done.  9.0 37.5 36.3 13.8 3.4 846 
51 undermine team working in the school.  4.7 24.9 16.4 35.2 18.8 850 
52 Individual performance objectives for Heads and 
Deputies are a suitable basis for awarding 
enhancements. 
12.1 41.7 11.2 32.7 2.2 848 
53 It would be better to reward the whole school for its 
performance rather than Heads and Deputies 
3.0 18.9 12.4 45.2 20.5 857 
54 It is wrong to award Heads and Deputies 
enhancements for high performance when there aren’t 
appropriate criteria to award classroom teachers 
through excellence points 
2.5 16.8 5.8 43.1 31.9 852 
55 It would be fair for the Governing Body to award a 
pay enhancement to a Head or Deputy just to retain 
her/him  
12.7 37.4 12.5 33.5 3.9 850 
56 The money available for enhancements associated 
with sustained high performance should be 
substantially increased  
8.6 24.6 24.3 27.2 15.2 846 
57 If a school’s budget is tight, it would be right for 
Heads and Deputies to go without enhancements even 
if their performance merited such an award  
10.0 23.0 12.3 39.7 14.9 851 
Section 5  We would like you to answer the following questions about your personal experiences with 
your pay. 
Linking my performance to my pay  has :  
 
58 made me more aware of the comparative performance 
of my school.  
17.4 36.4 25.6 18.6 2.0 665 
59 given me an added incentive to work beyond the 
requirements of the job 
30.5 44.6 15.1 8.7 1.1 663 
60 reduced my wish to co-operate with the Governing 
Body 
30.7 41.1 24.0 3.0 1.2 662 
61 helped me clarify my work priorities  22.0 34.5 24.1 18.3 1.1 660 
62 given me an incentive me to show more initiative in 
my job  
30.0 37.9 20.8 10.4 0.9 663 
63 has caused me greater stress in my job  16.0 33.5 28.2 18.1 4.2 663 
64 had no effect on the quality of my work because it 
was already at the appropriate standard 
2.4 8.4 25.2 36.2 27.8 663 
65 I do not understand how the Governors in my school 
determine the award of enhancements   
22.1 36.5 18.5 15.9 7.1 737 
66 My Governing Body provide me with the support I 
need to perform well in the post 
5.5 13.9 13.4 44.1 23.2 794 
67 I am paid enough for my current responsibilities 12.8 38.7 11.9 29.2 7.5 799 
68 The Governing Body know enough about my job to 
identify good performance  
15.3 37.6 7.9 34.9 4.2 808 
69 The LEA has provided information on pay trends in 
the local area. 
18.0 26.4 21.6 27.2 6.9 751 
70 LEA advice has helped the Governors set fair salary 
levels 
21.2 29.4 30.4 17.2 1.8 739 
71 It is hard to justify an enhancement for myself, when 
there are no resources available to determine 
excellence points for classroom teachers. 
3.7 13.5 9.9 42.0 30.9 790 
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Section 6. We should like to ask you some questions about your meetings with the Governing Body 
last year over  pay enhancements  
  Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree No view Agree Agree 
strongly 
Total 
replies 
72 Throughout the last year, I had sufficient 
opport unity to discuss my performance with 
my Governing Body 
24.9 27.0 11.8 28.8 7.5 747 
73 I understand the Governing Body’s decision 
regarding my pay 
8.9 11.5 13.5 52.0 14.1 721 
74 The decision represents a fair reflection of my 
performance 
11.3 17.4 29.1 33.1 9.1 701 
75 If I were dissatisfied with the Governors’ 
decision, procedures exist to allow me to 
appeal  
9.3 15.8 17.7 45.1 12.1 708 
76 I know what I have to do to get an 
enhancement based on my performance in the 
future 
17.6 27.8 25.0 24.4 5.2 697 
77 I am personally capable of getting an 
enhancement based on my performance in the 
future 
7.0 13.2 28.7 39.5 11.5 696 
78 Even if my performance is good enough, I 
doubt if the school can afford to reward me 
with an enhancement 
3.9 14.3 13.9 36.2 31.7 726 
79 Even if my performance is good enough, I 
doubt if the Governors’ pay policy will permit 
performance related pay 
7.1 26.6 21.2 27.2 17.9 717 
80 I feel pressurised into accepting performance 
targets set by the Governors without 
discussion. 
33.5 34.1 19.6 7.0 5.8 710 
Section 7. Now we should like to know something about your general attitudes, first to the school in 
which you work and then to working in education as a whole.  
81 I feel 'part of the family' in my current school 1.1 5.1 4.7 46.3 42.8 855 
82 I feel a strong sense of commitment to my 
school 
0.1 0.5 1.2 23.3 75.0 860 
83 I am very happy working here 0.8 4.4 4.4 40.7 49.7 860 
84 I do not feel 'emotionally attached' to the 
school 
40.9 39.2 4.7 11.2 4.1 859 
85 I think that I could easily become as attached 
to another organisation as this school 
6.5 19.6 13.9 48.8 11.1 856 
86 I would be happy to spend the rest of my 
career in education 
1.8 8.6 4.1 47.2 38.3 856 
87 I always show goodwill to complete an urgent 
task 
0.1 2.6 2.0 39.0 56.3 858 
88 I keep myself well-informed and undertake 
training when I think this may benefit the 
school 
0.0 1.2 1.5 49.1 48.2 863 
89  Whenever changes are made in education 
teachers usually lose out in the end 
6.4 38.9 19.5 24.9 10.2 855 
90 Working in education means a great deal to 
me 
0.1 2.5 5.8 44.3 47.3 856 
91 My performance is always well above that of 
other Heads/Deputies in similar schools.  
2.5 10.7 64.0 16.8 6.1 841 
92 I have confidence and trust in my colleagues 
in the school  
0.5 3.3 4.9 66.4 25.0 861 
93 I have confidence and trust in the school's 
governors 
3.1 8.6 15.7 54.7 17.8 859 
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Section 8  Finally we would like some personal information. Replies 
94 Are you (Please circle) Male 68.5 Female  31.5 Total  790 
   % Replies    
95 What is your age  <20 yrs 0.0     
  20-29 0.0     
  30-39 10.7     
  40-49 55.4     
  50-59 33.4     
  >60 0.5     
  Total 100.0 858    
96 How long have you been a 
Head/Deputy  in this school ? 
<1yr 8.9     
  1-2yrs 9.7     
  3-5yrs 25.7     
  6-10yrs 33.1     
  11-15yrs 14.7     
  16-20yrs 6.1     
  >20 1.8     
  Total 100.0 868    
97 Is this your first head/ deputy 
headship ? 
Yes 81.7 No 18.3 Total  856 
98 What is your highest qualification? 
  Cert. Ed.T. Cert. 2.7     
  BA/BSc/BEd. 43.2     
  MA/MSc 49.7     
  PhD 4.5     
  Total 100.0 864    
99 Is your current school :   
 1 Secondary 95.9     
 2 Middle 0.6     
 3 First 0.1     
 4 Junior 0.0     
 5 Primary 0.2     
 6 Infant 0.0     
 7 Special 0.1     
 8 Mixed school type 2.5     
 9 Sixth form college 0.6     
  Total 100.0 856    
        
100 1 LEA-Maintained 60.9     
 2 Grant Maintained 17.8     
 3 Independent 9.2     
 4 Voluntary Aided 9.7     
 5 Other 1.7     
 7 Voluntary controlled 0.6     
  Total 100.0 824    
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101 In what kind of community is your school situated? 
   % Replies 
 1 Urban 35.3  
 2 Suburban 21.8  
 3 Small town 27.2  
 4 Rural 10.6  
 5 Mixed community 5.1  
  Total 100.0 849 
     
102 What is the group size of your school   
 1 1 0.4  
 2 2 0.9  
 3 3 4.4  
 4 4 22.3  
 5 5 52.3  
 6 6 18.4  
 7 1S 0.1  
 8 2S 0.4  
 9 3S 0.5  
 10 4S 0.5  
  Total 100.0 817 
103 What proportion of these receive free school meals ?  
 1 =10% 38.5  
 2 11-20% 26.2  
 3 21-30% 17.2  
 4 31-40% 7.8  
 5 41-50% 4.6  
 6 51-60% 2.3  
 7 61-70% 2.2  
 8 71-80% 0.8  
 9 81-90% 0.4  
 10 91-100% 0.0  
  Total 100.0 743 
104 In which region in which your school is located  ?  
 1 North 7.3  
 2 North West 12.6  
 3 Yorks & Humberside 8.5  
 4 East Midlands 9.2  
 5 West Midlands 10.3  
 6 East Anglia 6.6  
 7 South West 6.8  
 8 Greater London 11.2  
 9 Other South East 16.1  
 10 Wales 5.4  
 11 Northern Ireland 1.5  
 12 Southern 4.1  
 13 Overseas 0.3  
  Total 100.0 863 
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105 How many enhancements have you received over the last 3 years ?  
  0 42.7  
  1 26.9  
  2 16.3  
  3 10.5  
  4 2.0  
  5 0.5  
  6 0.7  
  7 0.1  
  8 0.1  
  9 0.0  
  10 0.0  
  11 0.1  
  12 0.0  
  13 0.0  
  Total 100.0 806 
106 How many of these were performance-related  
  0 78.6  
  1 11.1  
  2 5.6  
  3 2.9  
  4 1.0  
  5 0.3  
  6 0.3  
  7 0.1  
  8 0.0  
  9 0.0  
  10 0.0  
  11 0.0  
  12 0.0  
  13 0.0  
  Total 100.0 782 
 
Notes: unweighted replies as at 20.6.97 based on Excel file ‘Teacher replies unweighted’. 
 
 
 
 
 174 
List of Tables and Figures 
 
Chapter 1 
Figure 1.1 Outline of the 'expectancy' framework ……………………………………………………….3 
Table 1.1  Summary of main replies ……………………………………………………………………..8 
Table 1.2  PRP has led to an increase in the quantity many of the staff do. Line manager views ……..10 
 
Chapter 2 
Table 2.1  Inland Revenue national pay bands 1995/1996 …………………………………………….17 
Table 2.2  Pay awards for pay band D …………………………………………………………………17 
Table 2.3  Analysis of Revenue staff, sample and responserate by Pay Band  ...........................................20 
Table 2.4  Performance assessments in the IR during 1996, and in our sample .........................................21 
Table 2.5  Attitudes to the Principle of Performance Pay ...............................................................................21 
Table 2.6  Staff views on different payment criteria - 1996............................................................................22 
Table 2.7  Staff views of how individual goal setting and appraisal work...................................................23 
Table 2.8  Appraisals and performance targets..................................................................................................24 
Table 2.9  Attitudes to work goals .......................................................................................................................24 
Table 2.10  Staff experiences of their personal PerformanceManagement targets  - 1996 survey...........25 
Table 2.11  PM  and Poor Performance in 1996 ...............................................................................................26 
Table 2.12  The perceived fairness of PM ..........................................................................................................27 
Table 2.13  Do particular groups feel they lose out under PM? .....................................................................29 
Table 2.14  Individual Motivational effects of PM ...........................................................................................31 
Table 2.15  Effects of PM on team-working and cooperation........................................................................31 
Table 2.16  Attitudes to working in the Inland Revenue .................................................................................33 
Table 2.17  Financial incentives and PM............................................................................................................34 
Table 2.18  Views on the scale of rewards by Performance Assessment received .....................................34 
Table 2.19  Line management assessments of whether PM has caused staff to work harder....................35 
 
Chapter 3 
Table 3.1 Management Pay Bands Maxima and Minima 1996/97 ................................................................38 
Table 3.2 Share values allocated in the 1996/7 pay award ..............................................................................40 
Table 3.3 Box markings in our sample compared with the indicative box markings (%) .........................42 
Table 3.4 Attitudes to the Principle of Performance Pay by organisation....................................................43 
Table 3.5 Staff views on different payment criteria ..........................................................................................44 
Table 3.6 Staff views on goal setting..................................................................................................................45 
Table 3.7 Staff views on appraisal.......................................................................................................................46 
Table 3.8 Views on the appropriateness and fairness of PRP .........................................................................47 
Table 3.9 PRP and poor performance .................................................................................................................49 
Table 3.10 The individual motivational effects of PRP...................................................................................50 
Table 3.11 Effects on morale and cooperation..................................................................................................50 
 175 
Table 3.12 Teamworking and PRP......................................................................................................................51 
Table 3.13 Line manager assessments of whether PRP has caused staff to work harder...........................52 
 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.1  Pay Systems in the Inland Revenue and Employment Service....................................................58 
Table 4.2  Employee work priorities by organisation .....................................................................................60 
Table 3.3  Attitudes relating to organisational citizenship ..............................................................................61 
Table 4.4  Attitudes to working in the Revenue and Employment Service ..................................................61 
Table 4.5  Attitudes to the Principle of Performance Pay by organisation...................................................62 
Table 4.6  Staff attitudes to different pay principles.........................................................................................63 
Table 4.7  The perceived fairness of Performance Pay ....................................................................................65 
Table 4.8  Goal setting functions of PRP............................................................................................................67 
Table 4.9  Staff understanding of how the schemes work...............................................................................68 
Table 4.10 Staff views on their ability to obtain performance pay awards...................................................69 
Table 4.11 Effectiveness in dealing with poor performance...........................................................................69 
Table 4.12 Individual motivation and performance pay ..................................................................................71 
Table 4.13 Team-working, cooperation, and performance pay ......................................................................72 
Table 4.14 Effects of performance pay on productivity (line managers’ views).........................................74 
 
Chapter 5 
Table 5.1  Different expected effects of individual and collective PRP schemes .......................................76 
Table 5.2  Main characteristics of the trust hospitals in 1996 .........................................................................77 
Table 5.3  Employment composition in 1996 (per cent)..................................................................................77 
Table 5.4  Performance of the Trusts in terms of NHS league tables 1995/6 ..............................................77 
Table 5.5  Summary of the two schemes ............................................................................................................82 
Table 5.6  Performance pay increases in the two trusts ...................................................................................83 
Table 5.7  Reasons staff joined the NHS (% ‘agreeing’) .................................................................................87 
Table 5.8  What staff value in their present jobs (% ‘agreeing’)....................................................................88 
Table 5.9  Staff views on the principle of Performance Pay ...........................................................................88 
Table 5.10 Staff views on other criteria for pay................................................................................................89 
Table 5.11 Performance pay good in principle (Q 32) by staff group (% agree) ........................................89 
Table 5.12 Comparison of staff views by Trust and Whitley contracts (% ‘agree’)...................................90 
Table 5.13 Awareness of trust objectives...........................................................................................................91 
Table 5.14 Effects of PRP on staff awareness of trust objectives (% ‘agree’).............................................92 
Table 5.15 Feeling part of a successful organisation........................................................................................92 
Table 5.16 Staff views on cost flexibility and performance pay (% ‘agree’)...............................................93 
Table 5.17 ‘Pay or jobs’: views by staff group..................................................................................................94 
Table 5.18 Dealing with poor performance (% agree).....................................................................................95 
Table 5.19 Team working under the two schemes............................................................................................96 
Table 5.20 Staff views of their performance targets and ratings....................................................................97 
 176 
Table 5.21 Opportunity to discuss performance with line managers.............................................................98 
Table 5.22 Impact of performance on work behaviour....................................................................................98 
Table 5.23 Line manager views on the effects of performance pay...............................................................99 
 
Chapter 6 
Table 6.1 Additional spine points for school heads and deputies (all schools)......................................... 105 
Table 6.2 Percentage receiving Annual Salary Statements and Performance Reviews........................... 107 
Table 6.3 Criteria in the school’s pay policy for salary enhancements ...................................................... 107 
Table 6.4 The nature of performance criteria used for the 1996/97 performance review....................... 108 
Table 6.5 Effect of having a performance review on performance criteria used...................................... 109 
Table 6.6 Procedures for setting targets in the 1996/97 Performance review........................................... 109 
Table 6.7 Conduct of the 1995/96 Review...................................................................................................... 109 
Table 6.8 Number of enhancements received over the last 3 years ............................................................ 110 
Table 6.9 Value of current job........................................................................................................................... 111 
Table 6.10 General attitudes to work in education......................................................................................... 111 
Table 6.11 Atmosphere in schools.................................................................................................................... 112 
Table 6.12 Atmosphere in education................................................................................................................ 112 
Table 6.13 Views on the principle of performance pay ................................................................................ 113 
Table 6.14 Views on alternative principles of pay......................................................................................... 113 
Table 6.15 Effect of different factors on support for the principle of performance pay.......................... 114 
Table 6.16 Impact on target setting for heads, deputies and governors ..................................................... 114 
Table 6.17 Fairness of the Governors’ decis ions on performance enhancements.................................... 115 
Table 6.18 Clarity, transparency and equity of awards................................................................................. 116 
Table 6.19 Performance pay and personal motivation .................................................................................. 117 
Table 6.20 Will rewards follow high performance? ...................................................................................... 118 
Table 6.21 Impact on relations with other staff in the school...................................................................... 119 
Table 6.22 Fairness of awarding salary enhancements to Heads and Deputies for good performance 120 
 
Appendix 1 
Table A1  Employment Service: sample information…………………………………………………123 
Table A2  Inland Revenue survey: sample information ………………………………………………124 
Table A3  Comparison of the survey sample with Employment Service figures ……………………..125 
Table A4  Comparison of Inland Revenue staff and the CEP 1996 sample ………………….…….…126 
Table A5  NHS Trust response rate by staff group ………………………………………….….……..127 
Table A6  NHS Trust response rate by gender, contract and employment status ………….…….…....127 
Table A7  Population and sample by gender ……………………………………………..……….…..128 
Table A8  Population and sample by school status …………………………………….………….….128 
Table A9  Salary enhancements for population and sample …………………………..……………...129 
Table A10  Head Teachers and Deputies by age: population and sample…………….………………129 
Table A11  School size group: population and sample ……………………………….………………129 
 177 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
 
This research is part of a comparative project on public service pay reforms in Britain and 
Germany funded by the Anglo-German Foundation, and carried out jointly with Dieter 
Sadowski and Karin Wagner of the IAAEG at the University of Trier.  We wish to thank the 
two NHS hospital trusts, the PCS (formerly PTC) and NAHT and SHA for help with the 
sample and the distribution and processing of the questionnaires, and the Centre for 
Economic Performance for additional financial support.  We also thank all those who gave up 
their time to pilot and complete the questionnaires, and the numerous managers, staff and 
staff representatives for all their comments on our various drafts.  We also wish to thank the 
German and British participants, both practitioners and academics, at the Anglo-German 
Foundation funded conference at the Centre for Economic Performance in December 1996 at 
which we presented our first results.  We should like to thank especially Jim Doran, and Jim 
McAuslan and for their help and detailed criticism of our working papers.  We also wish to 
acknowledge help from management staff at the Inland Revenue.  We also wish to thank 
Alexandra Dawson and Tracie French for their research assistance.  The views expressed in 
this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of any of the above 
organisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
178 
References 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
ACAS (1990) Appraisal Related Pay. ACAS Advisory Booklet no. 14. HMSO, London. 
 
Armstrong M. and Murlis H. (1994) Reward Management: a handbook of remuneration 
strategy and practice, 3rd edition, Kogan Page, London. 
 
Cannell M, and  Wood S. (1992) Incentive pay: impact and evolution. Institute of Personnel 
Management/National Economic Development Office, London. 
 
Dowling B, and Richardson R. (1997) Evaluating performance-related pay for managers in 
the National Health Service. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 
8:3, June, pp. 348-366. 
 
Hamner W. C. (1975) How to ruin motivation with pay. Compensation Review, 7:3, pp. 17-
27. 
 
Kelly J, and Kelly C. (1991) 'Them and us': social psychology and 'the New Industrial 
Relations'. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 29:1, pp. 25-48, March. 
 
Lawler E. E. III. (1971) Pay and organisational effectiveness: a psychological view. 
McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 
Lazear E. (1995) Personnel economics. MIT Press, Cambridge Mass. 
 
Megaw J. (Chair) (1982) Inquiry into Civil Service pay: report. Cmnd 8590, HMSO, London. 
 
Milgrom P, and Roberts J. (1992) Economics, organisation and management. Prentice-Hall, 
New Jersey. 
 
Organ D. (1988) A restatement of the satisfaction-performance hypothesis. Journal of 
Management, 14:4, pp. 547-557. 
 
Thompson M. (1992) Pay and performance: the employer experience. IMS Report No. 218, 
Institute of Manpower Studies, Brighton. 
 
Thompson M. (1993) Pay and performance: the employee experience. IMS Report 218, 
Institute of Manpower Studies, Brighton. 
 
Wyatt (1989) Performance Management Survey 1989 The Wyatt Company, Washington 
D.C. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
179 
Chapter 2 
 
ACAS (1990) Appraisal Related Pay. ACAS Advisory Booklet no. 14. HMSO, London. 
 
Dyne L van, Graham J, and Dienesch R. (1994) Organisational citizenship behavior: 
construct redefinition, measurement, and validation. Academy of Management 
Journal, 37:4, pp. 7565-802. 
 
Efficiency Unit (1988) Improving Management in Government: the Next Steps. Report 
to the Prime Minister by Jenkins K, Caines K, and Jackson A, HMSO, London 
1988. 
 
Inland Revenue (1993). Chairman’s Second Quality Review of Performance Management. 
December 1993. 
 
Latham G, and Locke E. (1979) Goal setting: a motivational technique that works. 
Organisational Dynamics, 8:2, pp. 68-80. 
 
Lawler E. E. III. (1971) Pay and organisational effectiveness: a psychological view. 
McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 
Marsden D. W, and Richardson R. (1992) Motivation and performance related pay in the 
public sector: a case study of the Inland Revenue. Discussion Paper no. 75, Centre for 
Economic Performance, London School of Economics, London. 
 
Marsden D. W, and Richardson R. (1994) Performing for pay? The effects of 'merit pay' on 
motivation in a public service. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 32:2, pp. 243-
262, June. 
 
Mayntz R. (1985) Soziologie der öffentlichen Verwaltung. Müller Juristischer Verlag, 
Heidelberg. (dritte überarbeitete Auflage) 
 
PTC (1996) ‘Whatever happened to a national civil service ?’ PTC Pay Research Brief 1: 
PTC Research & Information Department (November 1996) 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Employment Service - NUCPS Pay Agreement 1994.  
 
Employment Service MPB/APB Pay Agreement 1996/97 
 
French S, and Marsden D. W. (1997) Performance management and performance pay at the 
Inland Revenue: 1996. Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. 
 
IDS (1995), Pay in the public services: review of 1994: prospects for 1995. Incomes Data 
Services, London. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
180 
IDS (1996), Civil Service - Delegated Pay Bargaining in Departments and Agencies.  IDS 
Report 704. Incomes Data Services, London. 
 
IDS (1996), Pay in the public services: review of 1995: prospects for 1996. Incomes Data 
Services, London. 
 
Marsden D. W, and Richardson R. (1992) Motivation and performance related pay in the 
public sector: a case study of the Inland Revenue. Discussion Paper no. 75, Centre for 
Economic Performance, London School of Economics, London. 
 
Marsden D. W, and Richardson R. (1994) Performing for pay? The effects of 'merit pay' on 
motivation in a public service. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 32:2, pp.243-
262, June. 
 
PTC (1996) Whatever happened to a national civil service? Pay and grading in the Civil and 
Public Services following delegated authority on pay matters to individual 
organisations. Research Brief No. 1, November 1996, The Public Services, Tax and 
Commerce Union (PTC), 5, Great Suffolk St., London SE1 0NL. 
 
PTC (1996) - Membership Report 1995. The Public Services, Tax and Commerce Union 
(PTC), 5, Great Suffolk St., London SE1 0NL. 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Carroll M. (1993) Performance-related pay: a comparative study of the Inland Revenue and a 
high street bank. MSc dissertation, Faculty of Technology, UMIST, Manchester, 
October. 
 
French S, and Marsden D. W. (1997) Performance management and performance pay at the 
Inland Revenue: 1996. Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. 
 
IDS (1995), Pay in the public services: review of 1994: prospects for 1995. Incomes Data 
Services, London. 
 
IDS (1996), Pay in the public services: review of 1995: prospects for 1996. Incomes Data 
Services, London. 
 
Kessler I. (1993) Pay determination in the British civil service since 1979. Public 
Administration, 71, Autumn, pp. 323-340. 
 
Marsden D. W, and Richardson R. (1992) Motivation and performance related pay in the 
public sector: a case study of the Inland Revenue. Discussion Paper no. 75, Centre for 
Economic Performance, London School of Economics, London. 
 
Marsden D. W, and Richardson R. (1994) Performing for pay? The effects of 'merit pay' on 
motivation in a public service. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 32:2, pp. 243-
262, June. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
181 
Megaw J. (Chair) (1982) Inquiry into Civil Service pay: report. Cmnd 8590, HMSO, London. 
 
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) (1988) Towards effective performance 
management in the Federal government. US Government Printing Office, 
Washington DC. 
 
Milkovitch G. T, and Wigdor A. K, eds. (1991) Pay for performance: evaluating performance 
appraisal and merit pay. National Academy Press, Washington D.C. 
 
National Audit Office (1989) Manpower planning in the civil service. Cm 398, HMSO, 
London. 
 
PTC (1996) Whatever happened to a national civil service? Pay and grading in the Civil and 
Public Services following delegated authority on pay matters to individual 
organisations. Research Brief No. 1, November 1996, The Public Services, Tax and 
Commerce Union (PTC), 5, Great Suffolk St., London SE1 0NL. 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
NHS (1996) The NHS Performance Guide 1995-96. NHS Executive, Leeds. 
 
RCN (1996) Employment Brief 6/96, Royal College of Nursing. 
 
Financial Times (6.9.95)  Pay concessions swing NHS deal 
 
Review Body for Nursing Staff, Midwives, Health Visitors and Professions Allied to 
Medicine, Twelfth Report on Nursing Staff, Midwives and Health Visitors 1995. Cm 
2762, HMSO, London. 
 
Sheehy P. (1993) Inquiry into police responsibilities and rewards, 2 vols. Cm 2280, HMSO, 
London. 
 
Touche Ross (1993) Inquiry into police responsibilities and rewards. Written evidence from 
the Police Federation of England and Wales to the Inquiry into Police Responsibilities 
and Rewards, Chairman Sir Patrick Sheehy. See Sheehy (1993). 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
Ballou D, and Podgursky M. (1993) Teachers' attitudes toward merit pay: examining 
conventional wisdom. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 47:1, October, pp. 50-
61. 
 
Bevan S, and Stock J. (1991) Staying a head: a survey of head teachers. A report for the 
NAHT, Institute of Manpower Studies, Brighton. 
 
Cannell M, and Wood S. (1992) Incentive pay: evolution and impact. Institute of Personnel 
Management/National Economic Development Office, London. 
 
 
 
 
 
182 
Cascio W. (1991) Applied psychology in personnel management. (4th edn). Prentice-Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 
 
DfEE (1996 a) School teachers’ pay and conditions document 1996, ‘the Document’, 
Department for Education and Employment, London. 
 
DfEE (1996b) School teachers’ pay and conditions employment 1996: circular 4/96. 
Department for Education and Employment, London 
 
National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983) ‘A Nation at Risk’, Government 
Publication Office, Washington D.C. 
 
Ofsted (1996) Review of headteacher and teacher appraisal: summary of evidence. Teacher 
Training Agency, Ofsted. 
 
Ofsted (1996b) The appraisal of teachers 1991-1996, a report from the Office of Her 
Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Schools, ref. HMR/18/96/NS, The Office for Standards 
in Education, London. 
 
SHA (1997) Pay and conditions of employment for heads, deputies and classroom teachers. 
Scosoff’s guidance on the 1997 settlement. 
 
STRB (1992) School teachers’ review body, First report 1992, Cm 1806, HMSO, London. 
 
STRB (1993) School teachers’ review body, Second report 1993, Cm 2151, HMSO, London. 
 
STRB (1994) School teachers’ review body, Third report 1994, Cm 2466, HMSO, London. 
 
STRB (1995) School teachers’ review body, Fourth report 1995, Cm 2765, HMSO, London. 
 
STRB (1996) School teachers’ review body, Fifth report 1996, Cm 3095, HMSO, London. 
 
STRB (1997) School teachers’ review body, Sixth report 1997, Cm 3536, HMSO, London. 
 
Thompson M. (1992) Pay and performance: the employer experience. IMS Report No. 218, 
Institute of Manpower Studies, Brighton. 
 
Trade Union Research Unit (TURU) (1992) Report on performance related pay for the 
National Union of Teachers and the National Association of Schoolmasters and union 
of women teachers. NASUWT/NUT evidence to the 1992 STRB. 
 
Varlaam A, Nuttall D, and Walker A. (1992) What makes teachers tick? a survey of teacher 
morale and motivation. Clare Market Papers No. 4, Centre for Educational Research, 
London School of Economics. 
